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1Chapter I.
The History and Development of the Theory of Responsibility.
It is undoubtedly true that the concept of natural law of
the seventeenth century, which found such favor with Grotius, was
Instrumental in perfecting many of the legal precepts which have
survived to this day. On the other hand, when Bismarck uttered
the famous words, 'Mit juristischen Theorien lasst sich Auswartige
Pclitik nicht treiben' , he pronounced a truth which, however^ para-
doxical it may sound, is of great significance to the student of
International Law. And so, in the problems with which the present
paper is to deal, namely, the international responsibility of a
state for injuries sustained by aliens on account^ of intestine
commotions of various sorts, this fact must be continually kept
in mind, for, here, as elsewhere, the danger of allowing precon-
ceived i eas to prejudice one's verdict should be most carefully
guarded against. It is here, moreover, where many writers have
come to grief, for, failing to remember that international law
is built up of the practice of states, they have allowed themselves
to be led astray, and to interpret facts in terms of their pre-
determined theories. In spite of this fact, however, there can be
not doubt that the early development of the practice which states
observed in regard to aliens was very largely influenced by certain
f •ndaraental theories relative to the respective rights of nationals
and foreigners. Later, too, in the time of great constructive pub-
( (
2licists, from Grotius to Vattel, the political theories of the time
exerted a considerable influence upon these writers and through
them upon the governments themselves. In more recent times, how-
ever, expecially since our political life has divorced itself from
the fallacious concepts of the political theorists of the seventeen!
and eighteenth centuries, the practice of states has heen the sole
index of what is right and what is wrong in its international ex-
istence. It is with the development of these theories with which
the present chapter shall have to do.
There is a striking feature of the whole history of responsibi-
lity which deserves our close attention in as much as it is fundamen
tal to the whole practice of states and has given rise to the con-
flicting views in regard to the matter. It is the question of wheth
er th« responsibility of states for aliens injured in civil commo-
tions is a matter which should be regulated by municipal law or
whether it should be reserved to international jurisprudence alone.
Tne basis for the contentions of the publicists favoring regulation
by municipal law is what they at ley st , believe to be the antiquity
of the law in this regard. Those who favor the rules of inter-
national law rely upon the practice of the last century for sup-
port which, in turn, is based upon the somewhat restricted views
of the early publicists, but which underwent a very complete
transformation. Nor have these questions been confined to theor-
ists alone, but since the time when the question of the responsibil-
ity of states for aliens began to be of importance in international
law, the conflict of laws and of authority has been incessant, for
obviously, if a state is able to settle an embarassing matter by
i*s own jurisprudence, it is likely to choose such a course and to

3deny its liability in international law. On the other hand there
is another point worthy of notice, which opposes th^is view, and
which it would be well to k ep in mind, namely that just as the
condition of aliens improves concomitantly with the amelioration
of the condition of nationals just so much the more is a state
willing to acknowledge its international responsibility. This fact
was brought out by the developments of the 19. century as the dis-
cussion in subsequent chapters will show.
To speak more accurately, therefore, it is with a conflict of
laws with which this paper shall have to do and it shall be our
purpose to endeavor to decide which view is the more rational;
whether responsibility shall be regulated by municipal law or by
international law, and which of the two views is historically the
more correct.
We indicated before that the regulation of responsibility
by municipal law was believed by many to be of greater antiquity
but this view is only partly true. It is fundamental to the dis-
cussion that the principle be here laid down that the question of
responsibility in the sense in which we shall understand it, is
essentially Teutonic in origin and character, and that it proceeded
from the law and custom of the early Germanic tribes. The influence
which classical jurisprudence exerted upon the theory was a tardy
one and does not appear clearly until the time of Grotius, who was
the first to apply the principles of Roman law to this Germanic
system. The early treatment of responsibility for aliens, more-
over, cannot be said to have been distinctly municipal in character,
for in the early Germanic epoch the municipal and international
law in so far as we may speak of an international law at that time

4were bo closely interrelated that the two were not always disting-
uishable from each other. This state of affairs existed up until
the time of Grotius,when the latter really first drew the line of
demarcation, a process which was facilitated "by the fact that
in the development of the theory of responsibility it had assumed
more the aspect of a municipal than an international institution.
But we are anticipating. Let us return to the status of the theory
of responsibility among the early Teutons where it originated, keep-
ing in mind the various relations which have been indicated.
The character of the treatment accorded to aliens among the
Germanic tribes was closely bound up with the peculiar political
organization of these nations. The essential element of Teutonic
political life at that time v/as the clan, an organization of blood
relatives, who lived in intima.te relations of fidelity to each
ether. It is true that these clans were constituent elements of
great nations, but in the earliest tines there was no national
consciousness, and the only binding tie v/as recognized to be that
of blood relationship alone.
Since the whole political life of the clans was based upon
this relationship and since all law proceeded from the former,
anyone without the jurisdictional limits of the clan was a foreign-
er. 1. He was a man without any known kin, one who was born
without the conf irE s of the locality or of the mark; or, in his
capacity as a member of another clan the character of the treat-
ment accorded him may be said to have been essentially one at inter -
1. Wargangus
,
advena, albanus peregrinus etc. In short these are
the terms used cf
.
Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer , 396 1st. ed.

national law. In the earliest tines it is clear that the foreigner
possessed no rights whatever, and, in this respect, had a status
Similar to that of the slave. The freeman alone enjoyed legal
rights. 1. The foreigner could not make any demands upon the
protection and peace of the community in which he happened to be.
As a foreigner, he had no wergeld, and even if compensation could
have "been exacted from his murderer, there would be no relatives
to enforce the demand. Thus the Visigothic law provided that the
murderer of a foreigner was not responsible to any 'atter bot 1
and did not become outlaw. 2. There were exceptions to the rule,
in the case of a foreigner protected by the Gastrecht - right of
hospitality - or by a patron. 3. This state of affairs was change
presently by the growing consciousness of a political life beyond
the mere clan. The first indication of this we find in the Lex
Salica the celebrated code which originated in the early part of
the sixth century. This law provides 4. 'If any one should kill
a native Prank or a barbarian who lives in accordance with the
salic lav/ he shall pay 8000 danarii equaling 200 soldi, for the
crime. 1 This accordingly provides for domiciled aliens only, and
most astonishingly, it puts them on a footing of equality with the
native. The price of a Roman was considerable higher, 300 solidi
being the fine for his murder, 5. This lex is perhaps the oldest
of all and needs no explanation. It indicates, however, that the
foreigner in so far as he was under the laws of the Salic Pranks
had acquired some rights and was no longer in the position of
being completely without the law.
1. Brunner, Grundzuge der Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte , 13 2. Grimm
op. cit., I, 397 3. Brunner, op. cit., 1,277 4. XLIII 1 Lex
Emend, in Kessels, Lex Salica p. 251 5. ibid. 260

6Similarly to this law that of the Ripuarian Pranks provided
l a that if a Ripuarian kill a foreign Frank, that he shall he fined
200 solidos. The price for a Burgundian was 80 solidos, for an
allamanni or Frisian, a Bogian or Saxon 160 solidis, but the Roman
husse was only 100 solidi. 2. Evidently the Romans were falling
in value
.
Similar to the law of the Riparians was that contained in the
edict of Rotharius for the Langobardians . This code, which is
dated at 644 A.D. provided as follows for aliens. 3.
Ozone unaregang - foreigners - qui de exteras fines in
regni nostri finibus advenerint , signe sub scuti
potestatis nostrae subdederint, legibus langobardum
vivere deb e ant , nisi si alicun legem ad pietatem nos-
tram meruerint . . .
'
No provision was made at that time hov/ever for injuries or pre-
judice sustained by foreigners. 4.
In this point the laws of the Anglo-Saxons of approximately
the same date are more specific. In the laws of Iifle 5. which are
dated 688-95 but which certainly embody practice which is much
older than the date of codification it is provided that ! if anyone
icill a foreigner, then the king receives two parts of the wergeld
and the third part goes to the son or to the relatives. 1 And
again 6. 'if the murdered, man is without kin, then half belongs to
the ing and half to the Gilde 1 . But 7. 'if it should be an abbot
or abbess - v/ho protect the man - then they may in the same manner
1. Solun, Lex Ribuaria, p. 36 2. Lex Baiuwariorum, also Mon. Hist.
(Sarin. LLIII, p. 294. This refers to travelling aliens.
3
#
Bluhme , Edictus ceteraeque Langobardorum Leges, p. 68, 367
4. This lav; is remarkable in that it provides that legit {mate off-
spring of aliens may inherit. 5. Libernautff Gest'te der Angelsachsei
1,199 Ine li23 6. ibid. 23 , 1 7. ibid. 23, 2

7share the Wergeld with the King. 1
These provisions are perhaps the most complete of the earlier
laws In regard to foreigners. As has already been indicated, they
are of greater antiquity than the date would lead one to suppose
and It may he suggested, more free from the influence of Roman
jurisprudence than the continental codes, although in respect to
aliens the leges of the Teutons certainly hear little or no in-
dication of Roman influence. Up to this period in the history of
law, the clan relation was the predominating factor in political
life, but from now on the central organization gradually becomes
more perfect and the general law codes which are promulgated are
of considerably more significance, nevertheless, the clan relation
although succeeded by the national organisation continues with
unabated vigor within the land itself and still bears the charac-
. gristles of international relation which marked its } revious ex-
istence
.
While in the meantime the political organization of the Pranks
and other Germanic nations was perfecting itself, and on the con-
tinent the law became more fixed, chiefly under the guidance of
the Merovingian kings who certainly introduced the principles of
the law of the church and of the Roman law to a much greater extent
in the code of the Chamavian Pranks we find the st ipulat ionl . Si
wargengum occiderit, solidos 600 in dominico componat,' which is
essentially the principle in the code of the Ripuarians, except for
the phrase 'in dominico' which indicates the rise of a practice
which trie laws of Ine already gave voice to, namely the protection
of the foreigner by the lord or King an institution which grad-
ually had grown up. In some countries this protection took on a
j^lfronumenta. Leges V. 813 c. 9

a rather unfavorable aspect. This grew out of the Wildi angrecht of
eariy Franicish law, by which a lord would have claim to all for-
eigners who had no claimant masters or overlords after a year's so-
,
o irn in the land. 1. These men, then, were no longer free, but
were the king 1 s men 2. In other localities, the foreigner did
not lose his freedom, but he was under the direct protection of the
King, and as we shall see presently, special fines had to be paid
for breaking the icing's peace by injuring him. 3. The practice of
protecting foreigners was not a purely altruistic one on the part
of the sovereign for according to the prevailing law in most of the
nations, the inheritance of the alien fell to the overlord a cus-
tom from which the droi t d' aubaine of Prance grew up. Tne law
°^ Wildfang
,
it may be said, lasted until late in the middle ages
and from it proceeded , too, the lav/ of naufrage which permitted the
spoliation and capture not only of the goods but of the persons of
ship-v/recxed vessels. But let us turn again to England, where
the law oi tne Anglo-Saxons underwent a change of considerable
s ignif icance
.
Alter tne lavvs of Ine , the next provision of importance is to
be found in the laws of Aelfred 4. in the latter part of the
ninth century. 'If anyone slay a man thus conditioned namely when
he is witnout kin he shall pay half -wergeld - to the king and
half to the Gildergenossen. • This provision is not very different
1. Brunner, 180 2. Grimm, 399 3. Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte , 286
4. Lieberman, Gesetze, 67
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.
from the law of Ine , and indeed from any of the codes which all
in all seen to have a striking resemblance to each other. 1. But
near the middle of the tenth century, there appear certain provis-
ions in the Dunsajte, a code of rather mysterious origin, and whidk
was really a form of international agreement between the Welsch and
the English 2. which are distinctly individual in character.
They provide first that r, If a Welshman - from across the river -
kill an Englishman, then need he pay across on this side only one
half wergeld and just as little need an Englishman - pay- for a
Welshman slain - on this side - with more - be he of noble birth
or be he of lowly birth, half wergeld shall be the rule. " The mos
interesting provision of the law stipulates that 3. ''If one can
obtain fulfillment of justice in no other way, from one bank to
the otner one may tajce forfeits from every countryman of the debtor.'
Thus a system of reprisals is provided for in case justice is de-
nied to an i&ured alien, which does not differ much from the prac-
tice in modern times. The fact that the Dunsaete is of rather un-
certain origin makes it difficult to say just to what extent these
rules were observed and what their significance was. At any rate,
we have here an early recognition of the responsibility of the stat
for denial of justice to aliens, a fact which in itself is of im-
p or ^ance
.
The next code which deals to any extent with aliens was that o:
Eadward of about the year 920. Article 12 provides, 'That if a
person seeks to injure a holy man or a foreigner, either in his
person or goods then shall the king, in the Daneland, the Jarl and
hA-rtnw^^11 ' 375 . §• fJ is impossible to say exactly how muchborrowing bac* and forth of laws was done during the middle ages.This was effected chiefly through the church. 3. ibid. 2, 2
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the bishop of the diocese be the protector of the latter in case
he have no other protector., and the former - Injurer - make bote
to Christ and to the icing as is befitting, according to the deed, ofl?
he who is king among the people will punish the deed severely.'
The same sort of royal protection is again extended in the
laws of Aethelred circa 1614 and those of Cnut , 1027-34, and in
both codes the provisions are broader in scope. In Aethelred VIII
33 and 34 2. the King is the protector of the ordained or of the
foreigner when a person injure him either his property or person,
or binds him or beats him, or insults him in any way. The king is
likewise given the right of punishing the offender if he does not
make bote both to the injured person and the King. IlCnut
40 and 41 3. simply provides that if anyone injure an alien in any
way that the king is his protector and that the guilty party make
bote to the king - not to the injured party - or the king will
punish.
It may be well to point out at this juncture the exact re-
lations of these laws to the theory of international responsibility
in the connections in which this paper is studying it. In the
first place we found that the alien's status varied considerably
particularly in the matter of indemnities, and that there was a
certain responsibility for injury to him. In the second place
we found that the alien gradually became the object of special
protection by the king, to whom a part of the wergeld was usually
paid. It night seem, perhaps, that this was all a matter of
municipal law, but as we have already indicated the dual character
of the lav/ at this time little need be added. This has been made
clear in regard to the first point, but a word of explanation may
1. Lieberman, 135 2. ibid. 267 3.
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be in place in regard to the special protection of the king or
lord over aliens. In the earliest times this protection had the
character of a personal prerogative of the king, a right which the
latter assumed to be inherent in himself. Nor was this protection
purely altruistic in character, but as has been suggested it was
a service which was richly remunerated by the escheat of the aliens
property. Gradually as time passed the matters which the king had
considered personal prerogative became regarded as belonging to
the sovereignty which was inherent in the position, and the pro-
tection over aliens was one of the prerogatives which likewise be-
an
came adjunct of the sovereignty. Then as the idea developed that
the ultimate sovereignty rested in the people, this prerogative
special protection over aliens was agdn transferred and the con-
cept arose that the alien was to receive his protection from the
nation. This development of the idea of protection of aliens had
great weight in the development of municipal law, for it came to
be looked upon more as an expression of internal rather than of ex-
ternal sovereignty, a condition which existed at the time when
Grotius wrote.
But while this general development was taking place within
the English realm at the same time a new phase of clan responsibili-
ty appeared in the development of the idea of the liability of the
hundred. It is not within the scope of the present discussion
tc trace the early origin of the custom. l.The responsibility of
tne hundred for the death of a foreigner is first concisely express-
ed in the Leges Edv/ardi Confessor is , a code completed in the early
12th. century, consisting of the supposed customs of the Anglo-
Saxons. There can be little doubt but that the code is not entirel-
1. Maltland. Collected Paper I . 230 The Crim. Llah . of the Hunrirftri.l
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trustworthy in all of its provisions, but certainly there is
reason for believing that some of the matter contained therein is
authentic. 1.
The articles dealing with murdered aliens are found in connec-
tion with the Lex Murdrorum 2. These laws provided that if a man
was murdered and the slayer could not be found that 40 ma.aks were
to be collected in the vill
,
but if the money could not be collecj;
ed in the the vill the hundred was to furnish the amount wanting,
the amount to be turned into the icing's treasury. This sum was re-
turned in case the murderer was found within a year; if not, then
the marcks would fall to the king, and the relatives of the murder-
ed man would receive 6 marcks. Here follows the provision in re-
gard to aliens.
Si parentes non haberet dominus eius eas haberet , si
haberet scilicet fide ligatus cum eo. Si autem neu-
trum haberet, rex regni, sub cuius dominio et pace
degunt omnes albani, haberet VI marcas cum sina XL 3
In brief, the meaning of the law is this, that in or dinary
cases of murder, the hundred is responsible for the fine, if the
vill cannot raise the sum the chief part of which goes to the King.
When an alien without kin is killed, however, then the king keeps
the full amount. These laws probably were compiled by Norman law-
yers at the order of Henry I, during a revival of interest in Saxon
law and it is not unlikely that some of the provisions were new.
There has been some conjecture that the practice was introduced at
the time of Canut 4.
1. Careful comparison with other codes will bring out to what ex-
tent this is true. 2 .Liebermann , 641 § 15 ff. 3. If he has no kin
then his lord shall have them, - i.e. the sex marcas ; or if he has
comrades in fealty to him, they shall have them. If, however, he
has neither the king etc. 2. Larson. Canute the Great. 280
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"but the probabilities seem to indicate that in the germs of an
Anglo Saxon custom, William the Conqueror forged a very useful in-
stitution to protect his countrymen from maltreatment by the native
Anglo-Saxons. 1.
In the same century in which the laws of the Confessor were
compiled we have the Leges Henrici I which again expressly placed
the French and aliens under the protection of the king, with the
words 2. 1 Omnibus Francigenio et alien igenis debet esse rex pro
cognacione et aduocato, si penitus alium non habent. 3. This
provision certainly was a further strengthening of the status of
the French-Norman followers of the king, and to emphasize the fact
that violence to a foreigner was a violation of the king's own fol-
lowers and of the king's peace. What in Anglo Saxon had been a
voluntary extension of protection prompted in some measure by the
greed of the king and the custom of the land had now under the
Norman regime become a matter of necessity and was obligatory upon
the aliens, as the word debe t would indicate.
But if the theory of responsibility as a municipal institutior.
developed from the protection of the king over aliens at the same
time it was to this very source that many of the disabilities of
the aliens can be traced. Pollock Maitland 4. bases the commence-
ment of these disabilities at the time of the loss of Normandy, anc
believes that they continued throughout the middle ages. This is
1. From this system grew the frankpled^c— cf . W.A. Morris* Work
on the subject 'The Frankpledge System.' 2.Lleberman, 757, 592
3. So too 10.3 Et omnibus ordinatio et alien genis et pauper ibus
et abiectus debet esse rex pro cognacione et advocato et penitus
alium non habent. 4.Pol. & Maitland, Hist, of English Law I, 461
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undoubtedly true, in spite of the fact that beginning with Edward
III many concessions were made to alien merchants in an effort to
stimulate and protect trade with England. Thus. as on the continent
f
hosts were appointed for aliens L. and in case of trial where
aliens were concerned it was provided that it should be de medlat at
lingua 2. It is a noteworthy fact that during this period there
was no expressed change in the theory of municipal law responsibil-
ity for aliens, but It gradually became strengthened as a ,1 t is
to the continent that we must turn for the radical changes.
We have already traced the theory on the continent through the
Prankish period. Following the early constructive period, there
was no marked change in the whole law as in England by the intro-
duction of the liability of the hundred, but what changes took
place were slow and gradual. In the cities, the chief changes took
place, and, indeed, in favor of the alien. Here, the foreigners
coming to the local markets were protected by the market peace.
Special concessions were likewise madekn favor of aliens and they
were freed from the dangers of the Rechtsgang by the introduction
of the Blendeneld
. A special Gastgericht was instituted fiur their
benefit. All of these concessions however, were subsidiary to the
fundamental pfinciple of protection of the king. These changes
were confined chiefly to Germany, for, in France there grew up
agcxin the old identification of alien with hoste an Influence per-
haps of the Roman law. The }.ong periods of war with England, when
every Englishman was an enemy slowly destroyed the international
significance of the protection of the king over aliens, and the
latter again became identified in the popular mind with enemies,
no matter whether they were Eng: ishmen or Germans or Italians.
1.5 Henrv IV c 9 3 2. 2ft Edw. ITT n 17>
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The predominance of French influence throughout Europe in this
period was hound to effect the jurisprudence in other countries,
so that even in those states where the Germanic tradition had been
pr .served the longest the new confounding of alien with enemy grad-
ually crept in and helped to form the basis of the disabilities of
aliens, the germs for which had already existed. At the same time
as has been mentioned the possibilities of the Teutonic law toward
an international significance were destroyed and the whole matter
became one treated by municipal law, but without obvious pcyjri'bill-
ties which had heretofor existed to extend the matter to interna-
tional law. Her did the reception of Roman law in the latter fif-
teenth century produce any immediate effect upon the treatment of
aliens. The whole matter although in a chaotic condition from the
international point of view, was too firmly established. And in ag
much as there existed no real international law at this time it ?/ae
not until the time of Grotius and his epoch-making work, that new
developments took place.
In analyzing the theories which were propounded by the early
publicists and especially the work of Grotius we must remember
that the material upon which they based their structure was essen-
tially Roman incharacter. It will be remembered that the impulse
which* the Renaissance had given to the study of Roman law was fur-
thered by reception of this law into the continental jurisprudence
Moreover the publicists and jurists of the sixteenth century were
thereby imbued with the spirit of this jurisprudence, and the natii
eudimic law fell into a certain disrepute. It is not astonishing
therefore to find that Grotius as the leader in the new internation
al law drew largely from the sources of Roman law, and indeed
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chiefly from the priTate law and the jus naturel. 1. But the
limits of the present paper do not permit an extended discussion
of these matters, so we shall turn to the views of Grotius on re-
sponsibility as they were expressed in his De jure Belli ac Pacis
In "brief, the new view which Grotius introduced in regard to
the responsibility of the state for aliens was the old private law
principle that no one, not even the state was responsible for acts
of others, unless there be fault on his part. T^e element of fault
might be caused by complicity, by bad counsel, or various other
reasons, and most of all by passivity in the face of some act
which was not legal. Thus he says 'a civil community, like any
other community, is not bound by the act of an individual member
thereof, without some act of its own, or some omission 1
,
and 2,
he argues on the analogy of the relation of state to state with
that of the individual to individual, an analogue which had a great
fascination for him. He goes on to say, however, 'but of the ways
in which rulers come to share in the crime of others, there are
two which are most common, and require diligent consideration:
their allowing and their receiving. With regard to allowing, it
is to be held that he who knows of the commission of the offense,
who can, and is bound to prevent it, and who does not, does himself
offend...' 3.And again 4. 'But as we have said, there is required
to produce this liability not only knowledge but the power of pre-
vention. And this is what the laws say; that knowing, when tt is
directed to be punished, is taken for allowing; so that he who
l.Triepel 212 ff
. 2. Grotius II, XXI 3. Ibid, 342 4. ibid 343
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could have prevented is held bound if he did not do so; and that
the knowing here spoken of is consered as combined with willing
;
and that knowledge is taken along with purpose ;.. .for he is blame-
less who knows, but cannot prevent. 1 And in still another passage
he defines all the acts which constitute offence on the part of
the states. 1.
There is a noteworthy fact about the law as laid down by Grot—
iuc , and that is, the singularly attenuated character of the prin-
ciples which he pronounces. This is due perhaps to the fact that
Grotius looked upon responsibility in general as a matter regulated
by the existing municipal law. It is not easy to conjecture to
what extent this was true but in one passage he indicates the fact
that he believed the question of responsibility to be a matter of
municipal law, for he says. 2. 'Nor if either soldiers or sailors
contrary to command do any damage to friends are the kings liable;
whick has been proven by the testimony both of Prance and England:
that anyone witkout any fault of his own, is bound by the acts of
his agents is not a part of the Law of Nations by whick this con-
troversy must be decided, but a part of the civil law; nor that in
general, but introduced against sailors and certain others for pe-
culiar reasons.' 3. This latter class was in all probability tke
foreigners. The passage may be taken as reasonable evidence that
Grotius looked upon responsibility as a matter of municipal law and
therefore deemed the question relatively unimportant for interna-
tional law. He little knew tkat these few statements were to form
1. Grotius, II, XXI § 2 2. ibid. XVII § 20 & 21 3. It is to be
noted also, says G. further, tkat the Rule, that if a slave or any
animal cause any damage or loss, it creates a liability to the mas-
ter, is also a creation of civil law. For the master, who is not
In fault, is not liable in natural law, as also he is not whose shi palthough by tke laws of many nations, and by ours the damage in sucj.
case la commonly divided
f
on account of tl*m diff<nnit.y nf *+n
,
(f
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the basis of the views of international law theorists concerning
aliens for the next three centuries; for the importance of Grotius
influence in this matter cannot be overestimated. Although ori-
ginally there was perhaps little intention of including aliens, the
next great publicists took up these views and with but little
change they have persisted up to the present time. The great sig-
nificance of Grotius theory, however, lies in the fact that with
him and the new international law the beginning of the conflicting
views of municipal and international jurisdiction are marked and
the contest for supremacy was started which seems to have resulted
in defeat of those holding to the view of municipal jurisdiction.
But we are anticipating, and we return to the early publicists and
shall see what was accomplished by them, keeping in mind the fact
that the bases were being laid for the controversies of the nine-
teenth century.
It is Zouchtfthe next great publicis 4 after Grotius in his
wrk Juris et Judicii ?ecialis sive Juris inter Gentes etc. 1. %
quotes Grotius and gives voice to the same principle namely that
there is no responsibility except for fault of the state itself.
Similarly Puffendorf 2. in his De Jure "Natural et gentium depends
on Grotius for his views in the matter of responsibility for he say£
3. that the courts of law ma y punish on occasions certain per-
sons in consequence of a crime which has been committed by others.
Thus, for instance, If personB are in any way accomplices to a crim|^
1. Zouch, II sec. 5, § 1 p. 106 2. Puffendorf, 1497 3. ibid.
VII, 497, VIII, Chap. Ill, § 28; chap. VI, § 12, p. 503
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they may be punished accordingly. If a community however is
guilty of some corporate "body, it is to be regarded as an entity
and punished accordingly although sometimes single members alone
may be punished. 1. This statement seems to indicate that the
matter of responsibility was being looked upon more as a matter
of international law, although the same limitations on the matter
which Grotius placed upon it still held good. Thus in still anothe
passage Bfendorf says: 'Au reste dans 1 1 independance de l'Etat de
Nature, on ne peut venir a la Guerre contre personne que pour les
in jures qu'il a lui-meme comtnises. Mais, pour ce qui est des
Societez Aviles, lorz que Q,uel ^ qun des C^toiens a fait du mal de
son pur mouvement a un Etranger, ou s ' eu prend quelquefois a tout
le loyss de l'Etat ou a celui que est le chef ; et voici eu quel
cas cette imputation a lieu. II est certain, qu' aucune commun-
aute n'est tenne du fait des Particuliers , dont elle est composee,
qu autant qu'elle a commes au neglige elle-meme quelque chose qui
influe sur l'action dont on la rend resronsable car quelque scoeres
que sclent les menaces des Loix & du Souverain, elle l&issent tou-
j curs aux Sujets la Paculte Naturelle de contrevenir a lieu ordres.
Or, il y a deux rainons principales, pour lesquelles on peut de-
clarer la Querre a un Souverain pour tirer satisfaction des injurer
que Ion a recues de quelqcun de ses sujets tauts nouveaux venus
,
que naturels du Pais. L'un c'est parce quil a souffert que l'on
fit tort a l 1 Etranger :1' autre, parce qu'il donne retraite a 1'
OHendeur. Le premier poumit juste cause a Guerre, presque le Princ
Souverain accint vonnaissance du aime , & pouv -^nt l 1 ernpedie , sans
avoir a craindre de s'attirer pan la un mal plus facheux, ne la
pas fait neaumoins. 2.
1. If vote is taicen ti.ose agt,inst action are guiltless 2. Puf en-
rinW VTTT p., VT I TP., P ^ .
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This quotation illustrates how the passages from Grotius
which we have already noted were taken early in the history of the
new international law to apply to aliens and there can be little
doubt but that Pufendorf was the first to apply the general theory.
Close in his footsteps followed Vattel, whose views in this matter
although practically built on the writings of the preceding publi-
cists are the ones which are generally supposed to have formed the
basis of the practice in the early 19th. century, if frequent quo-
tation may be taken as a criterion.
According to Vattel, the cases in which a state would be res-
ponsible for injuries to aliens were of practically the sort enu-
merated by preceding writers, although Vattel is even more explicit
in applying the Grotian view of responsibility to cases involving
aliens' rights. 1. In the first place Vattel asserts that if a
sovereign does not prevent injury to a foreigner by his subjects,
he is ro less guilty than if he has committed the act himslef, but
as it is patently impossible even in the best regulated states for
the sovereign to have absolute control over his subjects, it would
be unjust to impute to the state every delict committed by the
citizens thereof. Consequently injury by subjects of a state does
not necessarily mean an offence on the part of the state itself.
As it stands, this principle is doubtlessly true, but too often it
has been used to form the basis upon which the advocates of non-
responsibility of states have • argued against the assumption of
liability for injuries sustained by aliens. Thus Calvo and many
others have used these arguments of Vattel to excess, accepting as
a fundamental truth matters which can be looked u on as only part-
ly tri^gut 1
,
continues Vattel 1
,
1 if a nation or its chief approves
1. Vattel. II. lfii
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and ratifies the act of the individual then it "becomes a public
concern; and the injured party is to consider the nation as the
real author of the injury, of which the citizen was perhaps only th
I
instrument.' In other words responsibility of the state proceeds
only where there is delict on the part of the state.
As regards the matter of indemnity, Vattel does not regard
the injury to aliens as a matter giving rise to public payment
but he believes that the state should compel the transgressor to
give compensation or to inflict punishment on him or to deliver
him to the offended state, a view which indicates that Vattel
made no distinction between satisfi ction and compensation as re-
sults of responsibility. 1. We shall come presently to the ls,w
in Spain, where we shall find th t the principle of indemnity to
injured aliens in the penal code of that country rests upon an
identical basis, namely that the transgressor is liable to pay-
ment of compensation, with the state acting simply in the capacity
of an agent. So too in the law in the United States.
It is when the sovereign refuses to caus?. reparation to be
made that it becomes responsible, 'but if he delivers up either the
property of the offender as an indemnification, in cases that will
admit of pecuniary compensation or his person, in or er that he may
suffer the punishment due his crime, the offended party has no
furtherdemand on him. 1 2.
There is one other case in which a nation is responsible,
namely when it authorizes its citizens to plunder and to maltreat
foreigners. But this is a matter too f r removed from present day
practice to require discussion.
1. ibid. 162 2. ibid.
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Such in "brief are the various views which determined the
course of international law for a considerable period of time. As
we have already Indicated the successors of Grotius all "based their
opinions upon those expressions in the De Jure Belli ac Pacis and a;
are nothing more than an attenuated development therefrom,. This
was necessarily so, in view of the fact that Grotius had already
declared the matter to he one of civil i.e. the municipal alw, and
accordingly all that was left to be done was to expand and revise
these early views as seemed commendable. But here the theories
of the early publicists were of vastly greater significance than th !
mere printed words. While the question of responsibility yet re-
mained a matter of practically exclusive municipal contril, the
views of Grotius and his successors furnished an excellent weapon
in the hands of claimant states, and it was through them, and not
through the respondent governments that the weight of precedent
finally turned the balance in favor of international lav; in the
practice of responsibility. This was largely due to the dual role
which the states were wont to assume in matters of this sort.
Tnus
,
if c-a. state v/as called upon to acknowledge its responsibility
for the maltreatment of an alien by some brutal mob it would re-
ply; 'No, this nation is not responsible in international law, for
tkfl question of responsibility is something which from time immemor-
ial has been regulated by the internal law of the land. If the in-
jured parties want redress, they must apply to the local courts. 1
If reference was made to the rule in Grotius, the government simply
need prove that there was no fault of its own. On the other hand
should this £ same state bave claims of a similar nature against
another state it is very likely that the principles of Grotius and
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Vattel would be rushed to the extreme, and in this way , the theory
of international responsibility was developed.
W ;ile the bases were being laid during this period for the
struggle in the mineteenth century between the municipal law
championB and those favoring international law, the developments
in municipal lav/ were not quiescent, so before we take up the views
of the later publicists and the exact nature of the theory of re-
sponsibility, let us examine the development of the municipal lav/
in the various European countries, turning first to France. In
* is country as in other of the European states the regulation of
the . atter of responsibility is still done by municipal law,
although the applicability of this lav; to aliens has through the
growth of international practice quite lost its pertinence.
T l« exact relation between legal theorizing and practical
political life has been a much debated question and a satisfactory
solution has never been advanced for the problems which arise from
attempts to reconcile theory and practice.
Ths present law relating to communal responsibility has its
foundations in the celebrated law of the 10 vendemiaire of the
year IV. This law, which we shall examine presently was drawn up
at the time when the revolution was at its height and insurrections
and disorders of all kinds were of frequent occurrence. The law maty?
be considered as the statutory expression of certain ideas which
had found great favor with the Constituent Assembly. Land which
evidently bore an intimate relation to the existing theories of
responsibility. These ideas of communal responsibility were based
1. Mic.oud, VII, 78
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on the old argument that upon every citizen r. sted a legal obli-
gation to maintain order and Should this obligation fail to he
carried out, the body of citizens would "be responsible for the
disorders which they had failed to prevent. 1.
It is undeniably true that a great similarity exists between
this theory and the early feudal theory of responsibility. This
w s the inevitable result of the theorizing of the publicists who
had left matters of responsibility to municipal law; It is cer-
tain that the leaders on the other hand of the Constituent Assembly
were acquainted with these views. It may be said of the theories of
the constituent assembly that they were also a part of the move-
ment to give the bulk of the population political liberty and a
share of responsibility in the welfare of the state. Moreover, the
law of the tenth vendemiaire was the result more of external press-
ure than of political theorizing.
On the whole, 2. the law provides thaiS the communes are re-
sponsible for injuries caused by riots and mobs. They are not how-
ever responsible for the culpa of communal authorities -G-rotius a-
gain!- but for the acts of the inhabitants themselves. The statute
provide equally for injuries to aliens and injuries sustained gy
nationals. In the event, however, of riots being caused by strang-
ers in the commune, it is free from all r sponsibility . The res-
:nsibility when incurred, is not only civil, but penal. In other
words , it means that not only must an indemnity be paid, but also
a fine to the government of the Republic. The ordinary courts we][e
given juridiction in these cases.
1. In short t:-is means that if the majority of citizens were guilty
of rioting would be responsible and if not guilty would be respon-
sible for not having restrained the other citizens. 2. Calvo , III
T4ft ff.
-
S
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Such In outline were the main provisions of the law of the
tenth vendemiaire . The statute had an important influence not only
upon the existing conditions in France, hut also upon the subse-
quent development of the theory which found expression in the judi
cial decisions of succeeding ye-rs, and finally in the celehrated
law of the fifth of April 1884.
With the passing of the revolution and the advent of a :ore
peaceful social order with its strongly centralized government, a
feeling arose and gained foothold that the principle of communal
responsibility was incompatible with present jurisprudence, and
that the responsibility of the communal authorities should super-
cede that of the inhabitants of the commune, a condition affected
perhaps by the development of international law*
Judicial recognition of this change was given for the first
time in a decision rendered by the Court of Cassation shortly after
the July Revolution of 1830. 1. The court held that the law of
the 10 vendemiaire was too local in character to be applied to a
city of the size of Paris and that furthermore the municipality
of Paris did not have at its disposition sufficient police or arme<
forces to warrant the enforcement of the law.
However close in accord this decision may have been with the
existing views in regard to communal responsibility, the judgment
was manifestly a violation of the spirit and purpose of the law of
the 10 vendemiaire, for one of the chief reasons for the enact-
ment of the law had been to assure the maintenance of order in Par
is itself. In subsequent ye rs , when Paris was again and again t. e
seat of insurrection special laws had to he enacted to provide in-
demnification for the losses sustained.
1. Calvo. III. 149; Michoud. Rev. Gand 7. 80
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The next great change in the theory of communal responsibility
came in the year 1884 with the new law of municipal organization
of April 5th. This law forms the basis for the present practice in
Prance and it may he worth while to quote the provisions in full. I.
Art. 106 The communes are civilly responsible for
damages and injuries resulting from crimes or misde-
canors committed with open force or ciolence on
their territory by mobs, armed or unarmed assemblages
either against persons or against public or private
property.
The damages for which a commune is responsible
shall be divided among all the inhabitants of the
said commune in accordance with a special list com-
prising the four direct taxes.
Art 107 If the mobs or riotous a semblages be
formed by the inhabitants of several communes, each of
them is responsible for the losses or injuries caused,
in the proportion to be fixed by the courts.
Art. 108 The provisions of articles 106 and 107
shall not be applicable;
1. When the commune is able to prove that all the
measures which were in its power were taken in order
to prevent the mobs and riotous assemblages and to
apprehend the perpetrators,
2. When the commune or the municipality did not
have at its disposition the local police or an armed
force
.
3. When the injuries caused were the result of
an act of war.
Art. 109. The commune which is declared to be
responsible may have recourse against the perpetrators
or accomplices of the disturbance.
Compared with the law of the 10 ve^Lemiaire this statute is
singularly restricted in form and content. What it really accom-
plishes is to bring about a sort of mutual safety insurance and giv
gives to the maire a great power in suppressing revolts. This duty
naturally falls upon him as the head of the police. 2.
To the casual observer it would perhaps seem that Prance had i||i
her system of communal responsibility an excellent means of
incluaing cases of injuries to aliens, but if she has she has not
been able to make the best of it. What lias really happened is that
whenever France has attempted to invoke this means of escaping in-

<;7
ternational liability, that she has failed and bo finally has had
to admit the principle of international responsibility as we shall
see in the next chapter, this change of attitude has come about
since the year 1870 and in one of the important recent cases, the
Aigues Mortes affair where she had a splendid opportunity to in-
voke the doctrine of municipal law it was not even mentioned.
At present, it would seem that the is'sue is definitely decided in
Prance in favor of the theory of international responsibility, but
this matter will be better illustrated by the study of French prac-
tice in the succeeding chapters where the cases cited v/ill enable us
to draw more accurate conclusions.
But the theory of communal responsibility did not flourish
in France alone, it also was and is an integral part of jurispru-
dence in Germany. Old laws flourished in Brunswick and Bavariabut 1
the medieval fciews seem to have been superseded. It is to Prussia
t we turn to find the most significant development. In Prussia
the law was not introduced until 1850, and it can hardly be said to
have been based on the old German law. It was a law which was
actuated by the outbreaks in 1846-9 and was a clear adaptation on
the French model to German needs. It was passed March 11, 1850
ar.d, in brief, provides that the Gemeinde is responsible for in-
juries caused by riots within its jurisdiction, unless such riots
were caused by mobs which were formed elsewhere and which entered
the municipality by force. Indemnity devolves in such cases upon
the municipality where such riotous assemblages originated even whe i
the municipality was clearly not in a position to prevent such
riots. If there are a number of Gemeinden they are collectively
1. Calvo III, 154, Boeuf , VIII 2. Triepel 375
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responsible. A later decision of the Reichsger icht held that
the municipality was responsible for infuries or damages incident
to the suppression of r'ots, even in cases of forcible entrance by
the police in discharge of their duties. 1.
The Gallic character of the act is apparent from the above, bu
in practice the Prussian legislation has differed from the French,
for as f..r as we huve been able to ascertain no attempt has been
made to apply the law to injuries sustained by aliens under the
circumstances provided* f or , nor indeed has there been any occa-
a
sion to do so. The Prussian law was clearly preventive measure
vkick was enacted to avoid the reoccurrence of such excesses as had
taken 'lace in the two preceding years. It is significant however
that When in 1896 the Barfierliches Gesetzbuch was revised this law
an
was not in any way altered, but still remains integral part of the
statutes in force.
Turning to Spain, we find that the matter of responsibility
is not regulated by the civil law, but is a question which is left
to the penal law. Thus articles 120 and 230 of the penal code pro-
vide for an individual criminal responsibility of the transgression
as contrasted with the communal, responsibility in other European
states. The prope rty and goods of the instigators and abbettors of
the insurrection may be seized and sold, and the money thus ob-
tained .aay be used to indemnify the victims. 2The chief objection
to the provision aside from ihe fact that it is contrary to intei -
national lav, is that in most cases the insurrectos are of the
poorer classes, and have no property to confiscate. This was espec
ially true of the Barcelona riots of 1909
1. Gesetzbuch des kg. Pr. Eeichs, 1850, p. 164, also Handouch der
Prrnnfi. VftTt/nit.ung, T, 135 2. Jour. Prive 1140
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The law is very unsatisfactory from this point of view. As re-
gards the international significance of the provisions however in
thii respect they have "been of greater importance than the Prussian
statute. In every case where claims of her responsibility for in-
juries sustained "by aliens in her numerous revolutions have arisen
Spain has sought to entrench herself "behind these provisions, hut
her efforts hav e usually been futile. Successivley in 1S30, 1342,
1S6S, 1693 1. she has been obliged to pass special laws to meet
tin exigencies of the moment, for even in the case of Prance where
a well developed system of municipal responsibility existed,
when claims ere being pressed by her against Spain, she refused
absolutely to recognise the principles which Spain contended for.
We have been unable to ascertain the antiquity of these pro-
visions, but if the:.' date before the first quarter of the nine-
teenth century it is possible that the law of Spain may have been
the foundation of the very widespread development of theories of
municipal responsibility in South America, in as much as the
Spanish law was boaily transferred to these countries uuring the
perioa that they ..ere under Spanish dominion. But this, as we
have indicted is a mere conjecture which v/ould indeed bbe diffi-
cult to substantiate. The South American jurisprudence we shall
discuss in connection with our study of those countries*
turn next to England, where we have seen that from the
lav and custom of the early AngloSaxons there grew up the institu-
tion of the responsibility of the hundred. Until the time of Edwar
I these matters were probably regulated only by the various exist-
ing laws and customs of the reilm, but by the second statute of
1 . cf . c' after II
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Winchester 01' Edward I of the year 1285, the existing lav; was con-
solidated under one statute 1. which was especially designed to
protect foreigners more particularly foreign merchants from in-
juries at the hand3 0-; 'robbers and felons'. Thus the hue and cry
is to be nude in the countries and jiundreds etc. after such trans-
gressors. •Likewise, when need requires, inquests shall he made
in towns hy him that is Lord of the Town and after in the Hundred
and in the Ihnnciise and in the county and sometime in two, three
or four counties, in case where felonies shall be committed in
the marches of the shires, so that the offenders may he attainted.
And if the county will not answer for the "bodies of such
manner of offenders, the pain shall he such that every twenty, that
is to wit, the people dwelling in the county, shall he answerable
for the robberies done, and also the damages . so that the whole
Hunared where the robbery shall be done, with the franchise being
within the precinct of the same hundred, shall be ansverable for
the robberies done . and if the robberies be done in the division
of two hundreds, both the undreds and the franchises within them
3 all be answerable . ' Forty days is allowed the county to answer f||
for the offence. "2.
This sains statute was reenacted with revisions and amendments
in the year 1354 of the reign of Edward III, ;3. due to the in-
crease of merchants. One important featu e of this new statute
shich does not appear in the previous lav/, is the fact that the im-
I irtancs of the aliens in the tr-.de of the realm is recognized,
1. 13 Ids. I Stat. 2, chap. 1 & 2 2. ibid, c 2 3.28 Edw. Ill
c 9
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and It is expressly stated that the act provides for the 'surety an
lndtmpnity 1 of -one same. In its main provisions the lav/ is iden-
tical with "the preceding one.
These statutes served as the oasis for the responsibility of
the hundred until the reign of Elizabeth, although the general
matter of riots was the subject of considerable legislation during
the subsequent years. 1. In 1585 new provisions were enacted 2.
due to t::e :act as the law states that the conditions of the old
law were too difficult to fulfill without greater cooperation on
the part of other hundreds and counties. The -fudt
,
too, that the
injured party, being fully indemnified under the terms of the law
was not anxious to prosecute also needed some amendment. In the
first place, the law provided 'that the inhabitants of every or
any such hundred - with the franchises within the precinct thereof
wherein negligence, fault or defect of pursuit and fresh suit after
the end of this present session of parliament, shall answer and
satisf;/- the one moiety or half of all and every such sum and sums
of money and damages as shall by force or virtue of the said stat -.
utes or either of them be recovered or had against or of the saia
kli dxed with the franchises therein, in which any robbery or felony
shall at any time hereafter be committed or done.., 1 2. This a-
mount could be recovera by an act of debt, bill, planit or infor-
mation in any court of record at Westminster in name of the local
clerKs of the peace for the time being. Furthermore the lav/ pro-
vided that although the hundred was charged with paying the
damages yet no definite means of meeting such damages had been
provided for, and accordingly a system of special assessments was
1 . OR II c 7 15 R II C 2 17 R II c B 13 H IV c 7 id H V c 8
8 H VI c 14 11 H VII c 7 19 H VII c 13 2. ^7 Iliz c 15
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introduced to furnish indemnity, this assessment to "be Liuue in
every hundred where there haa been default or negligence. If, how-
ever, the offender were apprehended tnere was no penalty.
A slight change was laade in the law during the reign ef Charle
II, irhen it was provided 1. that the Hundred was not responsible to
persons travelling on the Lords day who might be robbed ana that
such persons were go be barred from cringing any action for the
said robbery. The hundred might however make or cause to oe made
fresh suit and pursuit after the offenders upon pain of forfeiting
to the crown as much money as might have been recovered by tke in-
jured party against the crown.
The extension of responsibility to the hundreds directly over
cases of riots was first accomplished by statute in the reign of
George 12. In brief tnis act made the hundred responsible for the
destruction of nouses, barns, stables or buildings of religious
worship oy riotous assemblages. Action was to be brought in any
court of record at Westminster against any two or more inhabitants
of the hundred, and damages were to be recovered in the same manner
as provided for in the act of Elizbeth. This statute wus really an
extension of the law of William and Mary 3. where all damag
done to places of religious worhip by mobs or riotous assemblages
was to be regarded as a felony without benefit if clergy and the
penalty was death as in cases of felony without benefit of clergy.
The statute of George first was further extended in 172<i to
include various other offences committed bv mobs, such as the
1. 29 Chas. II,c 7 } 5 2. 1 Geo I stat 2 c 5 § VI
3. W. & M. sess. I, c 18
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killing of live stock, doitrtyirig of treea setting fire to build-
ings and oLher ol fences of a similar nature. 1. This statutory
rovision was reenacted in 1836 during the reign of George II 2.
Further liability for the hundred was provided in 1735 by a stat-
ute which adaed tne damages for destruction to fences and gates and
icmdred matter to the existing list. 3. Other additions to the
matters for wnich the hundred could be held responsible were maae
in the reigh of George II in order to make the list of subjects as
e^i-licit as possible. 4. Amendments were also maae to the law in
the reign of George III. 5.
The various amendments and revisions of the laws of rhundred
responsibility which all had their basis in the law of Elizabeth,
left the state of legislation at the beginning of the nineteenth
century in a most chaotic condition, but it was not until the year
1827, during the reign of George IV, that measures were taken re-
lating to the responsibility of the hundred. In brief, the new
law provided that the hundred was responsible for damage done by
rioters in the various cases which have already been mentioned,
and that it snould make reparation therefore. The general mode
of legal procedure was provided for the method of raising the
money necessary for indemnification. Cities, towns or places not
within any hundred or which did not contribute t© any county rate
were to be liable in all respects in the same manner as the in-
habitants of the hundred. The money for indemnity was to be raised
over and above the usual rate and in the same manner as such rate.
This act provided for the practice which was followed ntil
1886 when the new riot act was passed. It is significant for our
Btud-" that the responsibility of the hundred had in the course of
1. 9 Geo I c 22 § VII 2. 29 Geo. II c 36 § 9 3. 8 Geo II c 20 § 6
4. Hus 10 Geo II c 32 § 4 11 Geo II c 22 § 5 19 Geo II c 34 § 6
K
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study that the responsibility of the hundred had in the course of
its development completely divorced itself from the fundamental
concept of responsibility for injuries to aliens within the limits
of its jurisdiction, frem which the whole matter had originated.
Although as we have seen the change in the theory came gradually
through the seventeenth and eighteenth century the actual change
in the law did not come until the passage of the act of George IV
for the act of Elizabeth continued in force until this time. It is
during the early Georgian period that the two classes of regulation!
heretofor distinct combined: the acts regulating riots and those
regulating responsibility. The complete fusion occurred in the
act of George IV
Two slight amendments were made in the subsequent years to
the act of George IV. In 1832 the responsibility was extended
for damages done to threshing machines. 1. In 1854 in the
Merchant Shipping Act it was provided that the hundred was respon-
sible for damages done by plundering of shipwrekced vessels by
riotous a semblages. But the responsibility of the hundred for
riots was to undergo a still more radical change.
In 1886 in consequence of a riot in London a new statute known
as the Riot - damages- Act was enacted by which the ©Id responsibi-
lity of the hundred was completely done a?/ay with. 2. The law
provided 3. that: 'Where a house, shop or building 4. in any
police district has been injured or destroyed, or the property
therein has been injured, stolen or destroyed by persons riotously
and tumultuously assembled together, such compensation as hereinaf-
ter mentioned shall be paid out of the police rate of such district
to any person who has sustained loss by such injury, stealing or
1. 2,3 Will. IV c 72 r. 17, 18 Vic. c 104 5 477 3.49, 50 Vic. c 3£
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destruction; but in fixing the amount of such compensation, regard
shall be had te the conduct of such persons.
.
.' Insurance was te
he deducted from the amount of compensation, claims of which were
to be made te the police authority of the district. The amount
once determined, the expenses were te be raised as part of the
police rate; part ef the local expenditure of the district. Where
borough and county forces had consolidated the costs were to be
divided between the two in such proportions as the police authori-
ties should determine. The act also includi the provie ion made
m 2 & 3 Will. 4 c 72 and section 477 of the Merchant Shipping Act
.
The act is the basis of present practice in England In virtue
ef its previsions the last vestiges ef the old AngloSaxon respon-
sibility of the hundred were swept away and the new method of re-
sponsibility was introduced. Moreover like the act of George IV
the question of the liability for injuries te aliens is completely
extinguished. This is not surprising for during the whole nineteen
tk century no claims ef Great Britain's responsibility for injuries
te aliens within the limits of England were made. In consequence
thereof, it was natural that a cstom which at one time tooic the
place ef an international law gradually should lose its significanc
as an international matter, and become essentially a municipal mat-
ter. It is safe te say that if the states who attempt te regulate
tke matters of responsibility by their municipal law should observe
the degree ef impartiality in the administration ef justice which
the British courts exercise, the question of responsibility would
have passed out of the realm ef municipal law except .perhaps in
cases ef exceptional international significance. England has
abandoned the question ef the jurisprudence of injuries to aliens
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net as a result of international pressure, but because there was
no need If exercise such powers.
That the custom of responsibility of the hundred has been of
importance without the spheres of British jurisprudence, there can
be little doubt. There is more than a bare possibility that the
British jurisprudence has influenced the American law in this mat-
ter, in spite of the fact that the opportunities of showing an in-
tin, te historical connection are few.
During colonial times in New York 1., Pennsylvania 2. , Mass-
achusetts 3. and Virginia 4. riot acts were passed which ?;ere in
the first three states closely patterned after the acts of George
II. None of these acts however contain stipulations providing for
the responsibility of any political divisions analagous to the
hundred for damages resulting from mob violence, but with exception
of these few laws, entirely without relation to the matter of lia-
bility there is not legislation to be. found until the middle of
the nineteenth when various local influences brought about the
enactment of statutes which formed the beginning of this type of
legislation and which were the acts upon which at present the
responsibility of counties and municipalities for riots is based.
Thus for example in New York the first statute was enacted in 1855
ar.d robably was a measure directed against the spread of the ex-
cesses of the so-called rowdies, whereas in California there were
earl}' statutes in 1867-8 and were very likely motivated by the
difficulties in maintaining order and security
. This sort of
legislation appears to have been earliest, however, in Maryland,
when in 2835 tke first statute of the sort was passed. In Massa-
1. Col. Laws of N.Y. V 646 2. Stat, at large of Pa. VI 325 3.
Mass. Acts <x Resolves III 544 ff
. 4. Kening II, 352
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chusetts the beginning was made in 1839 and in Pennsylvania the
first statute hears the date of the year 1841. The New Jersey
law goes hack as far as the year 1864 and the statute in Kansas
was passed in 1868. All of these statutes have been revised and
reenacted but the present legislation is all of comparatively re-
cent date. We shall brielfy consider the existing statutes.
It is true of practically all the present laws relating to
the repsonsibility of the counties or cities for injuries or damage;
resulting from mob violence, that in the main they differ but littl i
from each other. Moreover it is interesting to note that in every
case these laws have been upheld by the courts as being constitu-
tional. In California the statute provides that every county or
municipal corporation is responsible for injury to real or per-
sonal property by mobs or riots. 1. In Kansas however we have
a similar provision but injury to life or limb is likewise in-
cluded, a matter which in itself seems just. The same provisions
as in the California statute are to be found in the Kentucky stat-
utes. Moreover, the liability of the county or municipal cor-
peration is only to be claimed when it can be shown that they had
the ability to prevent such riots. 2.
In Illinois a law regulating the matter of local responsibility
was passed in 1805 which provided that whenever any building or
other real or personal property, except property in transit, shall
be destroyed in consequence of any mob or riot composed of twelve
or mote persons, the city, or if not in a city then -the county
in which such property was detroyed shall be liable to an action
by or in behalf of the party whose property w;,s thus destroyed or
in.iured, for three fourths of the damages sustained by reason there-
1.
'Peering 1396:4452 2. Gen. Stat, of Kansas, 1909 S 2933
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of 1. It is especially stipulated that this provision would not
prevent the injured party from BUing the persons participating in
the mot. 2. Th« city or county which pays indemnity may recover
such amounts from any or all persons engaged in the riot. In cases
of lynching, the lineal heirs of the victim may recover damages
from the county or city not exceeding 5,000.
The law in Maine 3. provides in a similar manner for hoth
an individual liability for damages "by rioters and a liability of
the rown when injur}' exceeds the sum of 50. The same provision
for 3/4 value indemnification is also present. The Massachusetts
statute also has the three fourths rule and provides that the town
s^all he liahle in action of tort as may the offender. 4. There
are other Blight deviations in other states. Thus in Maryland then*
is a due diligence clause which stipulates that no indemnity shall
b« forthcoming when it can he proven that the city or county has
used due diligence in attmpting to suppress the riot. 5. Diff-
erent is the Missouri law where liability of individuals and of
cities of the first or second class is established. The city may
recover such amount? as it paid out as indemnity from the indivi-
duals engaged in the riot, plus 10 per cent and the added inter-
ests and costs. 6.
Turning agin to the eastern st,- tes we find that in New Jersey
the law has the same general features as the California law 7.
1. Rev. Stat, of 111. 1911, 807 § 256b 2. ibid. Maine 1904 929
3. This is a pretty general rule in our law. 4. Mass Rev Laws
1902 II 1784 sec 8 5. The Annotated code of Pub. Civ. Laws of My
1911, p. 1902 6. Rev. Stat, of Missouri. 1909, II, 3005 § 9549 iff.
7. Compiled Stat of IT. J. 1911, IB p. 4381
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"but in Sew York 1. where the law is in the main identical, action
may be "brought against an official, if he has not used due dili-
gence in suppressing the riot. In Pennsylvania 2. a special
las for Philadelphia regulates the matter 7.
It might seem perhaps that this discussion of municipal law
in the United States h.as led us away from the main points of our
discussion, hut the role which the municipal law may play in the
question of /'urisdicion in a federally organized stale is too im-
portant to be overlooked and will unfold itself presently in con-
nection with our discussion of the cases arising in the United
States. As a possiLle outgrowth of the responsibility of the
.:unured it is interesting too for it preserves the tradition of
the hundred be J ter than does the present law in England, and al-
though it is not vastly different therefrom it may be compared with
+
:-e putative relation between the law of the South American
states, and that of Spain. As regards the significance which the
lav; has or may have upon the practice of responsibility for aliens
this is only to be conjectured, for as has been remarked the exist-
ing legislation is of comparatively recent date, and where such law i
existed before, no cases of responsibility have arisen. In spite
of the obfiously potential ch.ara.cter of this legislation therefore
it is not. to be supposed, that it will supercede the existing
practices of international law which the United States has observed
ruch against her will, but like the system in England, and the
communal responsibility in Prance v/ill form an excellent means of
internal policing but a matter not at all rel ted with internation-
al law, except in so f r as the ir.jured ale ins may themselves wish
to submit to the decision of such tribunals. But as we have said
1. Consol. Laws of N.Y., II, 213 § 71 2. Dig. of Stat. Law of Pa
IS 10, IV, <-156 3. In Utahactiun must begin within a year.
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subsequent developments will show exactly what international sig-
nificance these laws will have.
This c atrpletee our study of the growth in the municipal law as
regards responsibility except for the legislation in the South
American states. But what the actual effect of the laws has been
and the close interrelation of the same with internal! onal juris-
prudence we can only ascertain by the study of international prac-
tice, a matter with which subsequent chapters shall deal. We have
already indicated at various times that the rela ion of municipal
law to international practice is gradually losing its significance
and instead of pralleling or overriding the international law it
ts gradually sinking to the type of law which is known as supple-
mentary municipal law, as for instance the municipal lav/ needed
to carry out treaties. This situation has been created in Europe
Chiefly by the delicacy of the international relations there, where
the states would rather submit to acknowledging their responsibilit
than to distunn amicable relations. This has been especially true
during the last quarter of a century. On the other side of the
Atlantic, however, where lines arenot so finely drawn, the states
have gone at greater lengths to assert their independence but even
here the development has followed the lines of that in Europe and
it seems truly just that this should be so, for if a state has not
reached a degree of civilization to prevent the reoccurrence of
outrages upon aliens within its confines then no great impartial its
In the administration of municipal law is to be exprected there. T
This has been the case and it yet remains for us to show whether
the force of international practice may have been sufficient to ha\
have completely superceded the municipal jurisprudence.
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We ht>ve tried to indicate in this chapter the v rious phases
of development through which the theory of rem onsiMlity of st tee
for aliens has undergone from earliest times until the present.
At the "basis of this development there are certain fundament 1
concepts which explain in some degree the reasons for the wide diff-
erence of opinion in record to responsibility
. These theories
we must ascertain before we can fully understand the significance
of international practice.
J
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Chapter II.
TEE IASURB OF RESPONSIBILITY AUD ITS RELATION TO TE^ PRESEITT PROBLEM
In the last chapter we traced the legal expression of the
theory of responsibility of states for aliens from the earliest
tines down to the beginning of the twentieth century, noting first
the dual character of the jurisprudence, the loss of its interna-
tional significance, the new lines of demarcation which Grotius
drew, and finally the conflict of laws and jurisdiction which took
place in the nineteenth century. The present chapter Y/ill deal
with what the theory is in and per se and what its present status
is
.
In the first place we insist that the character of responsibil-
ity, in the problems which we are discussing, is fundamentally one
at public lew. Attempts to regard the matters of responsibility
as purely within the ftel3 of private law are unjustifiable and
this we shall endeavor to point out in the succeeding discussion.
The responsibility of a state for injuries sustained by aliens
never assumes a real character at private law, altho at times it is
difficult to distinguish the private from the public law aspects.
It is true that very frequently matters which might give rise to
international responsibility are settled by the application of pri-
vate law rules, but in such cases there never existed an actual
responsibility in international law, although the potentialities
for such were present. Hence, we may say, that international respon-
sibility presupposes a public law treatment.
•hen we speak of responsibility in its international connota-
tion, we immediately assume that there has been an act in violation
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of some norm of international law, for it is only from such a viola-
tion that into mat ional responsibility can arise. Of equal impor-
tance to tne concept of an infraction of a given rule is the ques-
tion, to whom and "by whom in international law is responsibility
imputable? V»e know that international law is regarded as the to-
tality of rules or principles Thieh governs the B»t«al relations
between civilized states and according to which principles such
states regulate their rules of conduct; and , furthermore
, that inter-
national law imposes upon the states certain obligations as well as
rights. In short, international law is a relation between states,
and the individual, in so far as his interests are concerned, is only
the object of the rights and duties of such states. Thus, if a
state permits a flagrant outrage upon a subject of another state
whom it is bound by international law to protect in life and proper-
ty, it has violated a rule of international law for which its
responsibility may be engaged, not to the individual, but to the
state of which the individual is a subject.
We have indicated that it is an international obligation of a
state to accord to the subjects of another state certain rights and
privileges. The grafctiag »f these rights and privileges has given
necessity for laws within a state which complement the general
international law and which prescribe the mutual conduct of aliens
and nationals. Thus, there grows up a 'double form of responsibil-
ity, the international responsibility and the responsibility which
a state owes by its own law and jurisprudence. The former is the
relation between states the latter between state and individual.
It is only when the local laws are completely at variance with
international jurisprudence and the conflicts of law arise, when

44
the municipal law attempts to take precedence over the international
law, that such municipal law will affect the problems which we are
studying. But "before we go more intimately into the various cases
in which the international responsibility of a state is engaged,
let us enquire more precisely into the question of what constitutes
such responsibility.
We saw that responsibility in the general international legal
sense, proceeds from a violation of some rule of international law.
It presupposes three conditions: first, an illegal act in interna-
tional law; second, a relation between the positive act and a deter
minate subject; third, as injury resulting from said illegal act.
The illegal act which gives rise to responsibility presupposes
in turn, the material act of transgression and the norm which such
an act violated. The latter, if it is to give rise international
responsibility must be a rule of international law. The act it-
self may be either a positive act on the part of the state, or an
omission, a failure to carry out its international duty; but in
either case responsibility will exist just the same. Thejjpositive
act may occur by direct act of the state, or by some agent of the
latter for which it would be responsible. Again if the state neg-
lects to enact the necessary laws for the execution of internation-
al law, it is guilty of an omission, which in its effect does not
differ from a positive act of the states. But the responsibility
of the state is not engaged for all such acts or omissions occur
-
ing within its jurisdictional limits. What these particular acts
are and the circumstances in which they may arise, we shall present
ly ascertain.
ibility proceeds the duty of

reparation. It may "be either a duty of satisfaction or a duty of
compensation. The former consists usually in an apology or a
salute to the flag of the injured party, or the salutary punishment
of offenders, or some similar act. Compensation, on the other hand
is always a money payment, i£ theory, to the injured state, not to
the individual; "but in practice either method may he followed.
Whatever form, however, the obligation of reparation may tal:e it-
self, it is always the form in which the assumption of responsibil-
ity expresses itself. Thus it can exist only when responsibility
has been acknowledged, altho the making of reparation may be re-
garded as pri::.a facie evidence, that responsibility has been ack-
nowledged. Thus, when we find publicists saying, "aliens are en-
titled to receive indemnity when so and so occurs", they are fallin,
into the old error of mistaking cause for effect. They are dis-
cussing a matter in private law as though it were in public law,
for the payment of indemnity to the injured individuals is res
interna, that is, it is a matter which the parent state regulates
with its subjects as it sees fit. It cannot be regarded as within
the sphere of public law. This distinction of reparation and re-
sponsibility is a most important one to our discussion, and keeping
it in mind, we shall be able to maintain the distinction between
the public and private lav; aspects of the whole problem of responsi-
bility. I
The injury resulting from the illegal act consists in the il-
legal character of the act rather than in the result of the act
itself, duo to the peculiar nature of international law, the fact
that its force is potential rather than positive, and, again, from
the fact that the injury is usually more a moral injury than a
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materirl inj-ry. In itself the injury may "be a twofold violation
tKdt ft A*
of right. It may be a violation of a right so £=&=£a=*re an act con-
trary to objective international ISW, r.rd then it becomes cogniza-
ble in the municipal courts of the country, where the act was com-
mitted, but, on the other hand it may be a violation of a right
which maizes it a matter of subjective international law, and no
longer of municipal jurisdiction, but a matter between the states
concerned. It is even more dictinctly in the confusion of these
two fields of jurisdiction than in the fields of law mentioned
above, where the clash has come between municipal law on the one
hand and international law on the other. States have thought that
in satisfying the injury subject to their own law
. in this manner,
that the other injury, namely the violation of international law
has been fully repaired, but this is, of course, impossible.
Keeping in mind these points in regard to the general nature
of responsibility we may now turn to the theory regarding the es-
pecial responsibility of the state for aliens injured in mob vio-
lence and other eiril commotions, and the question of the protectior
the state is bound to accord them.
It has already been stated that one of the obligations which
international law imposes upon a state is the recognition of cer-
tain rights and privileges to aliens. If a state fails to do this,
such a failure to perform its duty may constitute a violation of
international law for wkieh its responsibility may be engaged.
Exactly what the nature of these are is also of importance. The
rlgttfca -rich aliens er,joy, exclusive of those granted by treaty
stipulations, are in general to be divided into two classes: first,
absolute rights, and second, personal rights. The former are matters
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regulated "by international law and the latter, matters of municipal
law. Strictly speaking, international law imposes on a state simply
the auty of protecting the life and property of an aliens. These
are the absolute rights of aliens. The personal rights of aliens
as they arc regulated "by the state in which the former are residing
may be discriminatory against the alien, hut as a rule, it is held
that these rights should be no more and no less than those of the
nationals themselves. In spite of the fact that this is the strict
legal status of aliens, it appears that there is a certain absolute
standard for the treatment of aliens which has grown up thru long-
years of international practice. This standard has never been for-
mally recognized, but it works as a great force in the shaping of
international opinion and gives strength or weakens the rules among
states, as they either give or take rights from aliens. 1.
In contradistinction to the matter of granting rights to aliens
which as a duty of one state to another may be regarded to a certain
extent as a surrender of sovereignty, we find the right of protec-
tion which a state has over its subjects abroad, a matter which may
be regarded as a manifestation of sovereignty, for the protection of
such subjects, is in international law the protection of the inter-
ests of the state. The protection of the state over aliens is not
to be looked upon merely as a right to be exercised at the «?nim of
the parent state, but a duty as well, 2. which is exercised under
certain limitations, namely, those cases where municipal law alone
should have jurisdiction. Pradier-Fodere 3. mentions certain in-
stances in which protection is due from a state for its nationals
1. Thus the extra-territorial courts.
2. Pradier-FoderS
, III p. 230.
3. Ibid, p. 231.
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abroad JLAgainst acts which violate international law. 2. Against
>
arbitrary procedure or denial of justice by local authorities.
5. Against manifest injustice about to be committed against nation-
als, in violating the exisfcixi$ or^der of things, or in introducing
odious distinctions. 4. In private suits between aliens and nation-
als which engage the general interests. 5. Against the violation
of the provisions of treaties or conventions between the two coun-
tries. 6. Against the irregular exercise of right by local author-
ity.
The right of protection depends in some measure upon the inti-
macy of the relations existing between state and the subject, for
it is the nationality of the subject which permits a state to
demand from another state a certain line of conduct to be observed
in regard to such subject. Here again the question of the relation
of the individual to international law is raised. In one case he
being the object of the right of protection, and in another the
subject of the internal laws in this relation.
The right of protection always expresses itself thru diplomatic
channels, and is therefore, frequently referred as diplomatic pro-
tection. It is this fact which has caused many stave- to feel that
the invocation of the right of protection should come only after
all the ordinary means of obtaining justice have been exhausted, or
only in very exceptional cases. Conflicting views have given rise
to many important questions of jurisdiction: to what extent can an
alien expect protection, and how far the second state will permit
the right of protection to be extended, can the individual oblige
the state or which. he is subject to protect him, is the second
state bound to recognize an extended interpretation of the right of

protection and many other problems which are too numerous to mention
It 1b however ,1b the municipal law basis of the right of protection
as against the international law in this regard, and the municipal
law basis for the duty of a state to protect aliens in contradi stinc
tion with the international law and the conflict of these fields of
jurisdiction, and their interpretation where rests the crux of the
whole matter of international liability. 1.
The question of protection and of the rights of aliens arise
frequently in cases involving injuries to aliens on account of mob
violence or riots, and in what is of infinitely greater import, in
civil wars and insurrections. To what extent is a state liable for
such injuries, and to what extent may the offended state demand rep-
aration for the same?
In cases where the responsibility of a state is claimed for
outrages upon aliens by mob violence, the liability of the former
is much clearer than in insurrections or civil wars, for the many
and complex elements do not come into play in a mere riot or mob
outbreak which affect aliens during civil wars. The acts of a mob
or riotous assemblage from the very nature of the latter, are like-
ly to be a matter which would enga- e the responsibility of the state
in which the;.- occurred. A mob outbreak is generally an expression
of popular passion, which, when it takes the form of an attack upon
the persons or property of aliens may be looked upon as an attack
upon the state itself. Thus the various outbreaks against the
Italians in the United States have been of this nature and were re-
garded by Italy as an attack upon itself, inasmuch as the acts com-
plained of were motivated by a sentiment distinctly anti-Italian in
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character. Moreover, the difficulty of apprehending the offenders
in cases of this sort, due to popular approval of the acts seem to
strengthen this contention. On the other
4
the theory which is "based
m
on a praesiytio juris et de jure attributing to a fault of the gov-
ernment the injuries therefrom arising from acts of moos, is not
quite correct. Thfe^» cannot he regarded as omniscient and omni-
present. Mob violence from its very nature is swift and sudden and
on this account it is wrong to impute to the government a fault whic 1
never existed is, in short, the confusion resulting from the Gro-
tian theory of fault, which wrongly identifies the individual with
an omission by the state. The Grotian view of responsibility, it
may be said
y
is fallacious from two points of view. In the first
place it unjustifiably imputes a participation of the state which
does not exist, and in the second place puts the state on an equal
footing with the individual. 1. Grotius distinguished between
positive acts and omissions as we have seen, but many writers re-
gard the responsibility without the direct culpa
, as a responsibil-
ity quasi ex, delicto 2. responsibility for act of commission, how-
ever, being considered as a complete delict. What these writers
re;;f.ra as a delict for quasi delict) without the direct culpa of the
state is simply the act which a state commits thru an omission,
and, as we have already seen, responsibility maybe engaged equally
for acts of commission or omission.
As a rule, liability is created by injury to aliens in mob
outbreaks, and since the publicists lean, for the most part, upon
the Grotian theory of fault, they think that there must be a fault
of the state, for, they argue
, how else could there be a liability
on the port of the state? But from the broad viewpoint of inter-
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national practice we are constrained to admit that liability can
arise without a positive act or omission on the part of the state,
it80If involving the fault of the latter. International law imposes
upon a state the duty of protection of aliens; this duty is violated
by the subjects of said state without the least opportunity or
possibility of a fault on the part of the state itself. According
to the Grotian view the state would not be responsible in the
international law. Yet, there has been a violation of a rule of
international law, namely the rule which imposes the duty of pro-
tection upon a state; and an infraction of international law we
learned above gives rise to responsibility. Clearly then, there are
some cases in which the Grotian view cannot be applied. The matter
hinges upon the question of what constitutes fault.
It is clear that injuries may be aone to aliens, especially in
civil wars, without the knowledge of the state and hence, without
possibility of the latter preventing such injuries. Gould we say
that in such a case the state had committed a fault? And so, in
mob outbreaks, the question of fault of the state is of even greater
importance as the facts in such cases are always harder to determine
It have indicated that it is impossible for even the most perfect
police system to prevent riotous assemblages from committing injur-
ies to aliens and from this point of view there must certainly be
some limitation upon the duty of protection. Moreover, if we accept
the view that if a state has used due diligence, it is^ld to be
at fault and this view is almost universally held, we would reach
the conclusion that under such circumstances there is no fault of
the state, although there is a situation where the responsibility
of the state may be claimed. Take for an instance the celebrated

Aigues Hortes affair in France which we shall presently discuss.
A number of Italians were killed in a mob outbreak, and from the
documents in the case, it is reasonably clear that all possible
means were taken to cuell the disturbance, in fact, it v/ould be
difficult to deny that France had not used due diligence. Neverthe-
less, the killing of the Italians had engaged the responsibility
of the French state and though there was no clear fault on the part
of the government, France acknowledged its responsibility and paid
an indemnity. Similarly in the so-called Fortune Bay case, where
British fishermen attacked United States subjects while fishing in
the bay of that name, and where there was little or no possibility
of protection on the part of the government officers. Certainly,
there could be no fault of Great 3ritain involved here, for it
was manifestly impossible for the state to have exercised its jur-
isdictional powers, and the treaty provisions in regard to aliens
had been violated. Great Britain finally acknowledged her responsi-
bility and paid indemnities.
We are led to conclude, therefore, that just as in private law
there are cases in which it has been recognized that there is a
responsibility without fault either by act of omission or commission
so, too, in international law, there are cases in which the respon-
sibility of the state may be engaged when there has been no fault
on its part. The responsibility therefor, especially in eases of
mob violence cannot be said to depend on the fault or degree of faul
of the Btate, but it proceeds from the nature of the facts in the
case
.
It shall now turn our attention more particularly to the ques-
tion of the responsibility of the state for aliens in cases arising
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during civil wars ai.a insurrection, a mauter xjihieh is of consider-
ably greater import than the responsibility for injuries resulting
from mob violence, not only because the instances are more numerous,
but because the liability of the state for injuries arising in
insurrections and civil wars is much less clear, and involves many
important points of Jurisdiction, of intervention and of sovereignty
In the instructions drawn up by Dr. Lieber for the armies in
the fieia in 1863, insurrection is defined as "the rising up of
people in arms against their government or a portion of it, or
against an officer or officers of the government. It may be con-
fined to a mere/armed resistance, or it may have greater ends in
view." 1. A civil war on the other hand, was said to be, "war
between two or more portions of the country or state, each contend-
ing for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the
legiti-ate government. The term is sometimes applied to war of
rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the state
are contiguous to these containing the seat of government." In
the subsequent discussion, however, these distinctions will not be
maintained, inasmuch as they are rather arbitrary and difficult to
follow, especially in the latin American countries. let us examine
first of all, the various arguments which are arrayed against the
assumption of responsibility.
The older writers declared that the idea of reciprocal respon-
sibility was in opposition to the idea of sovereignty, and if there
was such a thing as responsibility, it proceeded from the will of
the state where the acts had been committed. Gradually, however,
the exigencies of the moment had brought about a change in the
rag; "ie^t^ responsibility
2. BonfilB, Traite, p. 172. ' P
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seems to have been closely bound up with the view of Grotius, namely
that there is no responsibility without fault on the part of the
state. This we have discussed. These views however, as Bonfils
points out are fallacious inasmuch as the moral binding force of
international law, andconfound c:-eative with sanctioning law and
which would enable a powerful state to act about as it chose. 1.
More recent writers, howev r, attaching themselves more close-
ly to the Grotian view, find a variety of reasons why a state should
not be responsible for injuries sustained by aliens at the hands of
insurrectors. As a general rule, the stock argument which is pre-
sented is that a state is not bound to accord greater rights to
aliens than it would grant to its own subjects in similar cases.
Especially, is this the view of Pradier-Fod6re and of Calvo, Thus
the latter states in his work on international law: "To admit in
this case (internal strife) the responsibility of governments, that
is to say, the principle of indemnity, would create an exorbitant
and pernicious privilege essentially favorable to powerful states
and prejudicial to weaker nations and to establish an unjustifiable
inequality between nationals and foreigners. On the other hand,
in sanctioning the doctrine which we combat, one does, altho
indirectly, a deep injury to one of the constituent elements of
the independence of nations, that of the territorial jurisdiction;
Just here, indeed, is the real bearing, the true significance of the
recourse so frequently taken to the diplomatic channel for the pur-
pose of resolving questions, whose nature and the circumstances in
which they are produced place them within the exclusive domain of
the ordinary tribunals." 2. Calvo is more distinctly a writer of
1. Bonfilg, p . 173.
Calvo III,
-p. 1260; III, p . i4E .
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the older historical school, for he "bases his arguments more upon
the supposed violation of sovereignty than upon the principle of
equality between aliens and nationals. Moreover, he sees in the
right of protection over subjects abroad, a particularly dangerous
instrument which evidently he would limit to a sort of supervisory
function, without any recognition of the right of diplomatic inter-
vention.
Pradier-Fodere attaches himself to Galvo, for, in stating that
aliens may enjoy no greater privileges than nationals, he says that
states have always denied responsibility, and if they ever have givef
indemnity, it has been in the form of pecuniary aid., declaring
that such an act was one of spontaneous liberty, which placed them
under no obligation whatsoever. As to the truth of this statement
we shall see presently. 1.
Other writers, notably Fiore ^believe that a state is responsi-
ble unless it can show that it has used due diligence in suppressing
riotous outbreaks, for if it has been in any way guilty of criminal
negligence, responsibUUy^ill arise, except, however, in cases of
Yi3 r^ ° r
'
-
which we e*M*all'y call Act of God, a state cannot be
held responsible. But what this vis major may be, the state is left
to decide. In fact, it is a favorite doctrine of municipal law,
which has been transferred to international jurisprudence as a
principle which would enable a state to justify certain acts, which
would admit no other justification. This has been especially true
of cases of mob violence, as we shall see in our study of the cases
in this connection.
A third argument which is advanced by many publicists tc deny
« Fiore,Le,roit Int. Codifle ^j'^l&V*. ^ ,.
f
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has "been carried over to international law. It is the so-called
theory of risk. The adherents of this theory assert that when an
alien settles in a country, he assumes a certain risk. "When
strangers enter a state"
,
says Hall, "They must be prepared for the
risks of intestine war, "because the occurrence is one over which
from the nature of the case the government can have no control;
they cannot demand compensation for losses or injuries received both
because, unless it can be shown that a state is not reasonably
well ordered, it is not bound to do more for foreigners than for its
own subjects, and no government compensates its subjects for losses
or injuries suffered in the course of civil commotions, and because
the highest interests of the state itself are too deeply involved
in the avoidance of such commotions to allow the supposition to be
entertained that they have been caused by carelessness on its part
which would affect it with responsibility towards a state." 1.
Gppenheim likewise adheres to this view. There is, however, yet a
different application of the same idea of risk, namely that the
state by taking the alien under its protection assumes the risks of
the wrongs or injuries which may happen to him. This is essentially
the same principle as the one which Hall supports except in the
fact that it has a different application. 2. The risk is called
the risque etatif and has recently been quite widely supjo^ea.
Ehis theory of risk is to supplant the theory of fault, and the
state on the theory, ubi emolument urn
T ±bi o nv.s esse debet^ is re-
sponsible for the injured alien. The state, however, may extricate
itself from this responsibility by proving the fault or negligence
of the victim.
1. Hall, International Law, p. 251.
2. Rongier, p. 472.
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We have already said that the theory of risk had supplanted the
doctrine of fault in the eyes of some international law writers.
In addition to the general theory 'fault in the international law
there are also adherents to the idea that if there is fault it must
be met by a civil responsibility. These are mainly the writers
who have been led astray by the existence of municipal law regulat-
ing responsibility, a matter which we have sufficiently explained
in the preceding chapter.
Aside from the specific cases where the responsibility of a
state is engaged and aliens are not entitled to indemnity we have
therefore three main arguments against the theory of responsibility
insurrection in civil wars: first, that aliens are not entitled to
better treatment than nationals; second, that civil war is a case of
vis major for which the responsibility of the state may not be
engaged; third, that when an alien enters a country, he does so at
his own risk: ubi emolumentum ibi onus esse debet, and again the
same theory applying to the state in the so-called riscue etatif.
Let us -examine these respective viev/s and ascertain exactly what
bearing they mGy have upon the present problems.
ITo nation would be inclined to demand from another nation great
er privileges for its subjects residing in the latter state, than
the nationals of such a state enjoy themselves. Uor has it a right,
strictly speaking, to do so. All it can demand is that its subjects
be treated in accordance with the rules of international law. When
these duties of the state have been violated by injury to aliens in
a civil war, the responsibility of the state is engaged, not, indeed
for the injury done to the aliens per se, but for the injury to the
state which has been committed by the violation of the international
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obligation. Two possible consequences proceed from the responsibil
ity, the duty of satisfaction, or the duty f compensation. This
principle has already been laid down. Both of the duties are to
the injured state and not to the individual injured, for the indiv-
idual is not recognized in international law except as an object
of rights and duties. There is even a question whether or not the
state is obliged to give the amounts received in compensation for
injuries to aliens to the injured parties. If the offended state
does pay this amount to the injured nationals, it usually does,
then whatever inequalities arise between nationals arA aliens are
simply d^dental and cannot be said to have any effect in interna-
tional law, for in principle the aliens injured receive the money
from their own state and not from states where they were injured
and this is res interna. However, it has been argued that the mere
fact that the nationals of a state tacitly accept the violence
done them in a civil war, and make no protest cannot be considered i
legitimate reason why the aliens who have suffered in a similar
manner should not make reclamations against the state. Thus, Rivier
1. argues: "It is alleged in order to deny the existence of this
ob-igation of responsibility that the alien who is settled within
a certain territory should not be better treated than the nationals.
This is true in principle. But if the national suffers from the
reigning disorder in a country, it is because he has no means of
compelling indemnification. Why should the alien be obliged to
suffer eoually, if this state, espousing his cause, has the means
of forcing the other state to indemnify him." This is the view of
many other writers, among them Brusa, and vet, it seems that it has
1. Rivier - Droit des Gens II, 43.
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overlooked the essential element of responsibility, namely, the faot
that responsibility is a relation between states. Nevertheless,
even if this were true, it would mean the introduction into our
international theory of might makes right, a medievalism for which
there is no place in modern jurisprudence, and which would mean an
inseparable obstacle in the way of a sane development of interna-
tional law.
The fact that the relations in cases of responsibility are so
distinctly between state and state would seem to add weight to the
view that reclamations should be made thru diplomatic channels, and
that the aliens need not be compelled to settle the matter of repar-
ation thru the ordinary local cou-ts. Should aliens have recourse
to the local courts, then they put themselves on a basis of equality
with the natives and as regards any rights which the;/ personally may
enjoy under the uuty of protection by their own state, these are
extinguished. In other words, a new status is created which super-
cedes that which existed under objective international law. Whether
the matter be settled in local courts to the satisfaction of the
injured .lien or not this would not effect the question of the
satisfaction of international injury. On the contrary, for the
relation between the states would not be affected by a private ac-
tion in a municipal court. The fact, however, that very frequently
action is brought in municipal courts by aliens would seem to streng
then to a certain degree the view that the local remedies should be
exhausted before diplomatic recourse could be resorted to. This
argument, however, is without any real basis and indeed, seems to be
another result of the confusion of indemnity with responsibility
itself.
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To sue up then the facts relative to the contention that aliens
should receive no "better treatment than the nationals of a state
are accorded, we find that the relative treatment of aliens and
nationals in international law is supposed to he the same, and that
if, by receiving indemnity, aliens appear to be more favored, this
is an incidental effect which has no real international basis. It
is merely a question of the relation of the parent state to its sub-
jects, a matter with which international law has nothing to do. In
the second place, the international questions which are involved in
cases of responsibility would make it desirable that such cases be
settled thru diplomatic channels, without reference to municipal
courts.
The question whether a civil war is to be regarded as a case oi
vis major, or forc e majeure is more involved and must be decided
from the facts in the case than from the abstractions of legal
theorizing. As a rule vis major is regarded as the interposition
of violence proceeding from human agfBg^ of such a character as to
be incontrollable by the entity against whom it is directed. Some-
times, however, it is held to be synonymous with the idea of "Act oi
God." It is difficult to look upon civil wars and insurrections in
general as cases of vis major
, for these are matters from which it
is impossible to exclude absolutely the element of will. Revolu-
tions particularly the L.ort which flourish in Latin America are
scarcely to be regarded as the blind forces of nature at work, es-
pecially in the cases of rapine ar.d plunder, or even in the ordinary
acts of war which depend upon human violation. The doctrine of
vis major should be one W-4hj- invoked only in exceptional cases
where there has been no possibility of maintaining order. In short,

the invocation of this doctrine must depend on the facts in the case
for insurrections cannot "be SL.id to "be one and all cases of vis mi j-
or. These facts, according to international practice, must stand
out plainly, for only in exceptional cases has such a plea had any
great validity. Thus, the War of Secession in the United States is
a good example of a civil war which was generally regarded as a case
of vi s majo r, and in fact has "been one of the very few well defined
cases of this, sort. The fact that a civil war itself is not always
a case of vis major does not preclude certain events during the in-
surrection from "being so regarded and responsibility being refused
for the claims arising from such cases. This has frequently been
the case in South America. On the whole, therefore, we may say
that the theory of vis maja^ is one which can he applied only in
exceptional cases depending on the facts in the case, and can in no
wise he regarded as applying to civil wars or insurrections in
general.
We turn next to the douhle theory of risk which from one point
of view argues now - responsibility and from the other, a qualified
responsibility. There is something to be said for both view. Those
who believe that an alien entering a country does so at his own
risk, argue that such a person enters a state solely for the means
of benefiting himself and if the state accrues any advantages, these
are accidental and unintentional; and since the alien is acting
just for himself, it is but right that he should bear the brunt of
whatever reverses may come to him. The adherents of the risoie
e£atif, however, can see in the advent of the alien to a country
solely a benefit to the state, for which the latter should be will-
ing to pay, by assuming the risk of responsibility for any injur-

ies to the former. But these views are neither quite correct, in
that the:; are "based on the question of to whom the advantage of an
alien settling in a given state accrues which is not a particularly-
tenable ground. The alien entering a country, unless it is known
to be in a state of intestine commotion, does not assume any risk.
International lav/ has given him the right of protection in person
and property by the state in which he settles, and just as far as
this right extends, he cannot be said to have assumed any risk.
The duty of protecting the person or property of alien by a state
is absolute. It is limited only by the fact that the alien may be
ent ering- a country in which the order is not established and then
he clearly does so at his own risk.
As regards the risque etatif aside from the fact that it is
based on the dubious ground that an alien settling in a court ry is
of direct benefit to the state, the chief criticism which is to be
made of the theory, is that in order to be tenable it would of
necessity have to apply to nationals as well, for by not doing so,
it would discriminate against them, and such a proceeding would not
be just. 1. If this were remedied, however, it would mean that all
inhabitants of a country would be on the same legal basis, a fact
which would put the question of the treatment of aliens upon the
basis of internal or municipal law rather than international law,
a matter which international jurisprudence during the last century
has been trying to avoid.
One general criticism, however, may be applied to the whole
theory of risk, in both its individual aspect and also in that of
the Iris que etatif, and that is the fact that its private law charac-
ter is with difficulty translated into a public law character, and
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for this reason is likely to give rise to no little confusion.
Moreover, the opponents of one view can call upon the other to
support their arguments, and by this means would soon destroy the
efficacy of both views.
This completes the discussion of the three general opinions
why a state should not be responsible for injuries sustained by
aliens. We have endeavored to show that in no way can any one of
these views be regarded as an absolute argument why a state should
not be responsible. On the contrary, the first one has no interna-
tional significance, and the last two may be applied only under
exceptional circumstances. We shall now proceea to discuss the que,
tion of when and why a state is responsible, and what exceptions
here are to the rule.
There are two cases in which the responsibility a state is
almost absolute: first, for its own direct acts, and secondly, for
acts of its agents. As regards the direct acts of the state, the
matter is so clear that it needs no amplification. A state, as any
personality at law is responsible for its own acts. As regards
the acts of its functionaries. These may be divided into acts of
administrative authorities, and acts of judicial authorities. The
responsibility for the acts of functurians is not upon a material
basis as in the case of responsibility for acts of private individu-
als (that is to say depending on the character of the act), but is
more distinctly
' on a personal basis. The relation to the individ-
uals concerned, rather than to the act itself makes the state re-
sponsible. 1. m addition to this distinction, the acts of different
sorts of officers or agents, is the difference between the acts
I. Triepel, p. 548.
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done within and without the scope of the officers agency. 1. As
regards the acts of officers within the scope of their agency it is
clear that acts performed in pursuance of the commands or advice
pf the government, if such acts are in contravention to the princi-
ples of international law, will "be regarded as acts for which the
government is responsible. Just how far this principle is to "be
extended to the acts of military authorities is a matter which will
depend on the nature of the acts. As a rule it may "be said, that
such acts will give rise to an o"b ligation of responsibility on the
part of the government, if they are acts which would give rise to
compensation under the law of war. But the matter of military
authority we shall presently discuss more fully. The enactment of
laws or decrees "by which a state declares that it is not responsibl
for acts of its agents, are entirely without international sanction
or force, and can only he looked upon as an unjustifiable attempt
on the part of the state to extricate itself from its international
obligations.
It may be said of acts committed without the scope of an offi-
cer's agency, that it is a rule of international law, that the gov-
ernment is not liable in diplomatic procedure for damages caused by
officials acting beyond the limits both of their real or apparent
authority. Thus if an official is guilty o£ gross misconduct, the
sovereign would not be held liable. Even in municipal law there
can be no cuestion of a government's liability in any way for il-
legal acts of officers. Municipal law should always provide means
of recovering against such individuals. International complication
arise when it fails to provide such legislation, and not from the
acts themselves. An act outside an officer's agency can no more
give rise to an international obligation than a burglary or an! YT ^n?n n 7 AC)
.
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ordinary holdup.
More important to our subject than the matter of responsibility
for administrative officials, is the question of the responsibility
of the state for acts of judiciary exclusive of matters of juris-
diction, questions which are usually known as denial of justice .
Let us briefly consider the Question of denial of justice, what
constitutes such a denial, and to what extent a state may be re-
sponsible for such acts of the judiciary. These problems come up
usually after a civil war is over, when questions of compensation
and the entertaining of suits arise. Denial of justice may be
defined as the act on the part of the state refusing to aliens the
ways and means of recourse necessary to the receiving of justice,
and generally speaking, is conceded as being an infraction of an
international duty of the state. To refuse an alien such recourse
is an indirect authorization of others to depradate on the person
and property of aliens with full impunity.
Turning to the consideration of exactly what may be said to
constitute denial of justice we find that part of the duty of pro-
tection over aliens which a state owes, is to give them recourse
to the tribunals of justice. '.7hen this duty has been performed,
the obligation of the state has been fulfilled. Uor can a state,
except in extraordinary cases, be held liable for the result of an
action in the courts of the country. There is no international ob-
ligation on the part of states to sec that the decisions of the
courts are intrinsically just. 1.
It was mentioned above that fact that in some cases the state
will be held answerable for decisions of the courts. Such cases
are not to be considered per so a denial of justice, but the state
1. Anzilotti in /J.P..D.I .P. 22.
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is responsible "because by the decision, some international norm has
"been violated. Therefore such cases of responsibility for decisions
of local courts is not responsibility for denial of justice, but for
violation of international law. There are some writers, however,
who believe that an unjust decision may constitute a denial of
justice. They argue that in countries where prejudice against
aliens is so pronounced as to effect the decisions of the court,
these decisions may be said to be essentially denials of justice.
The judicial acts of a state are just as much state acts as those of
administrative officials; they are not recognized as acts of the
judiciary, but as acts of the state itself. Thus, they argue, an
unjust decision by such as tribunal is equivalent to a denial of
justice by the state itself.
A better view of the matter is to look upon it objectively as
a question of the status of aliens. The state is only obligated
to accord to the latter access to the tribunals, and that further
than this the right of protection cannot extend. Protest cannot be
made unless there is a deliberate violation of international law,
and such we may call a decision which, at the same time it pretends
to give justice, constitutes nothing less than a denial.
A second class of cases which engage the responsibility of a
state in time of civil war, are those cases for which a government
is held liable according to the lav; of war. These acts may be
those of military officers which have the direct sanction of the
government. Such acts, as we have already seen would be regarded
as acts of the state itself and naturally would engage its responsi-
bility. On the whole, the;; are only the grosser acts of war. Thus
the state would be responsible as a rule for damage resulting from
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bombardment or building fortifications and numerous other oases. 1.
There is some question as to whether all acts of depradation should
"be indemnified
,
hut as a rule, this has "been done, except for some
the petty matters for which it would be ridiculous to hold a state
liable. Prestations of war such as the employment of angaria
give rise to responsibility, in virtue of the law of war itself. 2.
Acts of necessity on the other hand, cases of vis major will not
give rise to responsibility. But here as in all questions which
depend on the determination of facts, it is the determination of
facts itself which is the most important factor in establishing
responsibility.
In contradistinction to the responsibility of a state for the
acts of government troops is the question whether or not it may be
held liable for the acts of rebels, and on this point there is a
great variety of opinion. There are two cases in which very clear-
ly a state could not be held responsible. The first is when the
insurrection has reached such- a serious stage of development that
the whole armed force of the nation is engaged in attempting to
suppress it. The best example of non-responsibility in a case of
this sort to be cited is the United States during the War of Se-
cession. The second case in which a state is not responsible, and
which we shall presently discuss more fully, is when the belliger-
ence of the insurgents has been recognised.
It may be laid down that as a general rule a state may not
escape its responsibility even in time of revolution. Clearly, if
a state has not recognized the belligerence of insurgents, they
cannot address themselves to the organs of government of the in-
surrectcs, and must turn to the de_iux& government of the state,
1. Wi<sse, p. 67.
2.. 3ar in«R. D. I. 474.
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who alone is to "be considered as having vested in it the power
connected with the management of foreign affairs, and which there-
fore is still the only body charged with the accomplishment of
international duties towards foreigners and especially when these
duties are reenforced by treaty stipulations. These principles
have been repeatedly enunciated by statesmen, rot only in Europe,
but also in the United States, yet, they certainly cannot be accep-
ted as absolute. The insurgents are not under the control of the
government, and it is patently impossible for the de jure govern-
ment to be responsible for all of the acts of insurgents. To be
sure a state may divest itself of all liability for the acts of
insurgents by simply recognising their belligerency, but until it
does this, such insurgents are yet dependents of the government whid
pretends to have authority over them. As in the cases of the re-
sponsibility of the state for acts of war, the liability for acts
of insurgents may be said to depend on the facts involved in the
case, nevertheless, it may be laid down, that the state is respon-
sible solely for the acts of war or abuse of power by rebel author-
ities in the same measure as it is responsible for its own authori-
ties. 1. For is this rule to be regarded as absolute, but states
will in all probability do just as the exigencies of the circumstan-
ces direct. These matters will stand out more prominently, however,
in connection with the uiscussion of the cases involving such
problems.
The responsibility for acts of insurgents, which we have just
aiscussed, is based upon the presumption 'from the contest. In *
case, however, as often happens, the insurgents government should
become the de jure government
.
the responsibility for acts of rebels
1. Rougier op. cit. p. 478.
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is clear, It is liable not only for the acts of its own officers,
heretofore rebels, "but also for all those acts for which the former
government would have "been responsible, in virtue of the principle,
forma regiminis mutata, non mutatur civitas ipsa. A now govern-
ment can never escape its liability for acts of the former govern-
ment, for these are essentially acts of the state, and the obliga-
tions of the state continue, whatever reversal may take place in
the actual form of government itself. 1.
In addition to the general cases of responsibility already men-
tioned, there is yet another time when a state will be considered
responsible for the injuries sustained by aliens, and these cases
arise when aliens have been injured as aliens, or as subjects of
a particular state. This matter we have discussed fully in connec-
tion with the responsibility of a state in cases of mob violence
and therefore does not need to be enlarged upon.
To sum up, then, we find that the state is responsible in civil
wars and insurrections, for its own acts, for the acts of its agents
for acts for which the law of war requires responsibility; to a
limited e::tent it is responsible for acts of rebels, and entirely
so, if the de facto government is victorious; and finally, if the
aliens were injured as aliens or as subjects of a particular state.
To these general rules cf responsibility, then, are, however,
certain important exceptions. In the first place, a state is not
responsible when the alien has lost his nationality (heimatlos);
secondly, when the alien is himself at fault; third, when a treaty
disclaiming responsibility exists between the states concerned;
fourth, when the belligerency of the insurgents has been recognised
by either the claimant or respondent state; fifth, when an alien
1. This principle criticised bee use it would incline those persons
•
^Jv'^gLrt
7 reYolutionists to wish victory of the de
_fectp_
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enters a country where the social order is not established, or in
contravention to an order of expulsion or decree declaring such
territory to be closed. 1.
Of these natters little
-iscussion is necessary, as the grounds
for non-responsibility are clear. As regards the alien who may
have lost his nationality, it is manifestly impossible for him to
demand protection from a state to which he never expected to return.
Certainly if an alien settles in a country sine_
a
nimo revertendi,
he is entitled to no greater measure of protection than the nation-
als of such country themselves. Hor would the alien be entitled to
claim the responsibility of a state when the act of which he com-
plained was the result of his own imprudence or fault. Thus, fre-
quently, cases have arisen when aliens injured by mobs have really
abbetted such injury by this prevocative attitude.
When we come to the study of the Latin American jurisprudence 2
in regard to responsibility we shall find that between a great many
of these states and the European states as well there exist treaties
in which the signatures declare themselves reciprocally not responsi
ble for injuries or prejudices sustained by their nationals resid-
ing in the respective countries. Whatever may be the merits or the
demerits of such treaties from the point of view of expediency, it
is clear that between the signatories such treaties will be binding
and no claims beyond those recognized in the treaties may be made
against one of the states by the other.
It has been indicated before, that the recognition of the
belligerency of insurgents relieves the parent state of all obliga-
tions of responsibility for the acts of such insurgents. The
1. Gf. Rougier lcc. cit. also
.Viesse loc. cit.
2. CJhapt. 17.

71
government of the insurgents when "belligerency is recognized, be-
comes the organ to which a state may address itself for the acts of
said government. All obligations of the de jure government cease.
Finally, we mentioned that aliens may not claim the protection of a
state, when they enter a part of the country in which the social
order is not established; cither when this: is a notorious fact, or
when the de jure government has expressly decreed that such country
aliens or nationals enter at their peril. Thus an alien entering
a country under these circumstances would be likely to do so only
for reasons of personal gain, and for this reason if for no other,
he could not expect to receive protection from a state which had
repudiated its control over such a region. The same argument holds
good when an alien enters a country in defiance to an order of
expulsion. He does these things at his own peril. 1. In these
connections, it will be worth our while to cuote the rules regarding
the responsibility of states for injuries sustained by aliens in
civil commotions, which were adopted by the Institute of Interna-
tional Law at this meeting in 1900. The rules are as follows:
"Independently of cases where indemnity may be due to
aliens in virtue of the general laws of the land, aliens
have right to indemnity when they are injured in their
person or property in the course of a riot, an insurrec-
tion or a civil war: 3.
fa) When the act from which the;- have suffered is
directed against aliens as such, or against them as
subjects of a given state; or
fb) »Fhen the act from which they have suffered con-
sists in closing a port without previous notifications
1. The theory of risk would be applicable here.
2- j&ftaire X7III
, p. 255 et sq.
3.' These rules it will be noted take an objective viewpoint. In
•stead of discussing the rules of responsibility which is essentially Che point of departure. It is the old error of confusing thepublic and private law character of responsibility; the subjective
with the objective. From the point of view of theory these rules
are wrong. From the viewpoint of international practice thev
would be justifiable.
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at a seasonable time, or in retaining foreign vessels
in port; or
(c) then the injury is the result of an act contrary
to law committed "by an agent of the authority; or
(d) When the obligation of indemnity is founded
upon the general principle of the laws of war.
II. The obligation is likewise established when the injury
has been committed (Ho. 1. fa) and (d) } on the terri-
tory of an insurrectional
-government, either by said
government or by one of its officials.
Nevertheless, certain demands for indemnity may be
set aside when they are based on acts which have
occurred after the state, to which the injured indiv-
idual belongs has recognised the insurrectional govern
Bient as a belligerent power, and when the injured in-
dividual has continued to preserve his domicile or
habitat within the territory of the insurrectional
government.
"In so far as the latter is recognized by the goverdt-
ment of said injured individual as a belligerent, the
demands provided in line 1 of article 2 may be ad-
dressed only to the insurrectional government, and not
to the legitimate government.
III. Obligation to indemnify ceases, when the persons in-jured are themselves the cause of the events which have
occasioned the injuries. Especially is there no ob-
ligation to indemnify those who have entered a country
in defiance to a decree of expulsion, nor those who go
into a country to engage in trade or commerce, when
they know, or ought to know that disturbances have
broken out, any more than those who established them-
selves or who sojourn in a land which offers no securi
ty at all, in consequence of the presence of savage
tribes, unless the government of said country has
given special assurances to the immigrants.
IV. The government of a federal state, composed of a number
of small states, which it represents in international
affairs, cannot, in order to escape from the responsi-
bility incumbent on it, invoke the fact that the con-
stitution of the federal state confers upon it neither
the right of control over any single state, nor the
right to compel them to satisfy their own obligations.
V. The stipulations mutually exempting states from theduty of extending their diplomatic protection must notinclude cases of denial of justice or of evident vio-lation of justice, or of the law of nations (jus
gentium) ."
In addition to these general rules which were laid down by the
Institute certain recommendations were made which likewise are of
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importance. They provided:
it mThe Institute of International law recommen.s that
states refrain from inserting in treaties clauses of
reciprocal non-responsibility. It believes that such
clauses are wrong in exempting states from the perform-
ance of their duty to protect aliens within their own
territory.
"It "believes that states, which by reason of extra-
ordinary circumstances do not feel that they are in a
position to insure to a sufficient degree the effica-
cious protection of aliens within their territory, may
escape the consequences of such a state of affairs,
only by temporarily interdicting aliens access to their
territory.
"Recourse to international commission of inquiry and
to international tribunal* is, in general, recommended
for all differences which may arise on account of in-juries sustained by aliens in the course of a rict,
an insurrection or a civil war*"
The criticism of the action of the Institute of International
Law has already been pointed out in a footnote. Aside from this
fact, that they treat the question objectively and not subjectively,
which is
A of supreme importance, these rules embody most of the
principles of responsibility which have already been discussed. The
question of diplomatic intervention due to the critical condition
in which the law in this regard was, was purposely omitted. There
can be no question, hov/ev r, in our mind, that if responsibility is
to be treated as a matter of public law and not of private law,
if it is to be looked upon as essentially a matter of international
law and not of municipal law, if the alien is the object and not
the subject of the luties of one state to another, then questions
of responsibility cannot be settled by the municipal courts of the
countries concerned, but solely by the ways and means provided for
in international law. These questions can only be taken cognizance
of by the diplomatic channels, and whether or not the problems are
to be finally decided by international mixed commissions or inter-
national tribunals of inquiry is a matter to be determined by such

diplomatic channels. V.e repeat, questions of international respon-^
sibility are matters to be handled by diplomatic channels alone.
There remains yet an important point to "be discussed in connec-
tion with the international liability of a state, the question
whether or not a federal state may refuse to admit its own responsi-
bility for the acts in violation of international, committed either
by or within the constituent states of such a union, and whether
these states are liable in international law. This question has bee
a practical one, over which the discussion has, at various times,
been very heated. Especially have these problems come up in the
United States, where on numerous occasions the national government
has attempted to escape liability, by invoking the principles in-
dicated above, fe have mentioned the rule adopted by the Institute
of International Law, but setting aside for a moment the pertinence
or justifiability of such a rule, let us inquire more intimately
into this question of the responsibility of a federal state.
fe know that a federal union is a sovereign body composed of a
number of non-sovereign states who share in its expression of will.
1. Such non-sovereign constituent states are to be differentiated
,
moreover, from dependent states by their share in the government.
Generally speaking, we look upon the formation of such unions as the
surrender by the constituent states of certain of the sovereign
powers which previously they had held, the new central organ, and
among the sovereign rights usually surrendered, is the right to
represent the body of states in its international existence, ffhen
such a federal state is received into the family of nations, and it
becomes a subject of international rights and obligations, the fact
l.^jfeir'n&k System des Subjektiven Sffent lichen Rechts, p. 295.

that all the potentialities dealing with the foreign affairs of the
country which formerly the various states possessed are vested in
the central government "bring it about that only the central govern-
ment of the state is recognized as having international capacity. 1.
This is all the more true, when we consider those federal states
are formed more frequently as the result of pressure from without,
than from internal necessity, which would seem to emphasize the
basis necessity of an international existence solely in the central
organ of the federal union.
The question of the relation of central to local state govern-
ment is important but only from the view of internal law. As a
matter of international law its significance is nil, except insofar
as the actions of these states may give rise to an international
liability. The constituent states are not cognizable in internation
al law, but in so far as they have surrendered their sovereignty,
the federal union is answerable for their acts, as for its own
acts or for acts of its agents. Diplomatic complaint may be ad-
dressed to it, and to it alone. But the difficulties which arise
in this connection do not proceed so much from the question of who
or who is not responsible, but proceeds from responsibility, the
questions of satisfaction os compensation.
.Then the question is merely over compensation, the matter is
fairly cleer. The federal government will furnish indemnity, and
settlement with the state at fault it may bring about as best it
may by its internal law. But in questions of satisfaction the prob-
lems are more difficult. Very often the duty of satisfaction con-
sists solely in the punishment of the offending parties, and when
such is the case, there are often conflicts of jurisdiction between
±« ^riepel, p. 361.
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the states of the union, and the union itself. This has actually
happened in the United States where the peculiar distribution of
powers has made the conflicts of jurisdiction a serious matter which
has had effect upon the international points at issue. Thus, when a
riot breaks out in a state, it is the auty of said state to punish
the rioters, but if it docs not do this, the federal power is unable
to have any recourse. If aliens are injured in such a riot, the
federal state is responsible, and if the punishment of the offenders
is required as satisfaction, it is internationally obligated to pro-
vide such punishment. But as this is a matter cognizable only ha-
state courts, the national government is powerless if the state
refuses to do this. The dilemma is evident, and is increased by
the fact that such a state of affairs is looked upon in international
law as a failure of the central state to provide the necessary leg-
islation for the carrying out of its obligations at international
law, a matter which can likewise give rise to an international
liability. 1. Such a state of a: fairs is to be remedied by a
revision in legislation. It is interesting, however, as one of the
numerous questions which may arise in connection with the peculiar
jurisdictional segmentation of a federal m;ion. These questions
will come up more squarely in our discussion of the practice of the
United States where v/e shall examine more in detail the various
questions arising in these connections. It must be remarked, how-
ever, that the constitution clearly provides the basis for complete
control by the central government over exigencies of this sort. 2.
A word yet in regard to the responsibility of states for acts
committed in dependencies or protectorates. In the former case thel. Baldwin, La .iesponsibilite du puvofr federal n.Gand v. IV p.^37-al^
..Burgess, Federal Gov't. and Int. Rep. Pol. Sci. Quarterly 71 u.~356.
°
2» Gf. Burgess 1 article
-mentioned. .
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responsibility is well defined and the state any be said to be
responsible the sane a3 for acts committed within its own actual
territorial limits. In regard to the responsibility of a state for
acts committed in protectorates, some writers have held that the
responsibility is indirect, 1. but this cannot be laid down as an
absolute rule, for it would seem much more plausible that responsi-
bility of the protecting state would depend entirely upon the
closeness of the relation between it and the protectorate.
This completes our study of the nature of the internal re-
sponsibility of a state, and its relation to the problems which will
be more fully discussed in the succeeding chapters. 7/e believe
that we have established the fact that the responsibility of a state
is the rule
,
and that non-responsibility is the exception. For a
long time this principle was disregarded by states, but at present
the intricacy and delicacy of international relations, especially
in Europe has brought it about that practice is more closely coin-
ciding with the theories which we have advanced. It is true that
many states whatever their practice may be still adhere to the view
of non-responsibility but these views of non-responsibility are
based upon the fact that such states do not recognize the absolute
public law character of responsibility, bat look upon it as a matter
sometimes of public and sometimes of private law, just as is suited
to the exigencies of the circumstances, fq believe that we have
shown the basic fallacy of the views, and it yet remains for us to
show how international practice has gradually drawn away from
-the
municipal private law view of non-responsibility, to a recognition
of the essentially international public law character of these ob-
ligations of the State.
1. Thus Anzillctti, in 15 R.L.I. P.
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Chapter III,
The Practice of the Leading European States.
We pass from the consideration of the general theory of
responsibility of states for injuries sustained "by aliens, to a
closer examination of the practice of the leading countries both of
Europe and of the Americas. We shall find that two questions
present themselves v/ith almost monotonous regularity. First,
does the practice of ".he states accord with the theory of respon-
sibility adhered to by the respective governments? Secondly is the
practice of the leading s + ates uniformly consistent, or does it
bear out M. Cairo's statement that the theory of responsibility
favors the large and powerful states, but that it is prejudicial
to petty states? 1. Let us, in the first nlace , consider the
practice of the European countries among whom the theory of re-
sponsibility originated and where it has undergone such an inter-
esting development.
In the first chapter we saw that it was only with the latter
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when it grad-
ually was recognized that nationals themselves possessed certain
rights and privileges, that nations began to demand protection for
their subjects abroad. This demand, although it had been made in
the early part of the century^ did not arise in any important cases
until the outbreak of the revolutionary disturbances of 1830 7 when
numerous claims of responsibility arose.
1. Calvo , Le droit international, v. Ill, p. 142
t
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Few countries have been confronted "by such momentous cases as
has Great Britain, and it wan during the events of the Portugese
revolution of 1828-31 that she was first called upon to take a
definite stand in the question of the responsibility of other stat
for infuries sustained "by her subjects. 1.
English claims in Portugal arose through the excer-r.es of the
Absolutist party in power at the time. Don Miguel had been made
regent in the year 1827 for his infant niece. Being an e*fe^»si»iy
ambitious prince he finally was able to have himself declared
King of Portugal by a series of skillful political moves. The
constitutional party immideately rose up in arms against him, but
the Absolutists, determined to crush all opposition, imprisoned,
banished and killed literally thousands of them. 2. The watch-
word 'Death to the Liberals and Freemasons' became the rallying
cry of the lawless elements of the kingdom. Englishmen, ae pre-
sumable adherents of the Constitutionalists were beaten on the
s 1 reets ;3they were arrested and kept in prison for weeks without
trial and were subjected to inummerahle indignities. Lord Palmer-
ton demanded reparations f or certain of the cases, and upon threat-
ening reprisal, they were complied with. 4. In the subsequent
events of the reconquering of Portugal by the Constitutional party
there were a number of cases where British subjects were suhiected
to brutal and violent treatment but apparently no reparation was
made
.
1. For the facts cf . 18 Br. & For
. St . Pap
.
, 43 et sq.
2. Cambridge Mgdgrn Hist ory, X"7~3~20 et sq.
3. Thus" the" case" of McKenha and Munro
,
18, Br. & For
,
103-4
4. ibid. 268 et sq.

The French government fared considerably "better. Their sub-
jects had been victims of outrages similar to those which the
British had suffered, but the action of the nev/ly installed gov-
ernment was more vigorous. An expedition under Admiral Roussin
was dispatched to the Tagus
. 1. The Portugese^defeated and obliged
to pay a considerable indemnity, besides losing their fleet through
a naval engagement. 2.
It is evident that from the first, Great Britain took an ad-
vanced s^and in regard to ma J ters which concerned the safety of her
subjects in foreign lands where civil war was being waged. So too
in the revolutions in Italy in 1848 she demanded the responsibility
of the governments of Naples and Tuscany for the injuries sustained
by her subjects. But before we enter a discussion of this case
let us examine the facts in the celebrated Don Pacifico case which 4K
in 1847. 3.
Don Pacifico, a native of Gibralter residing in Athens, was
c
the vitim« of a mob in April 1847. The circumstances were as
follows: Por some years it had been the custom of Athens to burn
an effigy of Judas Iscariot on Easter day. In the year 1847, in
consequence of the presence of M. de Rothschild, the Greek govern-
ment endeavored to prevent the observance of this custom. The
brigands infesting the capital seized on the opportunity to spread
a report that the interference wa^s due to the action of Pacifico,
wlio was of the Jewish faith. As a result his house wap attackedjin
broad daylight by several hundred people who, instead of being re-
pressed by the soldiers and gendarmes
f
were aided by them, and
1. Camb
. Mod . Hist . X, 325 2. 18 Br. For St^ Pap. , 395 for
amount of "indemnify 3. ?or the facts in this case cf . 39 Br. &
For
.
St. Pap .332 et zq.; also Moore Diges t of Int. Law, VI, 852
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were even headed by •persons whose presence naturally induced the
belief among the soldiers and the nob that the outrages they were
committing would be indulgently treated by the government
.
1 1.
Pacif ico it appears presented a claim to the Greek government,
but despairing of ever having it recognized, appealed to the British
government. He estimated his losses at something likej31,500
^po nds
.
Unfortunately enough, the Greek government delayed for a
long time to answer the notes of the British minister and when it
finally did reply
;
it deplored the fact that Don Pacif ico had taken
recourse to diplomatic channels, for the Greek authorities had made
every effort to bring the pewrpetrators of the outrage to justice,
and that beyond this the Greek government did not regard itself
as responsible. Pacif ico if he desired indemnification must bring
his case before a local tribunal. 2.
The correspondence dragged on for a considerable length of
time until finally on the failure of the Greek government to make
compensation Great Britain instituted a pacific blockade of the
Greek coast. 3 The blockade had been established but a short time
when Prance offered her mediation
f
and her good offices were accepl
ed by both parties with the result that a convention was entered
into and the various claims, including that of Pacif ico were re-
ferred to certain commissioners. The final decision of the arbitrs
tors was to allow Pacifico 150 pounds by way of compensation.
In the course of the arbitration Baron Gros, the Prench re-
presentative, expressed his views on the question of respons ibilitv
in a note to his government^ which was later communicated to the
1. Dispatch of Sir Edv. Lyons. 39 Br. & For. S_t. Pap., 352
2. Note of H. Clarakis. ibid., p. 347 3TThis acTTon was not sole-
II 17 to collect Pacific* n^irna. hut, nf mnral British ^j.nfc
tt
f
I
P2
British government. 'In general', said he, ' the principle is ad-
mitted nd this principle conforms to justice, that there can "be
no diploma* ic intervention in cases where the local authority is
not concerned. It is to the trihunals in conformance to the law
of the land to which the injured party must have recourse and de-
mand justice
.
1 1
.
Lord Stanley a prominent le: der of the House of Lords ex-
pressed a similar view when he declared in a speech "before that
"body that 'it appears to me exceedingly doubtful whether on the
part of the British government there was - I do not nay just cause
for complaint, hut just cause for demanding indemnity from the
government of Greece. I do not understand that where by no fault
of a government offences are committed against foreigners the
government is hound to indemnify these foreigners...! doubt whether
the law of nations justifies any demand whatever.' 2.
Lord Palmerston, however, in a speech before the House of
Commons June 25, 1850 justified the British course. 3.
'The Greek government 1, he said, ' neglected its duty
and did not pursue judicial inquiries or institute
legal prosecutions as it might have done for the pur-
pose of finding out and punishing some of the culprits
•.
. .A criminal prosecution - by M. Pacif ico- was out
of the question to say nothing of the chances if not
the certainty of failure in a country where the tri-
bunals are at the mercy of the advisers of the crown
. .
.The Greek government having neglected to give the
protection which they were bound to extend and having
abstined from taking* means to afford redress this was
a case in which we were justified in calling on the
Greek government for compensation for the losses
whatever they might be, which M. Pacif ico had suffered
I think that* the claim was founded on just ice .. .But
the Greek government denied altogether the principle
of the claim. 1
1. Calvo, III, 142-3 2. Hansards Parliamentary Debates , III, 1306
ser. 3 3. ibid. ser. 3, CXII, 394 et sq.
"

It was then he pointed out that the British government had "been
obliged to resort to a vigorous policy
;
and he concluded by justi-
fying her course through numerous examples.
On the whole
}
although Pacifico certainly exaggerated his
injuries
;
as the claims which he presented show there was a certain
amount of justification in the British attitude and in her rigor-
ous met nod of enforcing her views.
In the case of the claims against Naples and Tuscany for the
injuries resulting from the insurrections of 1848, Great Britain
found herself in a different position. The two governments were
supported by two of the most powerful European nations and were
thus far better able to assert and maintain their position than was
Greece
.
In the year 1849 a number of English subjects in Tuscany and
in Naples 1. addressed themselves to their governments in order
to compel the recognition of responsibility by Tuscany and Naples
for injuries sustained by them as a result of the measures taken
by these countries in suppressing the disorders of 1848. The
British government immediately presented these claims and sent a
fleet to Naples to support her demands. As the Grand Duke of
Tuscany was an Austrian prince, the claims against Tuscany were
presented to the foreign office of Austria. Prince Schwartzenberg,
the Austrian Minister protested against the British action and in a
note dated April 4, 1850 2. he expressed his astonishment that
England should demand for her subjects in foreign countries ad-
1. For the facts in this case cf . Br. & Por . St. Pap. v. 40, 41, 4 J
Correspondence relating to troubles of 1848. C~alvo, III. 144.
Pradier-Fode>e Traite* du droit Int. I, 343. Bonfilr
2. Calvo, III, 144"
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vantages and rights which the nationals heraselves did not enjoy.
He went on to say that in case an alien settled in a foreign
country
;
and this country were to "become involved in a civil war
;
the alien would have to abide by the consequences. In conclusion
he added 'that however the European na ions might be disposed to
extend the limits of the right of protection they would never go
so far as to grant to aliens privileges which the territorial
lav/s did not grant to the nationals.' Every sovereign state should
enforce and maintain its sovereignty by force of arms.
This however did not terminate the affair. The Tuscan and
Neopolitan governments, anxious to settle the matter amicably de-
cided to apply to Russia for mediation. Russia replied in a note
of May 2, 1850 1. that the legal grounds so favored the defendant
parties / that there was no occasion for arbitration. To arbitrate
would mean to admit that the pending claims had some foundation,
when they really had none at all. In short Count Nesselrode con-
curred with Prince Schwartzenberg . He clearly defined Russia's
viewpoint in the following words'.
'In accordance with the principles of international
law which Russia professes it would be impossible to
admit that a sovereign forced by the insurgency of his
subjects to reconquer a city occupied by the insurgen'
would be obliged to indemnify aliens who in this event
might be the victims of lossesor injuries.'
In conclusion he pointed out thut cases of this sort gravely involv
ed the independence of the continental states, and for this reason
England should relinquish her claims lest her subjects bacome a
veritable pest and an instrument for revolutionists to embarass
1. Calvo, III, 144-5
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the de jure government. These two notes substant tally put an end
to British claims. 2.
I have quoted at length the opinions of the different govern-
ments concerning the question of responsibility, net only because of
the his torical importance of the two cases
;
but also because the
opinions are those of the great statesmen of the time, statesmen
whose views have feund much favor with succeeding generations of
publicists
.
It is a noteworthy fact, that in practically all ef the dis-
patches and speeches relating to the cases examined above, the
point which is emphasized most is the obligation to furnish com-
pensation. In no instance has either party to the controversy
affirmed or denied the obligation of responsibility for injuries.
In short, the result is made to outweigh the cause, for as we have
already seen compensation proceeds from the recognition ef respon-
sibility, and without such recognition compensation cannot exist.
ITor can this distinction be considered a mere academic view. The
duty ef satisfaction as distinguished from compensat ien,as we have
seen^is frequently a consequence of the recognition ef responsi-
bility, and in international law occupies an equally important
position with the duty ef compensation, although states are mere
prone to demand the latter that the former. But to leave for the
present the discussion of these purely theoretical quest iens / let us
proceed to examine one or two further cases in which Great Britain
made claims of responsibility.
1. England was not alone in presenting claims. Prance also sent
a fleet to Naples and was able to secure indemnity for losses ef
French citizens.

OG
A case of leaser import an ce which likewise arose during an in-
surrect on took pi ce in the year 1862 at the time of the over-
throw of King Otho of Greece. 1. The successful revolutionists in
the excess of their joy broke into the shop of a British jeweler
and pillaged its consents. The houses of several Germans were
likewise attacked and looted. The British consul immediately in-
formed the Greek government that compensation was expected for the
losses sustained by Mr. Hall the jeweler. Mr. Diamantopoulcs re-
plied in a note of October 27, 1862 that an official inquiry had be i
been made into the aiiair rand that Mr. Hall would receive full com-
pensation for his losses. 2.
The events in this instance require no comment. The newly
organized government, anxious to ingratiate itself with the guar-
anteeing powers was only too ready to accede to any demands made
upon it. Thus in the injuries of a member of a French and Aus-
trian circus a large amount of money was paid. 3.
4.
In 1870
;
a Mr. H.D. Jencken petitioned the British government
to request compensation from the government of Spain for injuries
received by him at the hands of a mob. It appears that he had
been sent to Spain as counsel for a British firm in certain suits
instituted before Spanish tribunals. While v/alking one evening in
the public gardens of Lorca he was suddenly attacked by an infuri-
ated mob for apparently no reason whatever. The pretext of the
outrage was some fearful and barbarous superstition. Mr. Jencken
was finally rescued after having been severely wounded. The Sp^niai
government immediately took steps to punish the perpetrators of
the outrage. Earl Clarendon, however, in a note dated April 7,
1. 58 Br. & For. St. Pap., 1009 2. ibid. 1031 3. ibid. 1142
4. 62 ibid.
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1870 1. pointed out that Mr. Jencken had ventured to Lorca on
professional duty, and was therefore entitled to rely on the auth-
orities of the place for protection, a duty which they had failed
to perform. In view of these facts he thought some pecuniary com-
pensation would be proper for the severe and unmerited sufferings
of Mr. jencken.
After some delay the Spanish government replied that it had
punished all the criminals, hut as the offended party had con-
clusively renounced indemnity in the local court, that the govern-
mentdit not see any grounds for making compensation. 2.
These cases must suffice us for the present in regard to
British claims against other nations. Let us next ascertain the
attitude of Great Britain in cases involving her responsibility for
acts of British subjects affecting aliens,
o
An important case
;
known as the Fortune Bay case
y
came up before
the foreign offices of the United States and Great Britain in the
year 1878. The facts were as follows*. 3. A number of American
fishing vessels while fishing upon a Sunday in Fortune Ba;
,
New-
foundland were attacked by native fishermjen who destroyed their
cargoes, boats and nets and expelled them from the bay. The Ameri-
cans claimed that the;/ were fishing within the limits and privilege
granted them by the Treaty of Washington of 1871 and that the
stipulations of this treaty could not be abridged by local legis-
lation which prohibited Sunday fishing. The United States minister
in London was instructed to present to the British government the
1. 62 ibid. 985 2. 62 ibid. 1000-2. The Spanish law as we have
seen provides that indemnification in cases of mob viokence shall
be made by the assailants. This may explain the fact why Mr.
Jencken did not press his claim in local courts. 3. 1878-81 For.
Bel, Correspondence with Great Britain.
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demands for indemnity which amounted to 105, 305. 02. The British
government contended that in as much as the re ty granted only
the right to fish in common with Eritsh subjects . 1. The Americans
by violating the llewf oundland law, and hence exceeding their privi-
lege s
;
had no just ground for complaint. 2. The United States gov-
ernment took the ground that local law could not bo admitted to
limit or define treaty privilege, but that irrespective of this
question compensation was due for the violence suffered. 3.
In a note dated October 27, 1880 Earl Granville fully recog-
nised the contentions of the United States government in regard to
the second point mentioned above.
'in the first place', he wrote, 'i desire that there
should be no possibilit;, of misconception as to the
views entertained by her Majesty's government respect-
ing the coiiouct of the Newfo ndlarid fishermen in de-
stroying or damaging some of their nets. Her Majesty 1 I
government have no hesitation in admitting that this
proceeding was quite indefensible ana is much to be
regretted. IJo sense of injury could unaer the circum-
stances justify the British fishermen in taking the
lav/ into their own hands and committing acts of vio-
lence... As regards the claim of the United States
fishermen to compensation for injuries and losses
which they are alleged to have sustained.
.
.
, I have
to state that Her Majesty's government are quite will-
ing that they should be indemnified for any injuries
and losses which upon a joint inquiry may be found to
have been sustains d by them and in respect of which
they are reasonably entitled to compensation. ' 4.
Early in 1881 the Britsh government settled the claim by the
payment of 15,000 pounds which included the settlement of certain
other claims v/hich had arisen previously. 5.
The Fortune B«.y case present several interesting points which
differentiate it from the preceding casea . In the first place we
have here to deal with non domiciled aliens, and secondly v/ith a
case in v/hich the violence suffered took place in territorial water \.
1. Art. XVIII of Treaty of Wash., Ma loy, 738 2. 72 Br. & For
.
1267 et cq. 3. 1878 For. Rel. 308 et Bq. 4. 72 Br. E~For .T2&8 if
5. 1881 For. Rel. 509
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Moreover the case has to do chiefly with Inte pretation of a treaty,
and it is perhaps this faet^coupled with the peculiar circumstances
under which the dispute arose^hut led Great Britain to acknowledge
so freely her responsibility and to accord inderanity.
To sum up the facta which we have ascertained relative to
Great Britain»s position concerning questions of responsibility for
mob violence and civil wars. In the first place, the British govern-
ment has maintained a consistent practice in regard to making claims|
against other countries,despite the fact that there has bee a de-
cided opposition to such a practice on the part of the text writers.|
1. In the second pli.ce Great Britain has never failed to indemnify
t ose countries which claimed her responsibility for acts of her
subject*, though she has always rather grudgingly admitted such
responsibility. On no occasion has sne accorded indemnity out of
•motives of spontaneous liberality', a term which so many countries
employ when the payment of such an indemnity seems inconsistent
with the general theories held by them. On the .hole, as we have
already said, Great Britain has coordinated theory and practice
far more consistently than have the majority of states and she
has thereby helped to point the way to a more creditable practice
among civilized nations.
Turning to Germany we find that the German view concerning
responsibility is practically identical with that of Great Britain.
Several cases in which German;^ was concerned seem to confirm this
view. Unfortunately for cur purpose I have been unable to find
any instance in which a state claimed the responsibility of the
1. Thus Hall, Oppenheim and others of, Chapter II of this paper.
I(
(
<German government Tor acts of insurrectionists or rioters. This
fact is due not only the comparatively recent establishment of the
German Empire bqt also to the basic elements of the German national
character. The German is essentially a law-abiding person, and
this fact in itself explains the absence of outrages within the
confines of Germany such as the United States has had to cope with.
Early in 1876 the first case of responsibility for mob violenc
came up before the German foreign of fice. This affair was the
celebrated 'Salonica Incident 1 which precipitated the outbreak of
hostilities between Turkey and the states of the Balkans. The dis-
turbances originated in the following manner. 1. A Bulgarian girl
was on her way to Salonica to declare her intention of embracing
the Mohammedan religion. Her lother who was opposed to this met
her by chance on the train and succeeded in persuading several
Christians to assist her in preventing the girl from carrying out
her intention. Upon their arrival at the station of Salonica, the
Christians aided by some of the bystanders attacked the police who
bad met the girl at the station, seized the latter and took her to
the American consulate. The •American consul was absent at that
time. 2. These incidents occurred on the evening of the fifth
of May. The Bulgarian girl and her mother remained at the consu-
late overnight and left next morning.
The same morning some Mohammedans called on the Pasha and in-
sisted that the girl be brought to the Governor's house. The girl
was nowhere to be found. The Turks threatened to attack the Ameri-
can consulate, and proceeded to the mosque where other Mohemmedans
1. Staatsarchiv, v. 30, p. 333 et sq.
,
v. 33, p. 108 2. The Ameri-
can consul was unjustly accused of having taken part in the affray,
cf. 1876 For. Rel. b69 et sq.
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had asiierab^led. They were all armed and ready for the attack.
About this time, M. Moulin, the French consul, and Mr. Henry Abbott,
the German consul passed by the mosque on their way to the Grand
Council to intercede in behalf of the girl. They were surrounded
and compelled to enter the mosque
. While attempts were being made
find the girl the crowd b came more and more furious and finally
att c-ced the consuls. With bars of iron wrenched from the windows
they ruthlessly murdered the two men. The girl was finally found
and appeared on the scene a few minutes after the outrage. Upon
her appearance the mob dispersed.
The German and French governments immediately demanded re-
paration for the murder of their consuls. The Turkish government
forthwith admitted its responsibility, and dispatched a commission
of inquiry to Salonica. The perpetrators were tried and condemned
and the consuls were buried with full honors. An indemnity of
300,000 francs was paid to the widow of Mr. Abbott and 600,000 franc
to the widow and children of M. Moulin. The critical conditions
then prevailing in the Turkish capital explain to a certain extent
the alacrity with which Turkey settled the case.
The Salonica Incident aroused considerable excitement not
only in the countries directly affected but also in Great Britain
and in the United States. In Great Britain, because the German
consul was a British subject and for this reason the British gov-
ernment seconded the German claims with a good deal of spirit. The
United States was concerned on account of the unjust accusations
made against the American consul.
The point might be raised here that the reasons why Turkey so
promptly assumed the responsibility for the murder of the two con-

not quite correct. We must remember that consuls do rot enjoy the
privileges and inviolability of ministers of date. Ao Mr. Jeffer-
son pointed out in 1791, 'Independently of - a special- law, consuls
are to he considered as distinguished foreigners dignified by a
commission from their sovereign...' 1. They are dimply entitled
to especial respect from the country in which they reside. It
must be borne in mind, moreover, that the attack upon the German
and French consuls was palpably an attack upon them, no: as consuls
or representatives of any particular state or nationality, but be-
cause they were Christians.
In this connection it may not be out of place to suggest an
amendment tothe rules of the Institute of International Law relatin,
to the responsibility of states for injuries sustained by aliens.
As we have already pointed out 2. Article I, Sec. A of the rules
voted by the Institute provides that aliens are entitled to an
indemnity 'When the acts from which they suffered were directed
against them as aliens or against them as representatives of a
particular state. 1 The suggestion for amendment which we would
offer is that the words 'or as the adherents of any religious
faith or sect', be added. 3. The rule would then cover a multitud
of cases where Christian missionaries have been victims of outrages
cases which deserve to be prosecuted more vigorously than those in
which ordinary domiciled aliens are concerned, and which frequent-
ly would not be included in the rules as they stand.
But returning to our study of the German position in regard to
responsibility we proceed next to examine the facts in the first of
the secalled 'Casablanca Incidents'
.
1. Moore, V, 33 2. Chapt . Ill of present paper. 3. This would not
protect, however, such sects as are prohibited a country by its
municipal law.
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The months following the signing of the Al^iciras Acts found
Morocco in a rather ^ufoulent s r ate. On July 30, 1907 n ine European
in Casablanca were uurdared by the Moors. They were laborers em-
ployed in constructing a railroad between the quarries and the pier
at Casablanca and were of French, Italian and Spanish nationality.
Mouley Amln, the Sultan's uncle assumed command and restored quiet
in the town. Meanwhile the French cruiser Galille'e had been dis-
patched to the scene ^and on August 6 had landed a sma'l and inade-
quate force of marines to protect the foreigners in the city, much
against the wishes of the various consuls who realized that this
action might cause the Moors to breaic out afresh against the un-
believers. The fears of the consuls were realized. A riot broke
forth among the inhabitants of the city and the wild tribes from
the hills poured down into the streets. At this juncture the
Gal
i
l lee opened fire on the town, and when the French and Spanish
rei-nforc iTig fleets arrived tfie French vessels of the squadron con-
tinued the bombardment. The loss of life and property suffered
was considerable^ for the tov/n was practically wiped out.l.
The German interests in Casablanca were considerable and with-
in a short time the French government was requested to make repara-
tion for the injuries suffered. At a meeting of the French cabinet
the ministers decided on the issuance of the following note: 2.
^he ministers have considered the question of indem-
nities claimed by the families of the laborers mur-
dered July 30 at Casablanca, and by those persons in-
jured by the inhabitants while pillaging the city or
by the suppression of the disorders. They have ex-
amined the precedents, particularly those relating to
the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 and have come
1. For a more extensive account cf . I. Am. Jour . Int . Law , 976.
Also Archives Diplomat iques 272 2. $4 Jour . Pr'ivS , 1257

to the following conclusions:
1. The government of Morocco must be held re-
sponsible for the murders of July 30 as well as theinjuries resulting from the plundering and from the
suppression of the disorders.
2. That the indemnities due for material injuries
must be fixed by a commission of inquiry.
The minister of Foreign Affairs has been charged
with completing the examination of the question and
with applying these regulations as nearly as possible.
X.
In the Casablanca Incident, we have extraneous elements and
influences upon the responsible government, so that it was constrain
ed to acknowledge its responsibility^ or here the political situ-
ation was such that Prance was practically compelled under the
terms of the Algiciras Acts and by the exigencies of her foreign
olicy to assume the responsibility for the insurrection of July.
It is doubtful if under different circumstances the French would
have been as amenable to German claims. 2.
The two cases which we have just considered must suffice for
the present in regard to Germany^ position in the question of re-
sponsibility. Later when we come to examine the Venezuelan inter-
vention in 1902 and the intervention in China in 1900 as a result
of the Boxer troubles we shall find that Germany's position was
no less well defined. Fortunately for Germany she has as yet been
free from all claims against herself in questions which concern her
responsibility. It remains to be seen whether she will maintain
the advanced stand which she has taken in the solution of these
problems, when she is confronted with claims involving her own
responsibility.
1. On lTov. 11, 1907 the German commission fixed the amount of in-
demnity at 978,576 marks. cf . 107 Arch. Dip. 276. The claims com-
mission settled the question on Jan. 24, 1910 by allowing 13,069,
642 fr. 57. This included claims of other countries. 113 Arch.
Dip. 315 2. Dupuis, 463 ff., Marten, 238

Up to this point in the discussion we have dealt exclusively
with questions of international law, the municipal laws of coun-
tries having merely an indicental effect upon our problems, as e.g.
the regulations for voting indemnities. When we turn to Prance we
find in the matter of responsibility that the municipal law and
the international law have a much closer interrelation than in any
other country, for in addition to the responsibility of the stare,
we have the communal responsibility which for some time was of
considerable importance in Trench international relations. We
have already seen that the law relating to communal responsibility
had been declared by the courts 6hortly after the French Revolution
to be inapplicable to cities of he size of Paris. This decision
practically put an end to the entering of claims in the local
courts and left the matter to diplomatic negotiation. The diffi-
culties which aCCompany such a course, were, however, obviated by
the passage of a special law on August '60
,
1830 which placed at the
disposal of the government the sum of 2 ,000,0001'rancs for the
claims arising out of the events of the revolution of that year. I
is a notewoi thy fact that this sum was designated as secour
s
or aid
1.
The indemnifications furnished by Prance for injuries result in
from the disorders of 1848 were similarly ..otivated. By a decree
of the president of the republic on December 24, 1851 a special fun
of 5 , 600 , OOOfrancs was created to settle the claims which had
arisen. The decree especially pointed out, however, that the state
do
Wis under no legal obligation to^this^but that it was acting thus
in conformity with the principles of justice and political safety.
2
1. Calvo, III, 150 2. ibid., 152
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The problems which arose in the year 1671 were Of an entirely
different nature from those in the preceding revolutions. Here the
losses incident to the Prussian war were scarcely to be disting-
uished from those resulting from the excesses of the communist
regime. One of the first acts of the national assembly hau been
to authorize an investigation by a special commission of the losses
in the various departments invaded, at the same time the minister
oi the interior requested the various prefects to make an estimate
of the losses sustained. The commission of the Assembly reported
damages to the extent of 821,087,980 fr. as contrasted with the
666,647,799.32 fr. of the prefects report. 1. Final revision
determined the sum of the losses sustained to be 658,598,430 fr.
62. This v/as exclusive of the 2,000,000 fr. contribution of Paris
to the war.
The national assembly by the lav; of Sept. 6, 1871 voted the
sum of 100,000,000 to e distributed pro rata among the various de-
partments. This sum was supplemented in the year 1873 by an addi-
tional appropriation of 120 million to the departments and 140
millions to the city of Paris. Finally in 1874 the sum of 50,000
fr. completed the total indemnity voted.
Strange as it may seem the National Assembly made no attempt
to differentiate between the injuries ana losses resulting from
the foreign war and those of the civil war. Hot only was this
true, out the claims of aliens were put on the same basis as those 3
of the nationals. 2. In the payment of all of the various claims,
however, the budget commission declared that there was no intention
to create a right to an indemnity nor to sanction a debt of the
state, nevertheless, the violence attending the reconquest of
x. Calve III, 152 2. ibid. 154
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Paris by the troops of the regular government during the communist
insurrection gave rise to claims which were distinctly declared to
"be debts of the state, in view of the fact that Paris was not
communally responsible. 1. There was no mention of the fact that
the indemnities were acts of spontaneous liberality.
The three cases which we have exa ined bring the development
of the theory of responsibility in France down to the year 1670,
but the most decisive development of the theory has taken place
since that date. Before we proceed, however, with the more recent
arose
developments let us briefly consider a case whichA in the year 1866
just prior to the founding of the third republic. 2.
Free entrance to the cities of Osaka and Sakae had been
granted by Japan in a treaty with France. The approach to Osaka
nh ch had heretofore been used was found to be dangerous and the
corvette Dupleix was commissioned to make soundings. The next day
news came that the steam launch of the Duple ix had been attached
by a mob and that everyone on board had been either billed, wounded
or had disappeared. The consuls of the powers incensed at the
news of the outrage withdrew from Osaka. The first reports were
subsequently confirmed by the two sole survivors of the massacre.
The Japanese government immediately acknowledged its responsi-
bility and returned the bodies of the murdered men. 'They recog-
nized the fact that our men were exempt from all blame, that the
massacre was without possible excuse; and that a signal punishment
was necessary.' 3.
1. These acts were regarded as fait de prince , the result of vis
vaior 2. For facts cf . StaataarchlT" 16, p. 119 et sq.i Arch Dip
.
Ser 1, 33-4 3. Dispatch of Mm. Roches. Staatsarchiv , 16, 121
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The Japanese government carried out their promises. Three
officials and 17 Samurai implicated in the outrage were executed^,
and official excuses were read on "board the D .pleix "by a prince of
the royal house. The government further paid the sum of 150,000
piasters as an indemnity to the families of the murdered men.
It is clear from this case and from the other cases involving
French nationals abroad, which we have already examined, that
whatever the views of the French government on the question of in-
demnities a3 acts of "spontaneous liberality' in her internal pol-
icy, in her relations with other nations in regard to her own sub-
jects, this was a principle which she little favored. She was
again "brought cut in the questions arising from the Carlist Re-
bellion of the seventies. 1.
The Carlist and cantonal rebellions are too recent to require
any detailed discussion. The events which drove Queen Isabella of
Spain from her realm in the year 18S6 produced a multitude of
claimants to the throne and for the next five or six yea s Spain
was the seat of the worst internal strife. The party supporting
Alfonso son of the lat ; r queen finally emerged successfully after
a vigorous campaign against the adherents of Don Carlos in the
North, and the Cantonaiists or Republicans in the South.
The Carlist forces had operated from the vicinity of the
French border and the injuries to French subjects settled in these
regions was considerable. France requested the Spanish government
that reparation be made for the injuries sustained. The Spanish
government was, at first, not constrained to do so, in view of the
1. For facts of rebellion cf. Camb . Mod. Hist., XII, 258 et sq.
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law in Spain which prjvides that persons injured in an uprising
or Tiot may sue the perpetrators of such violence lor damages.
Settlement was finally made in consideration of a cross payment by
France for injuries sustained by Spanish subjects in Algeria. A
special law was passed by the Cortes Mar. 14, 1883 which gave the
Spanish minister extraordinary credit of 300,000 pjsetos to
indemnify French losses. 2.
In this connection it may not be out of place to examine the
Spanish claims against France for the disorders in Algeria. 3.
In the month of June 1881 Spanish colonists settled in Saida
in the province of South Orun, Algeria were the victims of the in-
cursions of the Arabs, under the leadership of Bon-Amerna. The
loss of life and property was considerable. The Spanish govern-
ment immediately entered claims for indemnity M. Barthelarry-
Saint Hilaire
, minister of Foreign Affairs
,
replied that the
French government had gr^ve reasons for following the events in
South Oran with solicitude but that in cases of this sort, the
government load never distinguished between nationals and aliens,
that aliens enjoyed the same benefits fro., measures of reparation
as nationals. Furthermore he declared 'that measures of reparation
evidently could not proceed from a legal obligation.' The events
in Saida were to be classed among those inevitable happenings to
which the inhabitants are exposed as for instance the devastations
of a plague, events which could not engage the responsibility
of a state 1
. 3. He went on to state that the Spanish government
l.Arch. Dip., p. 120 also V. Pr. 1888, p. 293 2. Arch. Dip., 1882-
83, III, l . 57 et sq. I R.D.I. , 177 3. Arch. Dip., ser. 2, v. 7,
p. 59
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had recently denied her obligation to indemnify injuries resulting
from civil v;ar and insurrection on the basis of the same 'univer-
sally consecrated theory. 1 It was not surprising therefore that
the French government should act on the same principles of inter-
national lav/. Nevertheless he signified France's willingness to
indemnify the Spaniards if similar concessions were made in regard
to the French claims for injuries sustained during the Carlist and
Cuban insurrections. 1.
M. Barthellmy-Saint-Hilaire neglected to mention however that
the French claims against Spain which had been the first to be
presented, had not been in accordance with the 'universally con-
secrated theory.' The Spanish government protested against his
view not on the basis of this principle, however, but on the
ground that the facts in the two cases were widely different, that
no analogy could be drawn. The French government in reply pointed
out that in practical effect there was no difference whatsoever,
and after considerable correspondence the mutual payments were a-
greed upon. The indemnity paid by France amounted to 900,000
fr. 2.
The position into which the French government was forced is a
striking example of the inconsistent policy which many powerful
states pursue in regard to the responsibility of other states for
the injuries sustained by their nationals. When France in 1893
was informed by Brazil that the 'universally consecrated theory'
1. Cuba v/as in a state of revolt during the 70'sLarge indemnities
were paid out by Spain. 2. Arch. Dip., ser. 2, v. 7, p. 71
II
r
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would prevent the payment of indemnities for civil war, France pro-
tested very vigorously and finally compelled payment. In the sane
year the celebrated
'Aigf/es Mortes Affair' took place and France
faced a rather heavy bill of claims. No mention however was made
of the 'universally consecrated theory'
.
Aigffes Mortes 1. a small town near Marseilles was the scene
of a very violent outbreak of race prejudice. The compagnie des
Sabins du Midi employed a number of French and Italian laborers in
its works
.
On August 17, 1893 these workmen engaged in a quarrel
in the course of which the greater part of the population of the
tov/n participated, until there ensued a veritable pitched battle.
A number of Frenchmen were wounded, but of the Italians 7 were
Killed and 26 wounded. Order way restored by the arrival of regu-
lar troops.
The question arose upon whom the blame was to be placed, but
this wa? never satisfactorily elucidated. The root of the whole
trouble seems to have been that the company employed a prepondera-
ting number of Italians.
The day after the riot M. Ressman the Italian ambassador to
France presented his 'remonstrances' to the French minister of
Foreign affairs who expressed his deep regret and added that
prosecution of the offenders had been instituted. But the -iore
important question of reparation was still to be settled. Before
we proceed with the discussion of this problem let us briefly sur-
vey the events in Italy which took place on the days following the
riots at Aigfles Mortes. 2.
1. I ,R.D.I, p. 171 2. ibid. 173, Archiv. Dip., ser 2, v. 49, p.
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The Italian disturbances were as distinctly anti-French in
ch racter as the Aignes Mortes affair had been anti-Italian, but
they were far less serious in result. In the main, the activities
of the Italians were confined to hostile demonstrations against
the French in Rome, Naples and Genoa
. In Rome a mob assembled in
front of the French embassy and in spite of the active resistance
of the police, hurled stones and blazing papers into the palace.
In Naples and Genoa the consulates were attacked, business houses
of French merchants had their windows broken, and the cars of the
French street car lines were derailed and burned.
Claims for indemnity were first presented by the Italian
government. On August 22 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy
telegraphed the ambassador at Paris that the reparation by France
would be complete when a just indemnity was accorded the victims
of the Agnes Mortes affair. Before this dispatch had been communi-
cated, hor/ever, the French government of its own accord offered to
pay an indemnity. This was later affirmed by M. Casimis-Perie in
a note of the 11th. of December, 1893, 1. declaring that the gove •
ernment was willing to do this as a 'pensee d' humanite* 1
. No
mention of non-responsibility was made and the offer was accepted
by the Italian government.
The French merchants who had been injured in the Italian
riots presented their claims early in October 2. The sum of their
demands amounted to 50,000 fr. as compared with the Italian claims
of 420,000 fr. A joint commission was appointed to examine all
the claims but after a short sitting it dissolved without coming
1. Archiv. loc. cit. p. 45 2. ibid. p. 43
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to any definite conclusions. After considerable correspondence,
the matter was settled entirely through regular diplomatic channels
and the amounts mentioned above were paid. 1.
But little comment on this care is necessary. It clearly fall |
under the general head of injuries done to aliens on account of
their nationality, injuries which now are universally considered
as giving rise to indemnification. This principle, moreover, as
we have alrsady seen has been adopted in rules of the Institute of
International Law relating to the responsibility of states for in-
furies sustained by aliens. The action of both the Italian and
French governments was very creditable in the affair and set a
precedent that other nations could well afford to follow. It is
worth noting that the Spontaneous generosity' phrase is conspicu-
ous by its absence in all of the correspondence. 2.
Since the Aignes Mortes affair France has not been involved
in any important questions of responsibility, with the possible
exception of the Boxer troubles, until the outbreaks in Spain known
as the Barcelona riots which took place in the year 1909. The
fact that this is the most recent case in which the question of
responsibility for injuries to aliens has arisen makes it worth
our while to consider the facts and the opinions with especial care
,
The Spanish crisis in 1909 was brought about by the war policy
of the government in Morocco. Public sentiment in Spain was de-
cidedly opposed to the pursuance of hostilities in Africa, and when
1. Ibid., 47-8 2. On writer I R.D.I, p. 174 misinterprets the use
of the word spontaneraent
. As I understand it, it refers to the
spontaneous actfon of the government In according indemnity in con-
trast to such an indemnity being the result of pressure by the
claimant state
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the attempt was made to mobilize troops popular dissatisfaction
manifested itself in strikes, riots, insurrections and all the con-
comitant excesses of mob passion. These disturbances assumed a
most critical aspect in Barcelona and Catalonia. In Catalonia the
outbreak was decidedly anticlerical in character but in Barcelona,
a hot-bed of p^itical fanatics the riots broke forth with unbrldle(
fury. This city, had been for generations the rendezvous of
anarchist, and the success of these agitators left the results of
the fight for the time in doubt. The uprisings were finally
quelled, but only after a considerable loss of life and property.
The important French interests in Barcelona naturally had
suffered considerably and it was not long before the question of
the responsibility of the Spanish government was raised. We have
already seen that the peculiarity of the Spanish law relating to
indemnities is such as to practically render the use of diplomatic
channels unavailable to claimants. Exceptions to the rule occurred
at the time of the War of Independence and again in 1833, 1840,
1842 and 1863 1. when special laws provided indemnity. In 1875
a decree of June 10 provided that the property of Carlist insurg-
ents should be confiscated to provide indemnities, but few persons
were benefited by this decree. As we have already seen a special
law indemnified the French only who had been injured during the
course of the rebellion.
The indemnities demanded by France for the Barcelona riots
comprised claims both for injuries inflicted by the insurgents and
by the royal troops in suppressing the disorders. For the burning
1. 37 Jour. Prive*, 1139
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of a monastery the sum of 80,638 pesetos wae demanded and another
claim for a similar outrage amounted to 87,379. There were five
or six other claims the smallest of which amounted to 6,500 pesetos
1. The whole difficulty in making settlement rested on the fact
that the Barcelona insurgents were laborers and insolvents from
whom no damages could possibly he exacted.
During the course of the debate on the budget of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on Dec. 24, 1908 the ministry was interpellated
concerning the progress of the reclamation against Spain. After
stating the facts in the situation M. Stephan pjshon, Minister of
Foreign Affairs went on to say 2.
That as has already been shown, there exists no in-
ernational jurisprudence in regard to the responsibi-lity of states when events occur in civil or politi-
cal troubles. The law varies with the state. Certain
states recognize responsibility, others do not. In
Spain there is a system of double legislation. When
aliens complain of the acts of insurgents the latter
are responsible with their property. However, legis-
lation has decided that only the property of those
who have been convicted of sedition are responsible
for injuries sustained.' 3.
The opinion of M. Pichon is very clear in its delineation of
the present situation of the question of responsibility. The
course which has been chosen by France is one evidently favorable
to the theory of responsibility. In the cases we have examined,
and the list is practically exhaustive, there has been no instance
of refusal of indemnity although perhaps in the case of the Spanish
claims of 1883 we have the nearest approach to a refusal. In addi-
1. 37 J. Pp. H40 2. ibid. 3. In Sep. 1910 the question
of responsibility was still in the sphere of diplomatic action -37 J , Pr
, 1141
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tion to the fact that France has been favorable to the theory
of responsibility we find that her practice has been uniformly
consistent not only in regard to claims for injuries sustained by
her own citizens but in her treatment of the subjects of other
naions
.
In our study of the numerous cases cited in this chapter we
have found that there has been a growing tendency among the great
powers to admit the validity of the theory of responsibility. In
the case of Great Britain we found that this tendency was pronounc-
ed as early as 1830 but that in Prance it has become clearly ex-
tablished only since the year 1890, although up to that time the
practice was decidedly in favor of the theory if the payment of in-
demnities may be taken as a criterion. Germany has in its brief
history as an empire maintained a similar stand in favor of the
theory of responsibility. We have already seen in numerous in-
stances that the practice of the other European states is similar
to that of the three great powers whose practice we have more
closely examined. Let us briefly consider a few cases involving
the smaller states of Europe, that we may ascertain the extent to
which the theory of responsibility is prevalent in Europe at large.
Italy's stand in the Aignes Mortes affair has been the posi-
tion which she has occupied consistently in all questions where
claims of her responsibility for acts of her citizens affecting ali
s
aliens have been made and likewise in all instances when she hersel '
has claimed indemnities. This we shall see even more clearly when
we come to the study of the situation in South America and in the
United States. A recent case arose in Crete where an Italian sol-
dier was killed. 1.
II 1. 13 R.D. p^223 . The solaier was evidently not on duty.

During the election troubles which took place at Cambanu in
January 1906 an affray took place in which a soldier belonging to
the Italian occupying force was so severely injured that he ex-
pired soon afterwards. The representative of Italy in Crete im-
mediately ordered the occupation of the region where the outrage
had occurred, and claimed an indemnity from the Cretan government
for the family of the victim, and to this end, ordered the seques-
tration of the cusoms duties in the region under Italian protection
Under such pressure the Cretan government hastened to comply with
the demands of Italy. On the 8th. of February, 1906, it paid
the sum of 20,000 by way of separation and the sequestration of
customs was raised.
The cases relating to Spain which v/e have discussed may be
taken as a criterion for judging the Spanish views on responsibility
When we come to study the practice of the United States ve shall
find more confirmatory evidence. An interesting car;e has recently
arisen in regard to responsibility of Spl in for the acts of in-
surgents in the Cuban civil war. 1. Short ly after the Hispano-
American war, England
,
France and Germany presented to the Span-
ish government claims for injuries suffered by their nationals in
the course of the civil war in Cuba. The Spanish government re-
plied that a nation could not be obliged indemnities except for
acts of government forces.
During the last tr/o insurrections in Cuba the injuries to
property had been commuted chiefly by the insurgents. The large
Spanish army had been unable to prevent these excesses. The
claimant governments recognized thi fact and although they pre-
1. 39 Jour. Prive" 675
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sented their claims to the Cuban government they con ' ended that
Spain should share the brunt of the burden, because many of the
injuries were the result of the outrages of government troops.
The case against Cuba was reasonably clear. It was a notorious
fact that much of the depredation had been from the acts of in-
surgents and later by the forces of the republic.
In 1912 the three governments presented claims amounting to
110 ,000 ,000fr . some of which had been pending for over 30 years.
No action has as yet been taken. Cases involving Russian subjects
have been very few, although within the last 10 years there have bei
been two instances, one in which claims were made against Russia,
and another where claims were made by Russia against another
state. These two cases which v/e shall next consider are a striding
illustration of M. Calvo's contention that the theory of responsi-
bility favors the powerful, but is prejudicial to weaker nations.
In the year 1905 the Swiss federal coucil announced that
their claim for the indemnification of a Swiss citizen injured
in the disorders in Russia of the same year had been repudiated by
the Russian government. 1. The Russian minister of Foreign
Affairs had replied in the following terms,
The imperial government could not assume the liability
for the indemnification of the Swiss citizen injured.
In short injuries of this sort occasioned either by
individuals or bodies of individuals should be reim-
bursed by the persons recognized as the guilty parties
by competent judicial authority. It is generally un-
derstood that this principle does not exclude the re-
sponsibility of functionaries who might be convicted
for neglect of duty in regard to the suppression of
disorders. Consequently the aliens injured have full
and entire right of instituting actions against each
individual or official whom they believed to be guil-
ty, without the imperial government as such guaran-
teeing indemnification to injured aliens. In view of
these ideas the latter cannot pretend to enjoy privi-
leges Russian subjects themselves are not entitled to.
1. 1905 Rapport du Conseil Federal, 300
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Russia was clearly inclined toward the view that the whole
question of responsibility was one which fell in the field of
municipal law alcr.e at least as regrrded claims against her.
Switzerland was too weak and insignificant a country to he able
to press her demands. In regard to the claims of her own citizens,
the policy of Russia has b en more generous. The following quo-
tation from the Journal de droit International Prive* for 1912
will suffice as an illustration. 1.
The Prince Salar ed daouleh who occupied New Kerman-
chah paid at the request of the consul of Russia
7000 tomeins as indemnity to Russian subjects for in-
juries sustained by them during the disorders in that
city.
Fortunately for the theory of responsibility such supporting
evidence for M. Calvo's niew is becoming less frequent. The
development which the theory of responsibility has undergone in the
European states during the nineteenth century has not been a very
rapid one, for as we have already seen the most important changes
have been since the Franco Prussian war. Fortunately too the
states in their practice of according indemnities are coordinating
theory and practice to a much greater degree than was the custom
earlier in the century. Another important phase in the develop-
ment has been the fact that responsibility is gradually being recog
nized to be a matter of international and not of municipallaw,
and gradually the adherence to the old view is becoming less.
The example set by the European states has really determined the
fate of the theory of responsibility, for its reception has been
1. 39 Jour. Prive\ 686

110
less favorable in the Americas from the international point of view
"but from the point of view of international practice, a ponderous
mass of evidence has been piled up in favor of the adherents of
international responsibility. And, after all, it is the weight
of precedent and practice which is the determining factor as to
what is and what is not international law.

ill
Chapter IV
The Practice of The Latin American States.
In our study of the conditions in Europe, we came to the
conclusion, and justly, that the status of the theory of inter-
national responsibility is gradually becoming more clearly defined
in regard to the relations of the European states with each other
and with the United States. When we turn to the Latin American
states, however, the situation changes and our verdict is likely
to be less sanguine. Here the status of the theory of responsi-
bility may best be described as chaotic.
The state of affairs in South and Central America recalls
the famous words of Jefferson, that the state which arose in revo-
lution will live in revolution and will pass away in revolution.
We cannot consider these revolutions as frivolous and sporadic
outbreaks, as they are frequently pictured to be, but they oft an
assume a very formidable aspect. Thus we have the Venezuelan
Revolutions of 1870 and 1892, the Columbian Revolution of 1870 and
the Brazil Revolution of 1893 which gave rise to lengthy and acrid
disputes. The injuries which were sustained by aliens in these
insurrections are typioal of the sort of thing which constantly
occurs in the Latin American revolutions. The flagrant disregard
of life and property has justified the vigorous measures taken by
the European governments to protect their nationals, and confirms
the view which these governments hold that the Latin American
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states hava not yet reached such a high degree of civilization as
to trust the destiny of foreigners in their hands. On the other
hand, there has "been a decided abu^e of their position "by the
European powers and a misuse of diplomatic intervent ion in favor
of nationals for supposed injuries. It is actions of this sort
which in turn justify to a certain extent the viev/s of M
.
Calvo,
and the attempts of the Latin American states to avoid -feite respon-
sibility for aliens.
The claims which are most frequently made against the South
Airier ican states are iae=s4 conveniently divided into three classes.
First, claims made for injuries arising from acts of oppression,
unjust imprisonment or mob violence. Secondl. r
,
claims for injuries
sustained during civil wars and insurrections. Thirdly, claims
made for violations of contract obligations . It is with the first
two classes alone that we shall have to do.
In order to avoid the liability for injuries to aliens, the
Latin American states have adopted every conceivable method, but
to all appearances, to no avail. They have repudiated the theory
of responisbility not only in their diplomatic correspondence, hut
in their statutes, their treaties, and even in their consitut ions
.
From a political point of view this position which the Latin
American republics have assumed may be regarded as a protest a-
gainst indiscriminate intervention by European states, whether
this be diplomatic or armed intervention. It is an effort, more-
over, to maintain the principles of the equality of states and
the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. From the juridical
standpoint, however, we see in this attempt of the Latin American
states to repudiate the theory of responsibility, a final effort
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to regulate the responsibility of states by municipal legislation.
From this point of view it is, therefore, to a certain degree com-
parable with the system of internal regulation in France, in Spain
and other European countries.
Although it is the purpose of the present paper to stuay
simply the question of the international responsibility of states
for injuries sustained by aliens and the problems arising therefrom
nevertheless, the interrelation of the municipal and international
law on this subject is so close in the Latin American states that
it becomes necessary for us to examine with great care, the efforts
made by these states to avoid responsibility. These attempts
take the form of regulation of the rights of foreigners, first by
constitutional provisions, secondly by statutory provision or
special decree, and lastly by treaty stipulations. Let us con-
sider in the first place, the constitutional regulations of the
liability of a state for injuries sustained by aliens.
The constitutional limitations of the rights of aliens may be
divided into two distinct types of regulation, those provisions
which prohibit reclamations of any 3ort, or limit diplomatic inter-
vention to cases of denial of justice, and those provisions which
guaranty to aliens nothing more than equal privileges with nation-
als. The earliest of the provisions limiting international re-
clamations i3 to be found in the Costa Rican consitution of 1871,
article 46. It is one of the least reactionary in character and
does nothing more than limit claims of aliens to the municipal
courts. The provision is as follows: 1.
Act 46. Costa Ricans or foreigners shall seek redress
1. Rodriguez, Amer ican Cons titutions
,
T.I, p. 332
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for injury or damages done to their property, or hon-
or before the courts. Justice shall he administered
to them promptly, fully without denial and in strict
conformity with the laws.
It is evident that this provision is pretty general in char-
acter and was not directed against diplomatic reclamation alone.
In contrast to this provision, however, is the article from the
Guatemala constitution of 1879, which provides that
neither Guatemalans nor foreigners shall have indemni-
fication for damages arising out of injuries done to
their persons or property by revolutionists. 1.
This was the first concise constitutional denial of the right
of aliens to indemnification for revolutionary outrages, and was
embodied in the Salvador constitution seven years later. The pro-
vision in the Salvador constitution differs slightly from the
Guatemala article in that it gives the injured party the right to
sue for damages. It reads as follows: 2.
Neither Salvadoreans nor aliens shall have any right
to claim in any case from the Government indemnity
for damages and injuries done to their persons or
property by factions, but they shall be free to sue
the guilty parties, whether official or private.
This provision is strengthened by an article -49- which pro-
vides that no international compact shall be entered into which
would modify in any way the present article. 3 % In fact, this
is what the Salvadoreans have done, but they have gone even far-
ther, as we shall see, and have strengthened their position by
treaty provisions of non-responsibility.
The Central American states had taken the lead in attempting
to determine the practice of responsibility by municipal regula-
1. Article 14, Rodriguez, Am. Const 8 , v. I, p. 238
2. Article 46, Rodriguez, Am. C onsts . , v. I, p. 268
3. Ibid.
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tion, and their example was followed In 1889 by the Republic of
Haity, with the adoption cf its new constitution. The constitu-
tion grants to aliens the same protection as native citizens sub-
ject, however, to 'the exceptions established by law'. 1. It de-
nies, however, the right to claim indemnities both to aliens as
well as to Haitian citizens. The paragraph which follows is essen-
tially the same as the Salvadorean provisions but broader in its
scope
:
The injured parties, however, shall have the right if
they choose, to prosecute before the courts, accord-
ing to the law, the individuals recognized as authors
of the wrongs perpetrated, and seek in this way the
proper legal reparation.
The Haitian Republic was the last country for the next 15
years to incorporate into its constitution provisions limiting the
obligation of responsibility. In the year 1904 two countries,
Honduras and Venezuela, finally embodied into their fundamental
law the principles which they had adhered to for the last 25
years. The provisions of the Venezuelan constitution 2. are iden-
tical with provisions in the other constitutions which we have ex-
amined and present nothing new. The Honduras provisions, however,
are significant for the reason that apart from the fact that they
deny the right of nationals or foreigners to make claims for in-
juries sustained at the hands of revolutionists 3. they further
prohibit the use of diplomatic intervention. The latter provision
is as follows: 4.
Art. 14. Foreigners shall not present claims against
the state or demand the payment by it of any indemnity
except in the case and in the manner in which Hondur-
1. Ibid., Art. 185, v. II, p. 85 2. Ibid., Art. 15 & 16, v. I, p.
201 3. Ibid., Art. 142, v. I, p. 388 4. Ibid., Art. 14 & 15, v.
I, p. 362
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eans may do so. 1.
Art. 15. Foreigners shall not resort to diplomatic
intervention except in cases of manifest denial of
justice, abnormal delays, or self-evident violation
of the principles of international law. The fact
that a final decision is not favorable to the claimant
shall not be construed as a denial of justice. If in
violation of this provision claims are presented, and
not amicable adjusted, injury to the government being
sustained thereby, the claimant shall lose the right
to inhabit the country. 2.
The provisions of the Hondurean constitution may be looked
upon as the most radical step taken by any of the South American
countries. They represent a deliberate attempt to limit and define
international rules in regard to diplomatic intervention to an ex-
tent never before recognized, and put the alien absolutely at the
mercy of the government
.
The Hondurean articles undoubtedly formed the feasis of the
stipulations in the Niceraguan constitution of 1905, which in sub-
stance are identical with the former. 3. Responsibility is
adroitly denied, and diplomatic intervention is limited to cases
of denial of justice. The constitution does not, however, attempt
to define denial of justice. Aliens making undue claims forfeit
the right dif inhabiting the country.
In the last chapter, we came across several instances where
responsibility for mob violence or insurrection was, to a certain
extent, regulated by the municipal law of the country. Thus we
found the Communal and Gemeinde responsibility in France and Ger-
many, and the provisions in England and in Spain. These measures
are not, however, measures of external policing but of internal ad-
ministration. Their international significance was only incidental
1. This provision and article 142 are evidently mutually exclusive.
The Kondureans intended to make their constitution rigid if any-
thing. 2. Ibid. v. I, p. 362 3. Ibid., v . I
.
,
pp . 301 - 2
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and at present may be said to be extinct. In the Latin American
states, however, the contrary is true. The constitutional pro-
visions of these countries are directly aimed against the theory
of responsibility. They are preeminently measures of external
safety. When we consider, hov/ever, the state of affairs in the
particular states which have embodied these principles of non- re-
sponsibility in their constitutions, their ^_dus operandi becomes
clear. The names of Venezuela, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras,
Haity, lliceragua and Costa Rica are synomous with insurrection, and
it is only this fact in nind that we can understand the reasons
for the violent repudiation of responsibility. It is a significant
fact, that none of the really great and important states of South
America have found it necessary to incorporate such principles into
their fundamental law. 1.
The constitutional provisions which we have examined so far,
have been a very direct repudiation of responsibility. Other of
the Latin American states have adopted similar but less direct meant
of attaining the desired end through constitutional provisions.
Such provisions, which may be found in the constitutions of
Ecuador, 2. Colombia 3., Paraguay 4., Cuba 5., and Panama 6.,
take the form of stipulations that aliens shall enjoy the same
civil rights or constitutional guarantees as nationals. In other
words, while the constitution is apparently granting to aliens cer-
tain rights, at the same time under the doctrine of implied powers
it denies them other rights. Manifestly, the nationals are not en-
titled to present claims against the government, and they never
are, the aliens will be similarly restricted. Provisions of this
1. Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Peru. 2. Ibid., Art. 37, v. II, p.
283 3. Ibid. Art. 11, v. II, p. 321 4. Ibid. Art. 33,, v. II, p.
388 5. Ibid.. Art. 10. v. II. pp. 144-5 6. Ihid.
f
Art Q, v. I ,y .^4
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sort are deceptive, for, although they seem to he giving extensive
rights they are in fact depriving aliens of more essential rights,
namely, those which they enjoy under the equally important principl«
of international law: the protection of nationals abroad.
These constitutional provisions are not to be regarded merely
as a codified expression of the view that aliens shall not enjoy
greater privileges than nationals. It is true that this is the
form of expression, but, as has been indicated, the really signi-
ficant feature is the implied restrictions which may be deduced
from these articles. It is this fact which gives these provisions
some international significance.
It is an interesting fact that these constitutional provisions
are to be found in those countries which more than any others have
been subject to continuous reclamations by foreigners injured in
the numerous insurrections. Hone of the countries which we gener-
ally consider as maintaining a more settled political life have
embodied rules of this sort into their constitutions. Some of
these countries, however, have adopted other means to attain simi-
lar ends. Such countries have had recourse to statutory provisions
and, most of all, to treaty stipulations. The statutory provisions
frequently supplement the constitutional provisions which we have
already examined. Let us briefly consider some of the more impor-
tant of these laws and decrees which seek to deny international
responsibility.
A great number of the statutory provisions regulating the re-
clamations of aliens have been passed as a direct result of some
civil war. This has been especially true of Colombia and Venezuela
the latter state being one of the first to adopt this method of
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procedure. In the year 1873 at the close of the memorable revolu-
tion in Venezuela 1. the reclamat ions of aliens who had sustained
injuries in the course of the insurrection were so numerous that
in a vain attempt to deny its responsibility the Venezuelan govern-
ment issued a decree which established 2.
That neither domiciled foreigners nor wayfarers have
a right to resort to diplomatic channels, unless when,
having exhausted legal resources before the competent
authorities, it may clearly appear there has been a
denial of justice or notorious injustice.
Foreigners do not possess the right to demand
indemnification from the government for the losses or
injuries proceeding from war except in such cases as
Venezuelans possess it.
The manifest severity of this law was
,
however, modified by
a further decree issued at the same time, which gave the claimants
a fairly wide latitude of reclamation, for the injuries caused by
the authorities of the de_ jure government. 3. This decree is es-
pecially noteworthy in that it represents one of the first of the
outspoken and forceful attempts on the part of the Latin American
s
J ates to limit the obligation of responsibility. It has served
as a •iodel for future laws and decrees.
Four years after the issuance of this decree, the Colombian
government passed a law regulating the rights of claimants who had
suffered losses in the recent civil war. 4. This law was slightly
more liberal than the Venezuelan decree. It recognized claims
proceeding from injuries received at the handn of the revolutionist!!
5. It provided, however, that these cases were cognizable only by
the local courts. As for the claims of foreigners, the law stipu-
1. These cases we shall later examine more closely 2. 74 Br. & For
Stat e Papers , 1065 3. 74 ibid., 1066 4. 68 ibid., 776 5.Except
in th~e province of Antisguia, ibid.,
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lated that they should not "be treated as foreigners as such, 1.
except in respect to property belonging to them, and taken from
them
.
The British government protested against this law in a note
addressed to Colombia on January 3, 1878, 2. and as a result a new
law was passed July 1, 1878 which provided that jurisdiction over
foreign claims was to be given into the hands of the administrative
departments. 3. The law was further amplified by a presidential
decree regulating the node of presentation and substantiation of
foreign claims. 4.
The next change in the Colombian law took place in the year
1885 at the end of another revellion. 5. This decree recognized
that the problems arising out of this civil war were ones which
gave rise to international responsibility. The claims of foreign-
ers who had not forfeited their neutral character were no_t to be
settled by the administrative authorities as had been the case in
the previous law, but were to be determined by Mixed Coiru-ission.
6. This decree was supplemented in the year 1886 by a law which
further provided for the settlement of claims, but especially stipu-
lated that the nation was not necessarily responsible for losses
sustained by foreigners at the hands of the rebels. 7. This law
was again modified in the next year by an amendatory decree, which
interjected the clause which we have just mentioned as establishing
the fact that the responsibility of the Republic as concerned the
claims of foreigners was not absolute, apparently extending the
l.Ibld., u. 778 2. 68 ibid., 776 3. 69 ibid., 376 4. Ibid.,
5. 76 ibid., 366 6. Ibid., p. 567 7. 77 ibid., 807, 808. This
lav/ w;, s amplified by a presidential decree
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limitations of responsibility to acts of officials of the de jure
government as well. This decree enumerated the acts of officials
for which the Republic would hold itself responsible, but denied
its responsibilil y for the Bam* acts when committed by the rebels
except in those cases in which responsibility was found tt be
recognized by ij ternat ional principles, or wtxs found to be the
practice of the civilized world. This latter clause practically
nullified the value of the preceeding provisions. 1.
The same year in which these rapid changes in the Colombian
law tooic place found similar additions being made to the law of
some of the other Latin American slates. Salvador, Costa Rica,
Mexico and Equador all enacted comprehensive statutes regulating
the s-atus of aliens. The laws all differ from the Colombian stat-
utes in that they were not a direct result of a civil war, although
to all intents and purposes their object was likewise to escape
responsibility
.
All of these laws are very similar to the constitutional pro-
visions which we have already examined. The Salvadorean law 2.
provided that aliens should submit to decisions of local tribunals
without resorting to remedies which Salvadoreans were not able to
e :ploy. The right of diplomatic intervention was limited to cases
of denial or wilful delay of justice, and could be resorted to
only after all other means had failed. The principles which this
lav/ attempted to lay down were denied by both Great Britain and
the United States. 3. The United States government pointed out/^j
1. 73 ibid., 53 2. 77 ibid., 121 3. 77 ibid., 116 i 78 et seq.
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law did not attempt to limit the responsibility of the government
for its officials, nevertheless it stipulated that it wus respon-
sible for acts of functionairs alone. Diplomatic recourse was not
expressly denied, but foreigners were forbidden to resort to any
other courses than those provided for Ecuadorians.
The next year, a very comprehensive law regulating the status
of foreigners was enacted by the Guatemalan Congress, 1. and a
whole section -VI- was devoted to the question of diplomatic inter-
vention. The government would recognize its responsibility for
acts of its own officials but on no condition for acts of any other
persons without public character. Diplomatic recourse was to be
limited to cases of denial of justice, or wilful uelay in its ad-
ministration. Denial of justice was very carefully defined by the
same law. 2. There evidently was no protest made against this
stature. The foreign powers very probably had found out by this
time that these attempts to limit by statute the responsibility of e
state had in actual practice but very little significance. To be
sure, there would be a protest against reclamation, but the indem-
nity would, ir.varii." _
t
' e p^.id. The sole end which such laws attain-
ed was to restrict very materially the foreign immlgrat ion into the
Latin American states.
In 1895 Honduras passed a similar law, although slightly more
attenuated in form. The same restrictions were placed upon the
1. 86 ibid., 1281 2. Ibid. 1290. This law simply confirmed the
principles of the constitution of 1879 where it was provided: '^eith-
er Guatemalans nor foreigners shall be able in any case to make a
claim for indemnity against the government by reason of damages and
losses to their persons or goods through the acts of factions.'
Protest was made against this, and the Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions replied that it was the intention of the government to guard
the constitutional precepts in conformity with the general princi-
ples of international law. 18ft0 ibid., 115
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(fright of reclamation and of seeking diplomatic recourse lor in-
juries sustained. 1. No protest was made against this law. A
more recent development in the attempt at statutory regulation took
place in Venezuela in 1903. 2. The law which was enacted at that
time was a part of 'he whole movement to escape responsib ility for
the civil war of the previous years, which had culminated in the
armed intervention and finally in the constitutional provisions
of the Venezuelan constitution of 1904. The right of reclamation
is limited to the sane extent as in the other statutes whioh we
have examined. The article relating to diplomatic intervention is
interesting and is worth while quoting. 3. It provides that
ITeither domiciled foreigners nor those in transit
have the right to have recourse to diplomatic inter-
vention except when legal means having -been exhausted
"before the competent authorities it is clear that there
has been a denial of justice or a notorious injustice
has been done, or that there has been an evident
violation of the principles of international law.
This law, apparently very rigid, is clearly qualified by the
last phrase, which evidently destroys the efficacy of the whole
article, from the point of view of limiting the rights of reclama-
tion. This fdCt seems, however, to have been overlooked by the
diplomatic corps at Caracas, for a meeting was held to discuss the
question of issuing a joint note of remonstrance. 4. llo decision
was reached and apparently the matter was dropped. It was really
a protest against the spirit rather than the letter of the lav/.
1. 87 ibid., 703 2. 96 ibid. , 647 3. Art. 11, ibid., 648 4.
Por
. Eel. . 1903
,
p. 806

that denial of justice was a well recognised ground for diplomatic
intervention but that the determination of such questions was to
be left to rules of international law and furthermore that decision!
of national tribunals could constitute no bar to international
discussion. The Salvadorean government, however, did not maintain
the position which they had aimed at, but declared that the law in
question referred' only to claims which have their origin in acts of
the judicial authorities and not to claims that are founded upon
an anterior act of the gubernative authorities.' 1. This opin-
ion substantially neutralized the force of the law although it be-
came he subject of representations to the Salvadorean government
by members of the diplomatic corps.
A similar controversy arose over the Costa Rican law respecting
foreigners, which had been promulgated the same year. The Costa
Rican statute provided practically the same limitations on the
right of aliens to make claims or to resort to diplomatic inter-
vention as the Salvador law. 3. The United States government
again protested and pointed out that a'municipal law excluding
foreigners from having recourse to their own sovereign to obtain fo:
them redress for injuries inflicted by the sovereign making the
law has, in itself, no international effect'. 4. Furthermore the
United States would have the right to insist upon such claims
whenever they felt that redress should be given.
The Mexican law respecting foreigners 5. had identical pro-
vis io.. to those of the other countries whose laws we have just
been considering . No protest, however, was made against these \
1. 1887 ibid. 114 2. VI Moore, 268 3. 77 Br. & For . Stat e Papers
727 4. 1887 ibid., 99 5. 77 ibid., 1270 et seq.

provie ions
.
Slightly different in con' ent was the law ol' Ecuador regula-
ting the matter of alein Claim*. 1. The government was only to be
held responsible for the voluntary and premeditc.t ed acts of offici-
als and that aliens could claim only when nationals possessed a
similar right. 'Nevertheless the government may, for the sake of
equity, indemnify neutral and peaceable foreigners regard being
had to the condition of reciprocity of the country to which they
belong in analagous circumstances.' 2.
This apparently liberal law was stringently amended in the
year 1888 following a civil war, and the rights of aliens to claim
were greatly restricted. The government refused to be responsible
either for acts of the insurgents for the military operations or
acts of repression and measures of security resorted to by the
government. 3. The provisions of this decree
,
so palpably un-
just, aroused a considerable feeling of disapproval in the diplo-
matic circles. The diplomatic corps at Quito sent a collective
note on August 29, 1888 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecua-
dor informing him that should cases arise, pending the receipt of
instructions from their governments , that they would act on the
principle that the internal law of a state could not alter the
principles of international law to the prejudice of aliens. 4.
This note was communicated by the President to the Chambers who,
however, refused to medify or amend it in any way. The President
then resigned, but his resignation was no + accepted. 5. ~i
The Equador Law was changed again four years later, (gjy Thisjj: |1
1. 77 ibid., 728 2. Ibid., p. 731 3. 79 ibid., 166 4. 79 Ibid.,

In Salvador in the year 1908 an entirely different sort of
statute appeared but what its influence upon the question of re-
sponsibility will be, it is indeed difficult to say. The provi-
sions %t this statute relating to the matter of responsibility are
so unique in character that it may be worth our while to quote
them. 1. The provisions are as follows:
Article 3. It is prohibited to stipulate in treaties
or international agreements the national treatment
accorded in matters where our laws do not put the na-
tives on an equal footing with foreigners.
Article 6. The negotiations of our international
treaties with endeavor to introduce in the arguments
referred to In Article 4,2. a special clause which
will determine the cases in which the official action
of diplomats agents in civil, criminal, or admini-
strative cases of their fellow citizens is admissible
under international law; by denial of justice, for
lack of the execution of a final judgment or by ex-
press violation of the treaties in force, or the
rules of the public or private international law
generally recognized by civilized nations, whenever
either in one or the other case all the means that
the respective legislatures gr^nt to the plaintiff
have been exhausted.
Article 7. There will also be endeavored to intro-
duce in said treaties the principles of the irrespon-
sibility of the Government for damages, likel, or ex-
actions caused by persons or property of foreigners
in times of insurrection or civil war within the
national territory by rebels or revolutionists.
We shall presently point out the arguments against the prac-
tice of inserting clauses of non-responsibility into treaties. It
seems strange that in the f^ce of general international disapprov-
al, that Salvador should have passed a law of this sort. It is
possible, however, that this type of law represents a last stand
of the idea of non-responsibility, but even this would excuse its
existence
.
1. Ibid., 1908, 706 2. Most favored nation article.
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These laws must suffice for our study of the attempts at
statutory regulation of the problems of responsibility. It is a
noteworthy fact that stringent as many of these statutes anu de-
crees may seem, they ao not attain the raaical developments which
v.e found to have been the case with the constitutional restrictions
upon the rights of aliens. The attitude of the European states
has been one of grave disapproval of such acts, and upon more
than one occasion they have resorted to remonstrance. The Latin
American governments, as we have seen, have usually been amenable
to such remonstrances, but they stand as a man by the right which
they declare they possess, namely, to regulate the matter of re-
sponsibility. This is brought out well in the proceedings of the
Pan-American conferences.
At the first Pan-American Congress held in the year 1S90, the
committee on claims and diplomatic recommended the
following to be adopted as principles of 'American' international
law
.
1. Foreigners entitled to enj 03/ all the civil rights
enjoyed by natives, and they shall be accorded all
the benefits cf s. id rights in all that is essential
as well as in the form or procedure, and the legal
remedies incident thereto, absolutely in like manner
as said natives.
2. A nation has not, nor recognizes in favor of for-
eigners any other obligations or responsibilities than
those which in favor of the natives are established,
in like cases, by the constitution and the laws.
These projected principles of international law, supported
by an eloquent appeal in their favor were accepted by all of the
delegates there assembled with the exception of the United States.
2
i. International American Conference, - 1st conference 1890 - Re-
ports of Committees, v. II, p. 233 2. Ilaity abstained from
voting
.

Mr. Trescot 1. the delegate of the United States in an able min-
ority report pointed out that these rules would mean an absolute
exclusion of diplomatic reclamation. That cases of reclamation wer<=
of such nature that they could not he submitted to the prejudices
of municipal law and that these were far better removed to the
jurisdiction of an impartial international tribunal.
In the second Pan-American conference which was held at Mexico
City, the question again came up and was discussed in even greater
detail. There were several proposals submitted, and after consider-
able discussion, the following convention was adopted to which the
majority of powers represented became signatories. The United
States has as yet not signed the convention. 2.
First: Aliens shall enjoy all civil rights pertaining
to citizens, and make use thereof in the substance,
form or procedure, and in the recourses which result
therefrom, under exactly the same terms as the said
citizens, except as may be otherwise provided by the
constitution of each country.
Second: The States do not owe to, nor recognize in
favor of foreigners, any obligations or responsibili-
ties other than those established by their consti-
tutions and laws in favor of their citizens.
Therefore, the states are not responsible for
damages sustained by aliens through acts of rebels or
individuals, and in general, for damages originating
from fortuitous causes of any kind, considering as sue]
the acts of war, whether civil or national; except in
case of failure on the part of the constituted author-
ities to co2iiply with their duties.
Third: Whenever an alien shall have claims or com-
plaints of a civil, criminal or administrative order
against a state, or its citizens, he shall present
his claims to a competent court of the country, and
such claims shall not be made, through diplomatic
channels, except in the cases where there shall have
been, on the part of the court, a manifest denial of
justice, or unusual delay, or evident violations of
tne principles of international law.
1. International American Conference, loc. clt., v. II, 937
2. Actas y_ document os de la Segunda Conferencia Pan-Americana , 830
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These rules, sweeping as they may seem in their applicatory
force, must not be interpreted as limiting absolutely the right of
diplomatic reclamation. The opportunities for a state claiming the
responsibility of another state are equally great here, as in the
special statutes which we have considered. It will be noticed that
diplomatic recourse may be sought when there has been a manifest
violation of the principles of international law, a .phrase which, J
in itself, permits a very wide latitude of interpretation. It
would be possible moreover to interpret this rule after the manner
of Senor Delgado, when the United States protested a similar ex-
pression of this principle in the Salvadorean law of 1887. 1.
Evidently the conventions of the Pan-American Conference if gener-
ally adopted will exercise but little restraint upon the right and
use of the power of reclamation.
The problem of pecuniary claims was further settled by the
Convention of the same congress, which provided that the signatory
powers would 1 sub init to arbitration all claims for pecuniary loss
or damage which may be presented by their respective citizens^and
which cannot be amicable adjusted through diplomatic channels, and
when said claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the ex-
penses of arbitration. 2.
As was pointed out in the Third Congress held at Rio de Janeirc
this stipulation did not mean that all cases were to be submitted
to arbitration, but only those which for special reason, as the
previous convention provides, and those to which international law
devotes particular attention which would give them international
character, were intended. The United States ratified this con-
1. page of this chapter. 2. Actas y documentos etc., p. 854

vent ion
.
The conventions of the conferences furnish an excellent cri-
terion of the Latin American point of view, and are significant in
that they show the remarkable unanimity among these states on the
subject of responsibility. Their efforts are however directed a-
gainst the method of presentation of claims rather more than againsl
the problem of responsibility. The latter question comes up much
more sharply in the treaties which the Latin American states have
concluded in the i**at tempt to free themselves from responsibility
.
The existence of these treaties may be traced "back as far as
the year 1863 when Bolivar and Peru concluded a treaty of peace
on the 5th. of November which stipulated among other things, 2.
that
the citizens of the contracting parties cannot claim
indemnities from the other for casual accidents hap-
pening without the fault of the constituted authori-
ties, nor for losses they may suffer by intermeddling
in the political affairs of the country in which they
reside, nor for imprisonment, subjection to trial, or
other consequences that may come upon them, if they
lend tnemselves to the service of revolutionary
chiefs, either personally or with their property. In
cases of illegal imprisonment they must address them-
selves to the tribunals to obtain from them the prop-
er reparations and indemnities against those who may
have occasioned and decreed it.
Neither for the foregoing causes nor for any othei
shall diplomatic reclamations be made or admitted by
one of the contracting parties against the other,
during the legal course of the trials, and when the
ordinary and extraordinary recourses that the laws
admit, are exhausted, they shall only then take place
in the cases in which, according to the laws and the
principles of equity, there shall have been notorious
injustice. 3.
The provisions of this treaty, although they antedate the
efforts to limit the matter of responsibility through constitut ion-
1. Third International American Conference. Minutes etc., p. 181
2. 55 Br. For. State Paper s, 837 3. Ibid. 839-40, Art. 10 & 11
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al or statutory restriction, are, however, not the earliest attempt
at regulation. In 1852 the Venezuelan government in connection
with a proposition to codify the American public law had included
a provision by which claims of foreign gOTernmenti for private in-
dividuals would not be received. To pave the way for an entente
,
on this subject, M. Leocadio Guzman was sent to various South
American capitals. Apparently the proposal did not materialize. 1.
The Peru-Bolivian treaty represents the most rudimentary form
of all the treaties in the matter claiming indemnities. On this
matter it is vague and unsatisfactory and would permit a wide lati-
tude of interpretation. The provision relating to diplomatic re-
clamation in general, is more definite, but it, too, is in no sense
very inclusive.
The date of the next important treaty in which the question of
responsibility came up was Feb. 10th., 1870, between Colombia and
Peru. This treaty provided that there should be simply equal pro-
tection of the aliens with nationals, and that injuries inflicted
by rebels or by private individuals or by 'unavoidable causes 1
could not give rise to indemnities. Diplomatic intervention was to
be permitted only when either state had neglected giving equal pro-
tection, or where injustice had been flagrant.
This treaty was in substance more definite than the preceding
one, although it will be noted the question of diplomatic inter-
vention was still more or less vague. This was also the case in
the treaty between Peru and the United States of the same year. 3.
I. 4 R.D.I, p. 227 note 2. 60 Br .For .Kel
. ,
349, 228
3. Alartens H.R.G. 2 ser. I, 97
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This treaty took up only the ouestlon of diplomatic intervention,
and is especially noteworthy for the fact that it was the first
treaty between a Latin American state and a foreign country in
which the question of responsibility was regulated. Moreover it is
the only treaty of this sort which the United States has ever en-
tered into. 1. The treaty remained in force for ten years. 2.
It were a tiresome and useless task for us to discuss the
provisions of the many treaties in full. As a rule the treaties
are almost uniform in their provisions which seek to limit the re-
sponsibility of a state, from the year 1870 on. Besides limiting
the problem of diplomatic intervention, many of the treaties ex-
pressly repudiate all responsibility for the injuries to aliens
except as they have been sustained by reason of acts of functionar-
ies. These, then, are the two chief characteristics of such treaty
provisions. Some of the treaties, however, contain stipulations
which do nothing more than declare that aliens are to have equal
rights with nationals and nothing more, and rest on the doctrine
of implied powers
. Thus we have the treaty between Prance and
Colombia, May 3d., 1892, article 1, which has a provision of this
sort for the protection of their interests. Since 1890 most of
the treaties which these states have concluded have contained
clauses which provided for arbitration. This has been done in
pursuance of the resolution of the first Pan-American Conference
held at Washington.
1. Alvarez in hi»''Droit International Americaine ,p . 124 remarks
that the United States had entered into no treaties of this sort.
The above citation proves this statement to be incorrect.
2. Art. 36, sec. 1. 3. Martens, Nouveau Recueil General, sec. 2,
XVIII, p. 611
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A tingle quotation of the sort of provision which is to be four
found in the more recent of these treaties will suffice as an
illustration of their extent and probable efficacy. On the whole
these treaties are similar, there being but slight differences in
verbiage or content. The following quotation is from the treaty
between Mexico and Germany, of the 5th. of July, 1882. 1. Para-
graph 2, Article 18 says as follows:
The contracting parties, desirous of avoiding any
occasion which might injure their friendly relation,
mutually agreed that their diplomatic representatives
shall not interv- ne on matters of claims or complaints
of individuals in cases which belong to the realm of
civil or criminal justice or to the decision of ad-
ministrative offices, unless it be that such cases
deal with denial of justice, extraordinary or illegal
failure of justice or the non-execution of a validjudgment, or, lastly, after all the legal remedies
have been exhausted there appears to be a clear vio-
lation of the existing treaties stipulations between
the contracting parties or of the rules of inter-
national law or of international private law generally
recognized by civilized nations.
Furthermore the contracting parties agreed that
the German government will not hold the Mexican
government responsible for injuries, acts of oppress ior
or extortion which the subjects of the German empire
mi f ;ht suffer at the hands of the insurgents in times
of civil war or insurrection or which are caused by
the wild tribes which do not recognize the authority
of the government, unless the fault be due to lack of
diligence on the part of the Mexican government or
its agents, 2.
Many of the countries deviated from the stipulations of this
treaty and provided for mutual non-responsibility. This is es-
pecially true when the treaties are between two Latin American
states although the same thing is to be found in some of the treat-
ies with European governments.
1. Ibid., sec. 2 v. IX, p. 774 2. Ibid., vol. cit . p. 484

In addition to the treaties which we have already cited there have
"been many others within the last fifty years which are similarly
constructed. The fo3 lowing list will give some idea, at least , of
the extent and importance of the movement.
Argentina and Peru, 1. March 9, 1874, Salvador and Honduras,
March 31, 1878 - art. 13 & 14 - 2., Salvador and Costa Rica,
November 8, 1882, art. 15 16 3.; Venezuela and Salvador, August
27, 1883, art. 5 4.; Salvador and Niceragua, November 17, 1883,
art. 13 & 14 5.; Norway*- Sweden and Mexico, July 29, 1885, art.
21 6.; Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, September 12, 1885, art.
29 7.; Prance and Venezuela, November 26, 1885, art. 5 8.; Prance
and Mexico, November 27, 1886, art. 11 <$.; Belgium and Ecuador,
March 5, 1887, art. 3 10. ; Prance and Ecuador, May 12, 1888 11.,
Mexico and Ecuador, July 10, 1888, art. 3 12.; Mexico and Domini-
can Republic, March 29, 1889, art. 11 13
.
;
"Italy and Mexico, Ap-
ril 16, 1889, art. 12 14.; a similar treaty between the same coun-
tries, April 16, 1890, art. 12 15.; Italy and Colombia, October
29, 1892, art. 21 16.; 'Germany and Colombia, July 23, 1892, art.
20 17.; Italy and Paraguay, August 22, 1893, art. 3 18.; Mexico
and Salvador, April 24, 1893, art. 3 19.; Spain and Honduras,
April 28, 1894, art. 4 20.; Bolivia and Chili, May 18, 1895, art.
5 21.; Belgium and Mexico, June 7, 1895, art. 15 22.; Spain and
1. Martens, N.R.G., sec. 2, XII, p. 443 2. ibid. v. XIV, p. 195
3. Actas etc., p. 251 4. ibid. p. 215 5. ibid. p. 228 6. ibid. v.
XIII, p. 690 7. ibid. XIV, p. 268 8. Ibid. XII, p. 686
p. 280 9..Du Clercq, Trai tes
,
, v. XVII, ,p.. 280 10. Hafteim,
N.R.G. sec. 2, v. XV, p. T40" 11. This treaty was never ratified bj
Prance-, cf. Du Clercq, v. XVIII, p. 46 12. Martens, N.R.G. sec 2,
v. XVIII, p. 750 13. ibid, v. 761 14. ibid., p. 711 15. ibid.,
p. 771 16. ibid., XXII, p. 308 17. ibid., XIX, ,831 18. ibid.,
19. ibid., XX, p. 864 20. 2 R.D.I. P., p. 337 21.
Martens N.R.G. , sec. 2, v. XXXIV, p. 396 22. ibid. XXIII, p. 73
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Peru, July 16, 1897, art. 4 & 6 l.;Holland and Mexico, September
22, 1897, art. 18. 2.
Of the total number of treaties which we have examined fifteen
wer:? concluded by the Latin American states with foreign states and
twelve among each other. Mexico has been the most fortunate of all.
She has concluded no less than nine treaties by which she divested
herself of responsibility. Salvador ranks second with six treaties
to her credit. Among the European states, Prance and Italy have
each conluded three treaties of this type.
We have already seen that the Institute of International Law
at its meeting in 1900, expressly condemned this sort of treaty-
making, and in the rules which it drew up in regard to the question
of responsibility for injuries sustained by aliens it recommended,
3. as will be remembered^
that the states refrain from inserting clauses of re-
ciprocal non-responsibility into their treaties. It
believes that such provisions are wrong in exempting
states from the performance of their duty to protect
their nationals abroad and their duty to protect aliens
within their own territory. It believes that states,
which, by reason of extraordinary circumstances, do not
feel that they are in a position to assure in a suf-
ficiently high degree the efficacious protection of
aliens within their territory, may escape the con-
sequences of such a state of affairs only by temporar-
ily interdicting aliens access to their territory.
No better criticism can be given the movement in Latin America
than this resolution of the Institute. It clearly shows the lack
of international precedent upon which such treaties might be based.
1. ibid., XXXII, p. 69 2. Martens N.R.G., ser. 2, XXXIII, p. 188
3. Annual re de 1* Institute droi t Int
.
, vol. 18, p. 253-4

But we do not condemn the latter solely for this reason, but be-
cause they are aimed at the overtnrow of an important internation-
al principle. It is true that they affect only the contracting
parties, but the moral influence which such treaties may exert is
certainly considerable. "For example , two etatee might agree be-
tween each other, not to prosecute ac J s of piracy which subjects
of one state might inflict on the other. Would the fact that such
an agreement was limited to the signatories destroy the demoraliz-
ing effect which such a treaty might have upon international
jurisprudence? Certainly not; and so It is with the theory of re-
sponsibility. It may be said in favor of these treaties, however,
that they are not nearly as comprehensive as might be supposed, in
regard to the provisions relating to diplomatic intervention.
Similarly to the statutory regulations they are not immutable but
may be regarded as having been framed with a view to preventing in-
discriminate reclamations. To make an attempt of this sort through
an international document is as we have pointed out, a dangerous
tendency and might pave the way to a discreditable practice among
states
.
Before we proceed to examine the cases which have arisen as the
result of the numerous Latin American revolutions, let us briefly
summarize the tendencies which have been discussed up to this
point. The efforts of the Latin American states to regulate the
matter of responsibility, which have found expression in the con-
stitutions, statutes and treaties of these countries may be ascribec
to the leading policy which at cne time found favor in Europe,
namely the attempt to regulate matters of responsibility by muni-
cipal legislation rather than by international law. We have al-
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ready seen the objections to such a policy on the ^art of the Euro-
pean states. In the case of the Latin American states the problem
becomes a much graver one not only because of the means which they
have employed and the extremeties to which they have gone, but also
because of the fact that the peculiar internal situation makes such
regulation not only difficult and undesirable but, in fact, really
dangerous. It is true that international standards for the treat-
ment of aliens find their basis in the treatment of nationals at
home. Thus, we find that with the general political uplift of the
masses during the nineteenth century there was a concomitant better-
ment of the condition of aliens. Now it is asserted that in theory
aliens are entitled to no better treatment and no greater rights
than the nationals of a country and as a matter of internal law
most jurist are agreed that this is so. But theory also argues
that a state may treat its subjects as it deems proper; it may de-
prive them of civil rights, refuse justice and, indeed, maltreat
them to what extent it pleases. The question of the validity of
such contentions and how the opposing views are to be reconciled is
the crux of the Latin American problem. As has been indicated,
they are questions of municipal law, not of international law;
but in spite of this fact they exert influence on the development
of such jurisprudence.
Leaving aside for a i oment the legal aspectB of the question
and arguing from the point of view of abstract morality it might
be admitted, that the state has such extensive control over its sub-
jects, and this would undoubtedly be the case if we could conceive
of a state existing apart from all other nations alike unaffecting
and unaffected by contact with them. The practical necessities of
international relations, however, cle rly demonstrate the impossi-
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Mlity of such a view. If we admit that, In the last analysis, a
state is the controlling power, the pilot of its own existence,
then these international considerations are of little value. But i:
we take as the determining factor of state life, the mutual inter-
ests and well-being of the whole international community
;
we come
to the conclusion that it is be ond the sphere of a single state
to deteimine and command its own destinies, regardless of the
effect its actions may have upon the destinies of the many. If
this be the case, then a state which maltreats and denies justice
to its subjects, or countenances such actions, is bound to extend
greater privileges to aliens. It is upon a similar basis that the
theory of extraterritoriality rests. The Latin American states
cannot be the final arbiters into whose hands the regulation of
the status of aliens within their jurisdiction, is to be placed.
The whole course of their political history as independent nations
has proven their incapacity for such a role. It is only by en-
trusting to international jurisprudence the determination of the
rights and privileges of aliens that we shall be able to attain
justice in conformity with the standards of the twentieth century.
We turn next to the international practice of the Latin Ameri-
can states as it is illustrated in the many cases which have arisen
To consider fully all of these cases were a tedious task. Their nun
ber is legion, and with exception of a few of the leading cases
express no new principles. In the following discussion, we shall
take up only those cases which clearly have had a constructive
value, keeping in mind the general sentiment in the Latin .American
states and the internal regulation of responsibility. We shall see
moreover, to what extent the practice of these states is comparable
to that of the great European nations, and whether they h: ve been
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affected by the practice in these states.
It is not our purpose to enter into a discussion of the cases
which arose In the Latin American states prior to the year 1850,
with the exception of the claims which c»ve rise to the celebrated
'Pastry War 1 between Prance and Mexico. In the majority of the
Latin American states, the history of their existence from the war
of independence up to the middle of the century was one of almost
continuous revolution and strife. It was distinctly a formative
period, in which the newly independent states were vainly trying
to find themselves. This early period is of little interest to us.
Reclamations were as numerous as civil wars, but practically none
of the cases reached the dignity of a real international conflict.
It is true that the Latin American states frequently denied their
responsibility but they invariably came to terms. It is only af-
ter the year 1850 that the Latin American states began to make a m
more concerted and purposeful attempt to deny their responsibility.
This as we have already seen took the form especially of internal
regulation. The height of the movement was reached in the early
nineties, when three important revolutions took place in rapid
succession. A powerful effort was made against the right of for-
eigners to claim, but to no avail and it seemed to have been con-
clusively settled that the Latin American states would henceforth
be obliged to admit their responsibility. The intervention in
Venezuela in 1902 confirmed this view. But we are anticipating.
Let us briefly examine the 'Pastry War' case which arose in 1838.
Lke ether Latin American countries Mexico since her indepen-
dence had been the scene of continuous insurrections and outbreaks
in which foreigners as well as nationals had suffered considerably
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The French subjects in Mexico, especially, had sustained great
losses. 1. The "basis of the relations between Prance and Mexico
was a provisional treaty which had provided for mutual guaranties
ol' freedom, safety etc. This treaty had never been fully concluded
due to the inaction and opinion of Mexico. 2. No attention being
paid to her claims, France finally lost patience and sent her ul-
timatum, demanding the payment of 600, 000 as indemnity within
three weeks. 3. The terms were refused, and accordingly, France
severed diplomatic relations and declared the Mexican ports to be
under blockade. This procedure, although in itself successful, did
not bring the Mexicans to terms. Admiral Baudir. was sent with
reinforcements to initiate a more vigorous policy.
Immediately upon his arrival, Baudin demanded an answer to
the late ultimatum. 4. The Mexican government desired a settle-
ment and agreed to hold a conference to accede to French demands an<
the conference came to naught. Admiral Baudin then resorted to
more vigorous methods. The Fort of San Juan de Ulna commanding the
harbor of Vera Cruz surrendered after a heavy bombardment by the
French fleet. A preliminary agreement was made with the commander
v/hich the Government however repudiated. The 'war* continued but
after the shelling of Vera Cruz and its abpndment the British
government offered to mediate and the two contending countries
agreeing, a conference was held. France did not, however, follow
up her advantage, but accepted practically the same conditions
which the Mexican government had offered her at the conference at
Jalapa. 5.
l.The name 'pastry war 1 was applied to this controversy oy the
Mexicans in ridicule of the claims of a French baker who had suf-
fered looses. 2. 27 For . St. Pap., 1178 3. Bancroft , Works , v. 13,
p. 187 for resume. 4. 27 Br. FTor St. Pap., 1176 5. ibid, 1186 fi
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During the course of the dispute an interesting doctrine was
aired by the Mexicans. They declared 1. that
Ws are a nation always agitated "by revolutions; as
such we suffer all the consequences of a state of re-
volution, popular tumults, robberies, plunderings,
assassinations, unjust decrees, and since we are oblig-
ed to suffer all these evils, we consider that the
foreigners who may be in our country must suffer like
ourselves, without a chance of redress or compensation
For an almost anarchistic expose of the feelings of the Latin
Americans on the subject of responsibility, this expression is
without doubt the most interesting. Although it may appear to be
an exaggerated position nevertheless as we proceed to examine fur-
ther cases, it stands as the most concise and candid statement of
principle, invariably reiterated by the Latin American states.
In the year 1856 an important case known as the Panama Riot
case arose between the United States and the republic of Hew Grena-
da. 2. This outbreak was the result of the refusal of a drunken
passenger at the railroad station of Panama to pay ten cents to
a NedVo watermelon vender. The companion of the Negro fired a
shot among the passengers, and a mot) quickly collecting an attack
was made upon the innocent travellers in which the police of Panama
joined. After considerable slaughter and plundering the governor
of the city managed to disperse the mob.
The government of New Grenada in a convention signed September
10, 1857 by the two disputing pov/ers, acknowledged 'its liability,
arising out of its privilege and obligation to preserve peace and
1. 27 Sr. ft For. St. Pap., 1176 2. For facts cf. Moore, Hist ory
and Digest of International Law, v. II, 1362 3. La Fontaine,
Pasicfi~s"i~e~ Internat ional
,
p. 34 4. Malloy, Treaties
,
I, 302 ff #J
good ordei/along the transit route. 3.
art
.
c{
<
I
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The matter was referred to arbitration and a commission was
appointed to make investigation and awards. The commission met at
Washington June 10, 1861 and sat for the nine months stipulated in
the convention. The total awards were 436, 235.45 1. but having
been obliged to adjourn before all the ca.ses had been argued, a new
convention was entered into, Feb. 10, 1864 2. and by the commiss-
ion herein provided for, the sura of 88, 267.88 was further awarded,
an amount which included certain other important claims. 3. The
British Government also had certain Important claims which -./ere
settled through the ordinary diplomatic channels. The amount of
these claims was ^4,745. 4.
It might seem from the convention between the United States anc
New Granada that the decision in this case was based solely on the
treaty stipulations, but this is not quite so. General Herran the
envoy of New Grenada pointed out that this was an extraordinary
liability of his government based on principles of international
law and the treaty stipulation between the country and that the
provisions of the convention were not to be understood as giving
rise to any further obligations beyond those the settlement of
which it was framed for. 5.
The 'pastry war 1 case has already initiated us into the in-
tricacies of Mexican politics. Unfortunately for that turbulent
republic the French intervention in 1838 had not taught them a
lesson, and within twenty years they faced a very similar situation
6. when the celebrated triple intervention of 1861-2 took place.
1. Moore, Int. Arb
. ,
II, 1394 2. Malloy, Treat ies I, 321 3. ibid,
322 also Woore op. cit . 1415 et sq. 4. 65 Br. & Tor. St. Pap . 1219
5. Moore, op. cit., II, 1369
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It is not our intention to enter into a detailed d-cussion of this
case, important though it is, the facts and the outcome of the dis-
pute are too well known. The British claims against Mexico were
based not only upor. demands for indemnity to certain of her citizen;
for losses and injuries sustained during numerous disorders, "but
also claims for bonded debt, this latter item forming the princi le
ground for her intervention. Repa3nnent of the sum of 600,000 stole i
from the legation house was also demanded. 1. The Spanish claims
were based mainly upon a recognition of claims by a previous con-
vention. The French intervention was solely for certain bonded in-
debtedness of Mexico. 2. These claims the party then in power in
Mexico refused to recognize on the grounds that they did not con-
sider themselves responsible to foreign nations for the acts of
their predecessors. 3. After a long period of diplomatic haggling
the three governments aecided that the only means left open to
them was the severance of diplomatic relations, and a joint in-
tervention was aecided u^on. To this end a convention was signed
in London October 31, 1861 by the three governments in question. 5.
The United States government was invited to give her adherence
to the convention. Mr. Seward declined, 6, however, but indicated
that as long as the powers restricted their activites within the
1. For an idea of the Br. cf . 52 Br. & For. 272 & 287 2. 52
ibid., 392 3. 52 ibid. 393 4. 5T~ibid. 63 .5. This convention
provided among other things that 'the high contracting parties en-
gage not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the coercive
measures contemplated by the present convention any acquisition
of territory nor any special advantage, and not to excercise in
the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to preju-
dice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and constitute
fully the form of its government.' . art. II, ibid. 6. House
Doc. 100, p. 187
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limits provided by the second article of the convention, that the
United States would not interfere.
In the latter part of the year 1861 the squadrons of the three
powers sailed to Vera Cruz and seized that port. Shortly after
this the course of the French "becoming apparent, the English and
Spanish occupying force withdrew 1. Their action was approved
by their respective governments. A treaty was made between Great
Britain and Mexico but was not ratified. 2. This was followed
by a convention in 1866 which finally settled the question. 3.
Such in brief are the outlines of the intervention in Mexico,
which takes us no further than the beginning of the French dominance
The affair requires but little comment on our part. From the poinl
of view from which we are studying the question, the joint inter-
vention was justifiable. A careful reading of the state papers
of the period reveals to us the shocking state of affairs in Mexi-
co, which even so able an historian as Mr. Hubert H. Bancroft is
not justified or able to defend. Strangely enough the vigorous
action of the powers did not seem to have the desired effect upon
the Latin American states, for presently further claims arose in
others of these turbulent states. It is difficult for us to say
to what extent this phlegmatic attitude of the Latin American
countries was based on the illusory protection which the Monroe
doctrine seemed to afford them. Many writers are inclined to the
view that the apparent indifference 'of these states is to a large
extent due to the sentimental protection of the Monroe doctrine, 4
1. Bancroft XIV, 43 2. 53 Br. & For. Pap. 3. 56 ibid, p. 7
4. Thus G.W. Scott in Annals of the American Academy , v. 22, p. 80
cr
ft
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and to a certain extent this view may "be justifiable . On the other
hand the attitude of the United States in the majority of the great
conflicts between Europe and the Latin American states has been
one of not attempting to protect these countries from being coerced
into paying their debts. Thus in 1838, 1861 and again in 1902 the
United States held aloof. It is really inconceivable that these
Central and South American republics could hope for protection in
cases of this sort. Their attitude may be explain; d far more satis
factorily by those very deficiencies and peculiaritlet of their
national character which have made possible the unstability of
their political life.
A number of claims of United States citizens against Peru, anc
a claim of Peru against the United States were settled by two com-
missions appointed by these countries, to arbitrate these matters.
1. The most interesting of these claims of responsibility was tha'
of Peru relative to the ship Alleghanian . The Alleghanian was an
American ship loaded with guano belonging to the Peruvian govern-
ment. On the night of October 28, 1862 the ship was boarded by a
party of confederates, set fire to and burned while at anchor in
Chesapeaic Bay. The Peruvian government requested the United State
to refund the value of the cargo lost. In a note of January 9,
1863 Mr. Seward rejected the claim on the ground that it wus an ac
of treason and piracy which the United States government had not
been cognizant of before Its commission, although it had exerted
extraordinary vigilance in the vicinity. The incident had occurre||L
without fault of the government by insurrect lonary citizens ov-
er whom the former had momentarily lost control. 2. When the
1. Moors, Int. Arb
. ,
II, 1615 et sq. 2. ibid., 1622 et sq.
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case was brought "before the claims commission it was rejected on
the grounds that it was a government claim and not that of a pri-
vate citizen. Subsequently the guano waft recovered in a damaged
condition and sold for 25,962.40 of which sum the Peruvian govern-
ment received 1.2. 1.
Claims of the United States settled by these two commissions
included certain demands for indemnity for injuries sustained by
American citizens in various Peruvian insurrections/ These claims
were settled favorably to the United States. 2. Another claim
against Peru was settled in 1871. The Peruvian government by a
decree of Feb. 27, 1871 ordered payment for the damages caused
by the sacking of CallQO in 1865 by the insurrectos under Col.
Pradro. Two citizens of the United States were indemnified by
this decree. 3.
In this same year the United States again had occasion to de-
mand the responsibility of a South American state in the ca< e of
the steamer Monttjo . 4. On April 6, 1871 a party of revolution-
ists in the state of Panama, Colombia seized the vessel Monty'o be-
longing to an American company. In a note dated June 21, 1871 Mr
.
Pish, the secretary of state directed Mr Hurlbut the United States
minister to Colombia to apply for reparation cn the basis that the
seizure of the Montfjj was a piratical act for which compensation
must be made on the basis of the treaty of 1846. 5. The Colombian
government denied Its responsibility for loiBes to aliens through
'com on crimes'. It prosecuted the offenders but nothing came of
I. ibid. 1624 2. Moore, op. cit . II, 1629 & 1652-7 3. Meore,
Digest, VI, 973 4. Moore, Int. Arb. , II, 1421 et sq. J For.Kel.,
13717 P- 2305. 1871 For. Rel. 230. For the treaty cf. Mallory,
Treaties, I, p. art . B
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the proceed ings
.
Finally, the two governments resorted to rMtr tion in the
year 1874 1. and the case was decided in favor of the owners of
the Montijo, the sun of 33,401 being allov/ed then 2.
Two pointsof especial interest to us were raised in the
course of the dispute. In the first pl:ce, the Colombian
government asserted that it co Id not he held responsihle for
dehts of the state of Panama "because in thifl care they were pri-
vate in character. The unpire, howeve-
,
pointed out that these
dehts were those of the federal government ot only "because a
violation of treat privileges was involved hut also on the ground
that dehts so incurred were clea rly public in character. Purther-
nore, he asserted, that in a federal system such as that of Colom-
hia in foreign relations the constituent states were non-existent
3. Second point was urged "by the umpire in connection with the
placing of liability. The officers of the Union had failed in
their treaty and internat ional law obligations to protect United
States citizens. That it was clearly the duty of the President
of Panama as agent of the federal government to recover the Montijo
'It is true that had not the means of doing so .. hut this absence
of power does not remove the obligation. The first duty of every
is to make itself respected both at home and abroad. If it promise
j
protection to whom it consents to admit into its territory it must
find the means of making it effective. If it does not do so, even
if by no fault of its own, it must make true amends in its power
viz. compensate the sufferer' How completely antagonistic is this :
1. Pasicrisie 209 & on convention. 2 Moore II, 1443 3. iMd. 143 1

147
view to Mr Seward's in the case of the Alleghaniam an unexampled
illustration of ths inconsistency of governments, for not only has
the United Stateds acted contrary to this latter view, hut later
as we shall ce° Bhe attempted to escape responsi hility on the h-s-
is of the nonresponsfbility of a federal government for the yets
of separate states, l.
A case very similar to that ot the Montijo arose ahout the
same time and is known as the case of the Venezuela Transportat-
ion Company involving certain claims of U ited States citizens
against the Venezuelan government. 2.
The Venezuela Transportation Company incorperated under the
laws of the stae of New York and was operating on the Orinoco River
and the coast of Venezuela. During the course of General Blancos
revolution steamers belonging to the company were seized hy one
of the parties, 3. and the owners consequently suffered serious
osses. The diplomatic correspondence war carried on for some 20
years when finally the President of the United Stales being em-
powered by joint resolutions of Congress in June 1890 to take
measures as seemed necessary 4. a convention was entered into and
the matter was decided hy arbitration and the claimants were a-
warded the sum of$>141,500 5.
1. Case of Italian lynching in 1891 2. Moor Int. Arh. 11,1693 ff.
3. There was no real de jure government at the time. 4. Moore
op. cit. 1707 For a long time it seemed as if the two countries
were g ing to war over t^e questions envolved. 5. ibid. 1724
2. con. One of the early Venezuelan claims cases involved important
demands of the U.S. against the former country including damages
suffered by the passengers on the vessel Apure in 1865. The c onanist
sion of arbitration was accused of fraud, and twenty years passed
before another convention was drawn up and the matter settled.
cf. 1866 For El. Ill; 431 ff. Hallory, Treaties II 1856 Moore
Int Arb. II lfifiO
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The Venezuelan gov eminent strenuously combat ted the claims of
the United States alleging that they were contrary to the principles
of responsibility which the United States herself avowed. As to
the explanations of the United States we shall see in J he next chap-
ter. A strong dissenting opinion 1. was filed "by the Venezuelan
commis'.'ioner relc* tive to the points upon which he disagreed. 2.
A period of ten years ensued he. ore any important claims of
responsibility arose. The next cases involved the rights of aliens
in Colombia and included the well :nown Arrut 1 s affair* Tbe claim if
of the United States in this case arose from the burning of Colon
3. These losses by the decree of Aug. }9, 1885 which have already
been examined the Colombian government proposed to settle by a
mixed commission. 4. This decree was later supplemented by a
further decree which practically empowered the Colombian authori
ties to settle these questions, 5. and in a resolution passed at
the same time authorized the executive to throw out all claims for
damages committed by rebels. 6. The representatives of all the
nations united in protesting against this act .on. A protracted
attempt to arbitrate the matter has even after 25 years had no re-
sult
.
Mr. Byard in the couse of the dispute, informed the various
claimants that f as a general rule of international law, a govern-
ment is responsible for the consequences of acts of rebellion
against its authority 1 . This dictum is difficult to agree with
the constant policy of the Unites States not only in the cases
which we have already examined but also in this viery case. Howeve
il]-advir:ed t is expression of opinion nay have been it was not
1. llurre Digest, VI, 981 Moore V 2. Sen. Doc 264 57 long. 7
3. ibid 50, 76 Br. & Eor 566 4. ibid 80 5. ibid 81 6. i id 11
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taken advantage of by the Colombian government.
We turn next to the series of mportant revolutions which be-
gan in the ye: r 1891 in Chili t.nd which gave rise to important views
on the question of responsibility. The Chilian revolution was the
result of an attempt by President Bi lmaceda to keep in office a
cabinet whom the Chilian Congress refused to support. The Congress
ional leaders opposed to Balmaceda were able to win over the nav y
and the revolt spread rapidly. The victory of the Congressional
party, the resignation rnd death of Balmaceda terminated the .nsur-
rection. Following the restoration of peace and order, aliens sub-
mitted their claimds for injuries and the inevitable question
of responsibility was again brought up.
On August 8, 1892 the United States concluded a convention
with Chili which submitted to an arbitral tribunal all the claims
which American citizens had against the Chilean government. The
claims were decided faovrable to the United States i England on
the 26 of September 1893 and Prance on October 19, 1892
signed similar conventions with Chili. The claims of Norway Sweden
were entrusted to the Anglo-Chilean tribunal.
I. For discussion cf . Moore II 2117; also R.D.I. P. 268 2. Moore,
II, 1859; also Br. & Por. 74/876 In this previous year Haiti made
settlement for the losses sust ined by foreigners during the in-
surrect on and riots at Port au Prince. The United States claims vi
were setlled by arbitrat on for 5,700. Other foreign claims
amounting to 588,418 were orderedpayed "by a decree of Oct. 7,
1884. 3. ^6 Br. ?c ^or 302 4. 1891 Por Rel 90 f. also R.D.I. P. \
III 476 5. Moore II, 1469 ff. 6. R.D. .P. 476; 87 Br. & Por 937
7. 85 Br. & Por 22 7. RDIP 22; also L. PasiC' isie 480
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The French claims were settled for 5,000 pounds sterling. 1.
In November 1895 the Italian government also concluded a convention
to arbitrate. Germany was accorded a lump sum indemnity without
resorting to arbitration.
As the writer in the Revue General de Droit International
Public points out the conclusion of these conventions would indi-
cate that the Chilean government did not refuse to regard itself
as responsible In fact, in the correspondence of the United
States, Mr. Egan the minister of the U.S. government was favor-
ably disposed to acknowled' e its own responsibility .2.
A more serious dispute was the demand of certain European pow-
ers for reparation following the civil war in Venezuela of 1892
4. The representative of Germany was intrusted with the claims of
England and Holland, and the Spanish legation exercised provision-
ally the claims of Italy. Prance and Belgium also presented demand!
for indemnity. The Venezuelan rrinister of Foreign Affairs insistsdl
that claimsof aliens should be made before the special claims com -
mission which had been established by decree of Nov. 22, 1892 for
the payment of all requistiions of the de jure government All
these claims were cognizable only by the high federal court. The
with
diplomatic represent a tires did not feel that they could accord the si
in as much as It meant tkat the Venezuelans would themselves inves-
tigate and settle all claims The establishment of an international
commission seemed to them the most advisable course
The Venezuelan government opposed this plan very vigorously,
1. KDIP 485 2. Moore V 4930 ff 3. 1892 Por Pel 54 4. KDIP 344
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so vigorously indeed, that the diploni; tic corps decided that some
sort of pressure should be brought to hear, and to this end the
Belgian charge drew up a memorandum which wan signed by all the
representatives of the inteeested powers. About this time the
Italian minister arrived on the scene. He refused to sign the
note on the ground that he was not sufficienty informed of the
facts to warrant his doing so. 1.
The Italian government questioned the various foreign offdes
as to their intentions, and at first seemed decidedly in favor of
conctrted action. On the advice of Arnut Magliano however the
claims of the Italian subject not being very considerable, Italy
finally decided to act for herself 2. Tht other nations were all
decidedly in favor of one or more int srnat ional commissions as thei:
claims were all very numerous, due however, to admin i strive delay ar
and chances in the diplomatic corps the e ntente waa never formed.
Meanwhile the Italian indemnities were settled upon the basis of
from 5 to 30 per cent of the amounts claimed payable in government
bonds to be issued for the creation of a special indemnity fund
for the civil war. The F ench claims were settled by a conventioi
signed Feb. 19, 1902 4. which provided for arbitration thereof.
This was superceded by the protocol of 1903.
1. II RDIP 345 2. ibid. 347 3. Subse uently the Italian govern-
ment issued a Green Booic pub. comprising papers which had been
communicated in secret. This led to the recall of the French and
Belgian ministers. France retaliated by doing the same. The
Italian government apologized 4. Senate Doc. 533; 59 Cong.
1st . sess
.
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Shortly after the incident which we have just relate* Italy
again became involved in a c ntroversy over the responsibility of a
state for the injuries resulting from civil war and pon this oc-
casionBrazil was the country against whom the claims were made.l.
At the end of the rtvolut on of 1893 the Brazilian; Congress enacted
a law on November 20, 1894, by which all claims of aliens were to be
settled by a Brazilian court of claims instead of through diplomat-
ic channels. It was claimed that this would be a more effective
means of securing justice. Nevertheless, the claims of Prance,
Spain, Germany, Austre ia-Hungar -
,
RuS 3ia, Belgium and Denmark
were set led through the regular diplomatic channels. 2.
By far the 77?ost numerous of the claims arising in Brazil were
thooe of Italy, but unfortunately for her cause the Green Book
which she had published relative to the Venezuelan claims and in
which she expressed kers«lf as disapproving the use of diplomatic
means was utilized by the Brazilian government as ammunition against
its author. Baron Blane in writing to the Italian minister to
Brazil attempted to equivocate and to define the Italian position.
•Diplomatic intervention, 1 wrote he, 'should not be exce sive.
Cases of injury ^suiting from acts in violation of internation-
al law, committed by agents or authorities of the government a-
gainst whom the claim is made are indeed different from injuries
which are of other origin; such as are occas oned by the opera-
tions of ordinary man, or the acts of revolutionists or male-
1. 4 RDIP 406 2. Saa Paigjta put a lump sum at disposa 1 of Italy.
Rio Grande appointed an invenst igatory commission. 3. This was a
distinct victory for Brazil which parliament should have taken ad-
vantage of
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factors in Municipal law. There is not doubt in the first case
that the stae should not be held responsible but in regard to the
seccr.d cases, them is Y/anting all rational b_aslB for governmental
responsibility, at least when the government or its agents hare
clearly not failed to carry out their duties in preventing the
possibility of the injury happening of which complaint is made... 1 ]
The list of Italian claims was presented March 11, 1H85 to the
Brazilian f;overnnent
. The latter however, repudiated all respon-
sibility for injuries resulting from acts of insurrectos, and all
cases of vis maior. 2 It t">en put forw rd and counter propositioi
which was rejected by the Italian government. After considerable
negotiations the Italian and Brazilian ministers signed two proto-
cols, one which provided for certain claims to be regulated by a
mixed local commission and the other protocol which submitted
the remaining question to the arbitration of the President of the
United States . 3
.
The Protocols were submitted tothe Brazifian congress and
axid an acrid discussion passed the first and second readings
Shortly after the second reading when popular excitement had reach
ed its height, a riot took place in Sao Paulo in the course of
which some 15 persons were killed and 50 wounded. In other cities
too there were anti-Italian manifestations.
These events produced a profound effect in Italy. The Pie-
monte leaving M. Martino as minister plenipotentiary was sent to
Brazil. All emigration to that country was forbidden and a flying
squadron of four cruisers was sent to Brazil. All settleme t
was finally brought about by certain mutual concessions. A lump
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sum of 4,000,000 fr. was granted to the settlement of all claims
not otherwise regulated. This was considerably below the sum origi-
nally demanded.
The negotiations in this whole dispute reflected little credit
upon Italian statesmanship. The most remarkable thing in the
affair was the fact that Italy did not demand reparat on for the
insult to her flag in Sao Paulo. In fact the result might be re-
garded as a distinct for Brazi ian diplomace, and would decidedly
have diminished the weight of foreign reclamation but for the
success of the Freeh claim for injuries sustained by a number of
its subjects during the course of the same insurrection.
Three French citizens domiciled in the country had bee murderec
and claims for reparation were made by the French government. In a
note of October 9, 1893 the Brazilian government replied that 'in
cases of internal troubles the Brazilian government does riot assume
responsibility and that it is not violation of individual rights
when by vis m^ior or in the legal excercise of public power it
guarante s the security of the state or commits acts • hich may be
injurious to individuals. The latter, whether aliens or nationals
haveno rirht whatever to an indemnity.
'This is the doctrine Y/hich has been given preference in the
eyes of -fhe leading publicists and in international practice.
'The government is therefore, not responsible for losses and
injuries to which the protesting parties may have been exposed.
In spite of this declaration by Brazil in 1895 the French
government received the sum of 900,000 fr by way of indemnity.
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We have treated these reclamation against Brazil at some
length, chiefly because or the fact that the years 1890-95 produced
some of the most important cares of responsibility of the whole
nineteenth century. We have already seen the results in the Aignes
Mortes affair, both in Italy and Prance, the Chile, the Venezuelan
ar.d Brazilian cases. There remains yet for us to examine the re-
clamation made against the United States in these years for mob
injuries
.
The South ""American cases when contrasted with each other
present some interesting points of difference and of similarity
In Chili we had a successful party of revolutionists freely ack-
nowledging its responsibility; in Brazil and Venezuela a fierce
repudiation of the right of foreign governments to claim indemni-
ties for ist nationals, on the one had by a triumphant de jure
government and on the other hand by the fortunate insurrectos.
In these cases Italy's policy left at first in the hands of un-
skilled diplomats, was one of unfortunate vacillation, which is
hardly to be compared with her successes in the Aignes Mortes affaii
and the lynching cases in the United States. In fact, it is diffi-
cult to reconcile Italy's actions in South America and her very
pronounced expression of opinion in the other instances. Prance, o
on the other hand had her traditional success in securing a large
indemnity for the number of her citizens and the same may be said
of the United States.
Inl901 the United States had occasion to make r< clamations
against Brazil for an outrage committed on an American Baptist
church. On the night of April 14 at Metteroy, a suburb of Rio de
Janeiro a mob attacked and sacked the Baptist mission church. The fi
furnishings books etc. were burned. The cause of the disturbance
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was supposed to be the result of an expose by an ex priest of his
former associates, a fact which aroused the catholics in the dis-
trict
.
The President of the Province ordered the mission to be
guarded and promised an examination of the claims and full redress.
The promises were carried out.
We turn finally to the intervention of the powers in Venezuela
in 1902 - 3, as a result of the refusal of that government to
recognize its responsibility for injuries sustained by aliens
during the course of the civil war of 1893-1901 and for its failure
to carry out other of itsinternat ional obligations. The case is
certainly one of the most celebrated of all the numerous South Amer-
ican disputes. The claims of three of these nations, Great Brit-
ain, Germany and Italy were of especial importance and the refusal
of Venezuela to recognize these demands led to the gravest results.
The reclamations of Gr^at Britain were based upon the seizure of
certain vessels belonging to British subjects, and for injuries sus
ta.ined by some of her nationals during the civil commotions. The
Italian claims were chielfy for injuries sustained in a similar
manner. The German claims were made the subject of a premefcpr ia
of the German Imperial Embassy to the United States government, on
December 11, 1901. It enumerated certain contract claims and
then continued:
'Through these wars - 1898-1900 many German merchants living
in Venezuela, and may German landowners have been seriously damaged
as partly compulsory loans have been extorted from them, partly
requistes of war which have been found in their possession as es-
pecially the cattle necessary for feeding of the troops nave been
taken from them without being paid for, partly their houses and
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grounds have been ransacked or devastated. The amount of these
damages comes to fully 2,000,000 bolivars. This amount is to be
divided between 3o claimants who are partly poor people. Several
of the damaged have lost nearly all their possessions and through
this their creditors who live in Germany have suffered likev.i e...
,
"Evidently the Venezuelan Government if ve judge it after its
behaviour in the present, is not willing to fulfill its engagements
in compensating these damages. After having first fixed a six-
monthly term during which the government refused to discuss any
claims or compensation, the Government issued in January last a
decree stating that a commission consisting solely of Venezuelan
officials should decide about the claims which the damaged would
have to bring to their knowledge during three months. The proceed-
ings as settled by this decree seem in three article not to be acc
eptable. First of all, that all the claims for damage which came
from time to time before the 23d. of May 1899 - that means before
the appointment of the present President of the Republic , Castro -
should not be considered, while , of course, the government of
Castro is, as all other governments responsible for
the deeds of
s predessors. Another article said that all diplomatic protestat-
be
ions against decisions of the commission should excluded and
only the appeal to the supreme Venezuelan court of justice should
be admitted. The members of this court are entirely dependent on t
the government and have frequently been simply dismissed by the
President. Finally the government wanted to pay for the claims
which should be recognized- by the commission only with bonds of a
newly to b2 emitted revolution debt, which would be, after the
experiences made up till the present without any value.
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'The behaviour of the Venezuelan government must therefore be
considered as a frivolous attempt to avoid its just obligations.
It is difficult to prophes:* what the future development in
South America will be. It is ossible that there will be an end
to the consitutionai
, the statutory provisions, and perhaps to
'concession' clauses of non-responsibility, but the recent Sal-
adorean lav/ of 190b leads us to believe that the treaties «.nd inter
national agreements of these countries will be the ground upon
w.:ich these theories of non- responsibility ana the repudiation oi
diplomatic intervention will maKe their last stand. It is i ot in-
probable that with the increasing resort to arbitration amongthese
states many of the former difficulties will be mo: e amicably ad-
justed. In fact this is the best solution to the problem thus far.
The Latin American states have founa that in monetary aisputes
the protection of the Monroe doctrine and the United States is not
to be relied upon, and they should therefore accept arbitration
as the most satisfactory solution of an embarrassing situation.
The European states have demonstrated that they, on their part,
intend to support the theory of responsibility and if they are
willing to accept arbitration, the future will be clear. But,
whatever the course may be which the Latin American states may fol-
low, the fact will remain that the theory of responsibility must
be recognized by them for it has become an integral part of
international law which states can hardly repudiate without re-
flecting on their international prestige.
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